


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Political Affairs

Political Affairs

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CONTENTS

27 July 1990

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Gumbaridze Report to 28th Georgian CP Congress [G.G. Gumbaridze; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 16 May 90]	1
Speeches From 28th Georgian CP Congress	11
Council of Ministers' Chairman Chitanava [N.A. Chitanava; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 17 May 90]	11
Abkhazian First Secretary Khishba [V.F. Khishba; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 17 May 90]	15
Komsomol First Secretary Baramidze [G.R. Baramidze; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 19 May 90]	17
Adzharian First Secretary Khakhva Speech at 28th Georgian CP Congress [T. S. Khakhva; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 18 May 90]	18
Gumbaridze Closing Speech to the 28th Georgian CP Congress [G. G. Gumbaridze; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 18 May 90]	20
Information Reports from Kazakh Supreme Soviet Session	22
24 April [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 25 Apr 90]	22
25 April [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 26 Apr 90]	24
26 April [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 Apr 90]	24
27 April [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 28 Apr 90]	25
Biographic Information on New Kazakh President Nazarbayev [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 25 Apr 90]	25
Nazarbayev Speaks on Presidency, Economic Reform, Independence [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 25 Apr 90]	25
Kazakh President Proclaims Extra Benefits for Invalids, Veterans [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 Apr 90]	32
Citizens' Congress Faults Latvian Government [M. Ziyeminsh; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3 Jul 90]	32
Latvian Agrarian Reform Legislation [I. Litvinova; IZVESTIYA, 4 Jul 90]	33
Godmanis on Latvia's Economic Agenda [I. Godmanis; BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA No 24, 25 Jun 90]	33
June Baltic Assembly Documents [BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA No 24, 25 Jun 90]	35
Future of Latvian Army Assessed [J. Baskers; BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA No 24, 25 Jun 90]	36
Readers on 'Latvia for Latvians' Debate [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 6 Jun 90]	37
Latvian Legislature 'Disorganized' [E. Lapidus; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 7 Jun 90]	39
Suspension of Latvian Declaration Urged [A. Rubiks; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 8 Jun 90]	40
Latvian Communist Party Appeal to Economic Leaders [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 9 Jun 90]	41
Exodus from Latvian Communist Party Ranks [V. Varnas; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 9 Jun 90]	42
Tasks for Party Restructuring in Moldavia Outlined [V. Stati; SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 4 May 90]	44
Moldavian Supreme Soviet Session Report [E. Kondratov; NEDELYA No 20, 14-20 May 90]	46

NATIONALITY ISSUES

Language Proficiency Requirements for Moldavian Workers [SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 12 May 90]	50
--	----

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Fluctuations in Population Growth Analyzed [S. Bruk; SOYUZ No 24, Jun 90]	51
Survey of All-Union Census Figures on Marriage [M. Tolts; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 20, 19 May 90]	53
1989 All-Union Census Reports Marriage Statistics [M. Tolts; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 27, 7 Jul 90]	54
1989 Armenian Census Results	55
Tabulated Population Figures [KOMMUNIST, 24 May 90]	55
Official Interviewed on Census [L.M. Davtyan; KOMMUNIST, 20 May 90]	62
1989 Population Census Results	65
Moldavian All-Union Census Report [L. Grigoryev; KOMMUNIST MOLDAVII No 5, May 90]	65

Azerbaijan All-Union Census Report [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 25 May 90]	66
Uzbek 1989 All-Union Census Results [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 15 June 90]	71
Head of European, Siberian Spiritual Administration on Muslim Role [LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No 10, 9 Mar 90]	77
Decree on Muslim Pilgrimage Published [I. Karimov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 3 Jun 90]	79
First Torah Ceremony Held in Moscow Since WWII [L. Aleynik, M. Lebedeva; IZVESTIYA, 27 May 90]	79

Gumbaridze Report to 28th Georgian CP Congress

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16 May 90 pp 1-3

[Political Report by G. G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, to the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia on 15 May, 1990: "On the Progress of Perestroyka, the Tasks of Republic Party Organizations, and the Status of the Communist Party of Georgia"]

[Text] Comrades!

The 28th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia has convened under conditions that are exceptionally difficult, momentous, and one might even say crucial; a time when the political, economic, and social character of our society is changing radically, together with traditional attitudes and opinions; a time when an entirely new phase is commencing in the life of Georgia and our people, including all national and ethnic groups residing in our republic. This process of change naturally lends to our congress today a distinctive and extraordinary historical significance. The decisions it is called upon to make will determine the long-range as well as short-range perspective and eventual destiny not only of the Georgian Communist Party but, what is most important, the future democratic, sovereign and renewed republic of Georgia.

In the presence of these unusually complex, difficult, and multi-faceted tasks, it is incumbent upon those of us attending this congress to be mindful of our responsibility; to reveal depth as well as breadth of mind in our deliberations, wisdom as well as perspicacity, and a capacity to represent the entire spectrum of interests in our pluralistic and conflict-beset society. This requires of each deputy firmness of character, a truly civic outlook, and the capacity to understand one another. It is of the utmost importance to check each word, each decision, so as to take only correct, error-free steps.

The issue before us is a basic one, simple and unambiguous. It is our duty to define our collective will. What is Georgia to be like tomorrow? What kind of political, economic, social, and moral heritage are we to leave in place for future generations? Can the Communist Party—can the communists of this republic—vigorously exploit their full potential so as to radically revise their activities and program objectives and bring them into line with the new objective political and social realities? Can they continue to be the creative and innovative force that is called upon to transform society, truly reflecting the will of the people? Today it is the one political party in Georgia that is capable of rallying around its platform all groups and segments of our population—our working class and peasantry, our intelligentsia, and youth—to unite the whole of our society and lead it towards a common goal. It is the one party with program objectives based on universal human values and ideals of humanism, democracy, national and

social freedom and justice, which will employ civilized methods to struggle for a lawful, sovereign, and democratic Georgia, and which will provide it a worthy place in the family of peoples of the world.

The Georgian Communist Party is currently the most experienced, the most organized in terms of both structure and ideology, and the most massive political force in the republic. It numbers in its ranks 400,000 people, representing an immense share of the republic's intellectual and productive potential. Naturally, in view of the process of social polarization, it incurs a special responsibility before the people, the nation, and society. We are duty-bound to protect and augment this enormous potential for material, moral, and cultural well-being and to place it at the service of radically improving the party, the society, and the entire republic.

The Central Committee will submit for the consideration of this congress a comprehensive program for the radical renewal of the Georgian Communist Party ideologically, structurally, and organizationally. It is the duty of this congress to devise thoroughly considered political formulas, strategy, and tactics, and make decisions best suited to respond to vitally important interests in the socio-political, socio-economic, cultural and national development of the republic. At the same time, political ambitions and illusions, along with sentiments of momentary convenience, must not be allowed to influence us. There is no other choice: Our policy must be consistently realistic and constructive, taking into account the laws and objective course of history.

It is essential to devise principles that will ensure the integrity of the party on the basis of genuine pluralism with a proper balance of social interests, that will weld together and unify its ranks, that will make it possible to avoid divisiveness and a split arising from causal factors or reasons beyond its control. Such an event would be a grievous blow to perestroyka, democratization, and the integrity of the republic.

The truth is that our congress did not commence today. For all practical purposes it has been going on for an entire month. The Central Committee has held 20 meetings in just the last 10 days. Taking part in them have been bureau members and secretaries, senior officials of the Georgian CP Central Committee apparatus, and party activists, as well as representatives of the peasantry and working class, the scientific and creative intelligentsia, and the public at large. Extremely keen and substantive discussions took place, providing for an exchange of views in which almost 300 delegates to the congress expressed their thoughts and proposals. No one was restricted by the rules, and all had an opportunity to express their views and opinions freely and fully. Possibly, this evaluation of the meetings and work occurring before the congress began may seem a bit exaggerated. However, I should like to emphasize—I know that a majority of the representatives of our party activists share this opinion—how important it is for us today to hold constructive discussions and dialogues, and to have

a free exchange of ideas, so that we may better ascertain views and delineate problems posed by complex political and social processes, while jointly searching for the proper political approach to solve the problems facing the republic Communist Party and the society as a whole.

For more than a year the republic Communist Party has been operating under unusual and unfamiliar conditions. Not only party members but the whole of society has been extremely active politically. It is obvious therefore that the traditional procedures for conducting the congress cannot respond to the dynamics of social life or serve as models for political action.

It should also be emphasized that we have special hopes for the congress. In an atmosphere of close party cooperation and good will, it will be our task to exchange views with one another as we search for constructive approaches, points of contact between alternative opinions, and opportunities for their mutual enrichment. Only in this way will we succeed in making thoroughly considered and properly weighed decisions, reflecting the common concerns of the delegates and the communists of Georgia. It is incumbent upon this congress to analyze current political and social processes in the republic, to evaluate impartially and determine correctly our tasks for the future, and to work out a reliable program of strategy and tactics.

I

Democratization and glasnost, pluralism with what amounts to a multi-party system, and, most important, a markedly different approach with respect to national development have substantially altered the political image of the Communist Party of Georgia and brought about a radical renewal of its functions, methods, and style of operation. From this standpoint it is possible to divide the reporting period with unusual precision into two distinct stages.

The April (1985) CPSU Plenum opened up a broad path for perestroika and democratization within the party and the country at large. Under its banner, it might be supposed, the 27th Georgian CP Congress of January 1986 would be conducted. The developmental dynamics of the political and social situation clearly indicated that the time had come to awaken national and social self-consciousness. Under these conditions the unresolved state of many social, political, and national problems acquired a special urgency. Meanwhile, the necessity for launching an immediate search for a way to resolve political conflicts as they arose and to establish a constructive dialogue between the party and society was becoming increasingly apparent. The first disturbing symptoms of the fact that the methods and style of the political leadership were not in accord with the new realities first made themselves known in May, and again in November, 1988. Many comrades reacted to the public meetings, acts of protest, and other disturbances that occurred during public discussion of proposed

changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution in an extremely one-sided and tendentious way. Among them were not a few who interpreted these occurrences as acts of extremism and nationalism. A considerable number of party leaders failed to recognize in these acts public dissatisfaction with the slackened pace of perestroika in the republic. The desire on their part to suppress meetings and demonstrations, and so impose a monopoly over criticism, self-criticism, and the right to choose the direction of democracy was completely unjustified on the face of it.

There were frequent attempts to realize "instant" perestroika by means of arbitrary bureaucratic and totalitarian tactics. Meanwhile, pressures on any sort of unsanctioned expression of thoughts or feelings kept mounting, while official policy and opinions continued to withdraw from the expectations of democratically shaped public opinion.

Obviously, many steps were taken too late under the influence of circumstances that had become unduly dangerous, and this tardiness did not contribute to the authority of the Communist Party. I am mindful of discussing the issue of building the Trans-Caucasus Railway; public proposals to move a firing range for training away from the David Garedzha Monastery; and the restoration of certain dates and events to our history, together with names of some public figures and writers, which for a long time had been consigned to oblivion.

Historical dates do not simply disappear at anyone's whim. In attempting to erase them from the memory of the people, we deprive ourselves and future generations of the means of moral and cultural support, and we destroy the legacy of historically formed political orientation—a millennium of traditional concepts of government that succeeding generations of Georgians devoted their political and martial resources to defend.

The political leadership of the party had no desire to retire from its political arsenal obsolete stereotypes, thereby prompting people to resort to extreme forms of behavior, which arose on a wave of emotional response. Political initiative was held in abeyance as the confrontation increased and the situation became exacerbated until it reached a critical point.

The 14th Plenum of the Georgian CP Central Committee, following an in-depth analysis, came to the conclusion that the very methods and style of political leadership in the republic brought about the factors that ultimately led to the use of repressive measures in attempting to resolve problems.

The tragedy of 9 April revealed the political crisis that had culminated in the republic, which extended the limits of our awareness and thought, substantially altering our customary preconceptions and stereotypes. All this occurred, however, at the expense of enormous ethical trials and losses.

The Georgian delegation to the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies clearly expressed the situation of our people. The tragedy that occurred in Tbilisi could have been and should have been avoided. Its dreadful consequences are without justification of any kind. The measures taken to interrupt the meeting in front of Government House were not appropriate to the occasion and exceeded all permissible bounds, precipitating a shameful clash with our own people.

The extremist slogans and appeals and excessive emotional conflicts that manifested themselves at this meeting represented more than anything else a response to the moral apathy that had been instilled over the years; a response to the notorious theory of the merging and dying out of ethnic groups with the blending of language and culture; and to demagogic slogans and stereotypes that had led the country into a political and economic impasse, arousing a sense of civil and national defenselessness.

The acts of specific persons and groups connected to the events in Tbilisi have already been assessed by the GSSR Supreme Soviet and by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, which categorically condemned the utterly unjustified acts of violence committed against peaceful citizens and fellow Georgians. At the same time, the fundamental policy approach taken by the deputies and the Georgian CP Central Committee played a substantial role in what happened. We have noted previously on more than one occasion, including the Central Committee Plenum, that it is our solemn duty to study exhaustively and extract the tragic lesson to be learned. It is quite impossible to converse with the people under cover of tanks and armored personnel carriers. It is necessary to remain in contact with all segments of society, including those inclined to extreme radicalism. I am speaking of continuous, constructive dialogue and active cooperation with all political and social movements. We must achieve a high level of discipline and political responsibility, encompassing the entire range of economic, social, and national problems. In particular, a solution to the mounting problems of nationality must become one of the priority tasks of the Georgian Communist Party.

It is an indisputable fact that against the background of a tragic legacy in nationality policy, serious dislocations occurred, especially in the course of the cult of personality and during the period of stagnation, and it was only to be expected that certain conditions should arise in inter-ethnic relations within the autonomous areas and various other regions of Georgia. Coming on top of these, however, were realities of the present day. I am referring, in particular, to forces in our society that are averse to overcoming difficulties as they arise in inter-ethnic relations. Civic peace and harmony among peoples of various nationalities, their consolidation and unity, threaten such forces with the loss of privileges and a comfortable existence. To destabilize the situation they

resort to the most simple expedient—they play upon national sensibilities, inflame separatist sentiments, and promote extremism.

In view of the complexity of the entire situation, it is not coincidental that the republic's political leadership felt constrained to approve extremist tactics and announce a special policy, in a moment of hypocritical expediency, when democratic principles and the means of reaching a political solution to problems were no longer operable. The republic party organizations failed to meet challenges that may prove to have far-reaching consequences.

II

What, essentially, are the political programs, goals, and objectives of the Georgian Communist Party? What are the views of the party in the area of national development? What have we achieved? And what do we intend to achieve tomorrow and the day after tomorrow? On the responses to these questions and the tangible accomplishments that follow will depend to a large extent the fate of the party and the long-term future of Georgia. In this context we must appraise what has been accomplished during the reporting period and both short-range and long-range plans for the future.

The policy design of the Georgian Communist Party has been outlined in the "Conceptual Scheme for National Development," which was drafted by the Central Committee with the participation of specialists, scholars, the public, and the broad masses of working people. It is universally recognized as a unique document in the annals of the Communist Party of Georgia, and after consideration and discussion by all the people it was formally approved by the Central Committee Plenum. This document nevertheless remains open for the incorporation of new insights. We have already received a number of pertinent proposals, including some interesting ideas submitted by the party organization of the city of Kutaisi.

It is noteworthy that the initial point of the Conceptual Scheme is as follows: The aspiration for national freedom and independence constitutes a sacred right and the highest moral duty of every civilized people. In pursuit of its program objectives, the Communist Party of Georgia therefore recognizes the attainment of Georgia's sovereignty and statehood as the main road leading to a democratic society.

What are the preconditions of such an approach?

First, the Communist Party is committed to truly expressing the will of the people, which is bound up with the national and social regeneration of Georgia and the incorporation of humanitarian ideals of statecraft.

Second, as history demonstrates, there is no such thing as social justice, and there can be no such thing, without national justice. The opposition of class interests to national interests, which initially fostered abstract

notions of world revolution, eventually led to the establishment of a unitary totalitarian state, accompanied by the alienation of people from national interests and therefore from the interests of society as a whole.

Third, the introduction of methods of administration by command from above in the exercise of national policy, together with corresponding hierarchical structures in management and government operations, fostered the psychological growth of a tendency that was to prove extremely dangerous for society—a tendency to depend on foreign aid, which brought about many serious aberrations in policy and management, leading to a crisis in the economic conditions.

The Communist Party of Georgia is faithful to the principle of continuity. It selects from the past everything that is rational and useful and builds upon positive experience. At the same time, it makes no attempt whatever to shift from itself the onus of mistakes and deviations in the past that have resulted in tragedy for our party and our people. The party demonstrates this by its practical endeavors to restore the complete truth about people and events of the past by evaluating them fairly and objectively, and by condemning once and for all political adventurism in all its forms. The time has come to call things by their proper names.

It should be said that the situation as it developed in the republic at the time of its formation did not have the support of all communists. This became particularly clear in the process of discussing the prospective national territorial structure of the country on the eve of forming the USSR. The Georgian communists stood staunchly opposed to the Stalinist idea of "autonomization" (*avtonomizatsiya*), while defending the democratic model of federation as a union of independent states, which Lenin supported.

We are indebted to these communists in many ways for Article 72 of the USSR Constitution, which guarantees the union republics the right of secession from the Soviet Union, and which reveals a broad range of safeguards to protect the sovereignty of Georgia and the other republics. Restoring historical truth means that the names of Budu Mdivani, Sergo Kavtaradze, Mikhail Okudzhav and other Georgian communists, who were accused of "national deviationism" and later subjected to unjust repression, should be included among those of our leaders. Unfortunately, the political ambitions of a part of the party's top leadership gained the upper hand and thereafter became snugly ensconced as role models for monolithic totalitarian government.

In accordance with the Conceptual Scheme for National Development, the GSSR Supreme Soviet gave a fair and objective appraisal of the violation of the treaty between Soviet Russia and Georgia of 7 May 1920 and declared a whole series of documents in the period that followed to be invalid.

At the same time we must be realists. It would be altogether wrong as well as mistaken to try to deny

everything and so reduce it to nothing. No one has a right to cast into oblivion the lives of whole generations of those who spared no efforts on behalf of the people's welfare, and who endured the bloodiest war in the entire history of mankind.

We need an objective analysis and legal assessment of the mistakes and deviations so that we may take them into consideration in the process of developing new standards and principles for founding a lawful state.

With this in mind the Communist Party of Georgia is today setting itself the task of becoming a truly democratic force capable of being at the head of the leading segment of our society. It is obvious, and indisputable, that this is a doubly difficult task for the party in power.

In all its activities throughout the last year the Communist Party has demonstrated that it is open to dialogue and prepared for political collaboration. It has done a good deal of strenuous if unobtrusive work to avoid the emergence of uncontrolled events during mass demonstrations and other acts carried out by various political and social movements. This has made it possible to forestall to a considerable extent serious complications and destabilizing conditions, especially in Tbilisi and some other major industrial centers.

Moreover, we feel strongly that it is necessary to diversify and enrich the dialogue with the various social movements so as to make it more constructive. This dialogue ought to be carried on not only when tense situations arise but on a regular basis, touching upon all key issues that together determine the strategic objectives of our development. We have repeatedly endorsed this view in both words and deeds.

It is precisely for this reason that the Communist Party of Georgia stands in support of political pluralism, renouncing any claim to political monopoly or diktat in all spheres of activity. In affirming its willingness to operate under a multi-party system, the republic Communist Party, acting with due regard for the opinions of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, most of our party committee secretaries, and our intelligentsia, as well as the public at large, has exercised its right of legislative initiative to submit for the consideration of the GSSR Supreme Soviet issues of paramount importance pertaining to the leading role of the Communist Party, proposing amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution and a postponement of elections to the GSSR Supreme Soviet to October and November. These proposals are made with the aim of creating equitable conditions for all concerned in which to conduct a dialogue or cooperative efforts.

In taking such steps we are acting, of course, in the interest of the whole of society. The Communist Party is against putting undue pressure on the individual, it is against tactics of ideological terror, and it condemns such occurrences no matter who may be responsible for them.

Moreover, in future, the Communist Party will do all in its power to represent the interests of the population as a whole and each citizen of Georgia. It will struggle unrelentingly for the unity and national development of Georgia. It will foster a flexible, full-blooded national economy, together with a fair resolution of demographic problems and a restoration of the environment to its normal condition.

At the same time, in observance of the principles of democratic conduct, it strongly advocates increasing responsibility and strengthening discipline. It regards as essential compliance with constitutional and legal norms will all issues and problems settled exclusively by parliamentary means. Pursuant to this policy, it declares the parliamentary process to be the basic means for realizing its political program together with vigorous participation in the elections for the GSSR Supreme Soviet.

The Communist Party of Georgia has set forth the principles it advocates for recasting its political positions, along with its feelings about the processes that have been taking place in the republic, in the Conceptual Scheme for National Development as well as in January and March 1990 plenums of the Central Committee. The dynamics of public life and social relations, however, compel us to revise our judgments each day. Such is the law-governed character of modern life.

Presumably, all this should be taken into consideration in the preparation and approval of the final policy documents of the congress.

III

What courses of action are available to us to attain genuine political and economic sovereignty in the republic? What problems remain to be resolved before this can come about?

Perestroika and dogma are incompatible. Moreover, political prudence and perspicacity require that objective factors and circumstances be taken into consideration when pursuing such goals. Any sort of self-indulgence in hare-brained schemes should be excluded. When it comes to matters of tactics, there are substantial differences of opinion among some members of the Communist Party as well as between the various social and political movements.

Our lives as well as our experience with political activity in the recent past confirm the necessity of refraining, insofar as possible, from entertaining illusions and from making snap judgments in a hurry. Under the political circumstances that have developed, and under the actual social and economic conditions of our lives and our work, it must be acknowledged that the way to genuine sovereignty is fraught with difficulty and can only be achieved in successive stages—not at a single stroke.

Thus we cannot fail to take into consideration the existing situation in the country. We must take precautions so that our actions do not lead to a needless

confrontation and encourage anti-democratic forces in the republic or beyond its borders, forces which even without provocation will seize upon any means to thwart and turn back the progress of perestroika. The independence of Georgia will only acquire a truly human and humanitarian value if it is bound up with the formation of a lawful, civilized democratic society. We have no right to permit a repetition of certain tragic episodes in our own history.

We cannot remove ourselves from processes taking place in Europe, in countries of the Middle East, and throughout the world. We must be mindful of the lessons of our history and the geopolitical situation. We have never been, nor can we be today, isolated from what is going on in the rest of the world—from international trends and developments.

On the political plane, independence acquires meaning only in the event that it is secured in fact as well as in terms of the law. As I have already mentioned, purposeful legislative action has already been initiated by our deputies, social leaders, jurists, economists, and experts of other kinds, among whom are members of the government as well as of the Central Committee, who have been engaged in devising legal guidelines for conducting a review of the Union Treaty and for making other decisions. This work is proceeding in a competent manner and should continue on this course.

We have 25 pieces of proposed legislation now in the process of being worked out, including draft laws on property ownership, land and land use, rent and rental contracts, the banking system and money circulation (including republic currency), local industry and self-government, culture and the protection of social rights, public education, security, and many other things. They will all be submitted in the very near future for public discussion.

It should be noted that the President of the USSR and General Secretary of the Communist Party, M. S. Gorbachev, when I have met with him, has always shown interest in and support for the positive processes occurring in Georgia and for the achievement of genuine and full sovereignty. This, in his view, will come into being through the decentralization of all sectors of public life, along with a differentiated approach with respect to each republic, giving maximum consideration to distinctive historical as well as to political, social, and economic factors.

Among the prerequisite general conditions for any genuinely sovereign state are those of a flexible yet controlled economy and one that is at once structurally sound, highly efficient, and independent.

It should be stated outright that the economy of the republic is at present in a critical condition. The slowdown in the growth rate of key economic indicators, which was noted at the beginning of the 12th Five-Year Plan, was aggravated by unforeseen structural dislocations and the spontaneous outbreak of events which

further complicated the situation. And at the very threshold of conversion to free-market conditions, overall growth rates fell off sharply. Thus after four years of the Five-Year Plan the national income had grown no more than 0.4 percent instead of the 19.2 percent projected for the plan. There was a shortfall of about four billion rubles in the national income. The growth rate of industrial production came in all to 8.8 percent as compared with 18.8 percent anticipated for the four-year period. Similar trends were observable in all sectors of the country's economy as a whole.

The qualitative indicators of economic growth have been getting worse as well. Labor productivity, instead of rising 16.4 percent as projected, actually declined by 0.1 percent. Labor and production discipline became extremely slack.

In sum, the breakup of the traditional structure and the conversion from a controlled economy to a free-market economy has been accompanied by immense losses. And this is exacerbating social tensions in the society. Additionally, the national economy has suffered severe losses because of strikes and other acts of protest.

In the opinion of many management organizations, radical economic reform in the republic has already been completed. Yet the results expected are not observable. Why? In the first place, the reform generally throughout the country has been spinning its wheels, and we are a part of the economy as a whole. In the second place, the actual reform turned out to be a radical reform in name only since all the overall indicators for the Five-Year Plan were determined and decided upon in advance. In the third place, the economy turned out to be unprepared for the introduction of elements of a free-market economy, and the new organizational forms were introduced in a slack manner. As a result, we failed to accomplish the main thing—to bring the producer any closer to ownership of the means of production.

It is the view of the Communist Party that the way to restore the economic situation in the republic lies in the creation of a national economy. What do we mean by this term? A national economy is a system of relations of a sovereign state that is structurally and organizationally interrelated so as to make possible the independent satisfaction of the bulk of the basic needs of the population as it functions in the best interests of national development.

Self-sufficiency in the production of staple food production, naturally with due allowance for traditional economic ties, is of vital importance in achieving full independence. It is therefore justified to examine carefully once again the comparative level of development in the various branches of agriculture and to bring to a halt the monopolistic practice of cultivating certain crops exclusively, which is detrimental to the land and ultimately to the interests of the people.

One of the key factors of the national economy is its structural design and effective manageability. At various

locations in the republic are a number of enterprises of union subordination, which produce a significant volume of industrial products and help to determine its industrial character. For practical purposes, however, they do not lend themselves in this period to proper management on a regional or even arepublic-wide scale.

It is becoming extremely important to increase the production of mass consumption food and non-food products, which currently make up 60 percent of the total volume of industrial output.

In addition to methods already approved, cooperation with foreign firms may open up broad prospects for the establishment of joint enterprises when they offer unconditionally a priority to the national interests of Georgia. This kind of cooperation could prove to be one of the most effective ways of acquiring advanced technology and of meeting world standards in as short a time as possible.

The degree of authority of the state and its peoples, and its ability to accelerate social and economic progress, as world experience shows, is determined more than anything else by the level of material prosperity, which is a product of their labor, energy and strength of mind, including the most advanced contributions of science and technology. It is of the utmost importance to extend the international cooperation of Georgia.

The adoption and mastery of modern technology is vitally important for the Georgian economy. The costly expedient of relying on an inexhaustible supply of raw materials, which is characteristic of the Soviet economy as a whole, was never suited to the particular circumstances of Georgia with its limited supply of mineral resources. This system simply served to bind our economy tightly to the all-Union raw materials base, thereby turning it into an appendage of a single national economic complex.

Today this system confronts us with the most serious kind of problems, especially in the field of light industry where there is a severe shortage of facilities and labor resources.

We are going to have to radically overhaul the entire economic mechanism of productive relations. On the basis of its program for economic transformation, the Georgian Communist Party has established the principle of freedom together with the greatest variety in forms of property ownership. It is our firm conviction that in this area, too, there must be pluralistic tendencies and approaches to self-regulation.

The Communist Party advocates every kind of property ownership on earth. Here, however, we must exercise a certain caution. Many traditional agricultural practices were abandoned in the course of the past decades. It is therefore necessary to study and analyze the experience of our agricultural traditions and revive them with due

regard for the broad diversity of natural climatic conditions and the subsistence needs of the people, bearing in mind that the land is our national treasure.

It is quite impossible to ignore the fact that the transition to free-market relations will substantially change the situation in the social sphere and will be accompanied by tendencies which will require state regulation. Above all, this poses an employment problem, affecting management personnel as well as white-collar and blue-collar workers. It is necessary to preclude the possibility of unemployment. The Georgian Communist Party believes that any return to such an undesirable social manifestation would mean a step backward in utter disregard of the undoubted achievements of our society.

Thus when we speak of the full sovereignty of the republic, it is necessary to think in the first place of its actual independence, the basis of which must be the achievement of economic independence.

We have no right to be in a hurry, to fail to look ahead, or to sacrifice the vital interests of the people. At one of the election meetings it was correctly said that economic independence means that others will be relying on us. Clearly, this should be our ultimate objective.

One of the most significant factors for the entrance of the republic into the international arena is the knowledge level among the people and the competence of the skilled workers. The upgrading of skills constitutes the most appropriate and acceptable way for Georgia to attain full independence.

The key role in this respect is assigned to public education. There is no point in saving on the use of foreign exchange for instruction of young people in leading centers abroad or for retraining young specialists in technologically advanced countries. This investment in education constitutes the most prudent and useful of programs, promising major returns in the future.

At the same time, it we should focus on the material base, teaching resources, and potential for scholarship of secondary schools for the purpose of developing major centers for training cadres of highly qualified workers. It is necessary to bring the structure of republic secondary schools into proper correspondence with the needs of our society and the particular requirements of the Georgian economy.

The national culture is our great and priceless legacy. The Communist Party stands for a fundamental renewal of its relations with the leaders of science and culture. It is for according them full freedom of creativity and self-expression; it is against their absorption into a socialistic monoculture. The Central Committee maintains that under conditions of pluralism and a multi-party system, any kind of attempts at ideological interference into scholarly or artistic activity or pressure exerted against such activity must be ruled out.

IV

One of the principal issues of concern not only to the delegates of this conference, and not only to our 400,000-strong party membership, but to the entire society, is the qualitative renewal of the Georgian Communist Party, its fundamental restructuring, and its place and role within the dynamic development of social life.

For this purpose we need first of all an organizational, structural, and ideological renovation, a moral revival, and a self-cleansing process. Only through this process can the party become the unifying nucleus of the society.

The tragic mistakes and miscalculations that were committed in our recent history as in the past must not be allowed to besmirch the reputation of all communists or the Communist Party as a whole. These errors consist entirely of crude distortions of party policy guidelines. And the tragic mistakes of recent years represent departures from the principles of perestroika and democratization.

In summary, we may state categorically—and the pre-congress period supports this conclusion—that despite the difficulties of the situation, the Communist Party has sufficient experience and power to dispense with the artificial unitary structure of government and by adapting to the structure of a democratic society to stabilize its authority by political means.

The discussions taking place both within the Communist Party and with the other political and social movements represent one of the most important features marking the second stage of the reporting period. By drawing upon the wealth of the people's historical experience in the building of the state and the nation and its central-old ideals, the Communist Party of Georgia succeeded to a considerable extent in consolidating the forces promoting a healthy society and in working out the general guidelines contained in the Conceptual Scheme for National Development.

Nevertheless, we continue to have many shortcomings, deficiencies, and contradictions within the party as well as within ourselves, and it is only natural that we should be engaged in the process of renovation and reappraisal of obsolete stereotypes. For this very reason it is essential that we do not permit a split to occur and that we maintain full unity within party ranks.

It should be borne in mind that today no one doubts that with respect to national self-determination, the Georgian Communist Party will carry out and indeed is already in the process of carrying out self-determination. These principles provide an entirely new basis for allying it with the healthy social and national movements emerging in Georgia. They constitute the theoretical and practical principles with which the Georgian Communist Party enters upon a new stage in its development—the era of political pluralism and the multi-party system.

By no means all communists, including the leaders, have been successful in ascertaining the role of the party under the new and unusual political conditions or in understanding and applying in actions rather than words the essential features of the new democratic approach to things. We have encouraged and will continue to encourage the active participation of communists and to expand opportunities for them to express their views and opinions and to exercise their will. This greater degree of openness will enable us to perceive more clearly the feelings of party organizations, to check decisions more carefully, and to be increasingly self-critical. We take seriously every observation and constructive criticism, paying careful attention to them and taking them into consideration in our work, and we will continue to do so.

At the same time, mention must be made of certain critical observations, reproaching us, for example, on the grounds that the influence of the Georgian Communist Party has not been sufficiently forceful and persistent. But, as you know, the whole point of the political reforms has been to do away with shamelessly imposing one's wishes and will on everyone else and to suspend the system of administration by official fiat, which has been condemned by our society, and to advance our policies by purely political methods.

We also cannot agree with the allegation that we are yielding the initiative to other political factions, even in the case of intra-party matters. This is untrue if only for the reason that we do not yield—rather, we encourage—such initiative on the part of every citizen as we strive to extend genuine pluralism and promote dialogue by taking into consideration the positive views of other social and political movements. And we see nothing to be condemned in doing so!

A political initiative of immense importance has been introduced by the presence of this very style, raising our society to a new level of democratic thinking. Opposition by confrontation is at this point entirely out of place. We know very well to what consequences confrontation can lead.

With regard to the heightened interest of the population in internal party matters, including the interest shown in party cadre policy, this is evidence of the fact that people today, as in the past, associate the solution of sensitive issues with the party, recognizing it as an influential and authoritative force. They are not indifferent to who will be in the party leadership, and we have no right to disappoint their hopes.

And, of course, there are no grounds whatever for the attempts made to blame the Communist Party and its Central Committee for ignoring national problems, claiming that the party plays a third-string role in the national and social movements. Has not the Communist Party of Georgia worked out a well-structured and realistic Conceptual Scheme for National Development? Has not the party helped to make a fair and objective appraisal of the facts and events of our history on the

basis of which to establish the legal basis for the sovereignty and independence of Georgia? Evidence of this is to be found in the policy documents distributed today, and these are in the hands of the delegates.

Finally, as previously, attempts are being made to demand of the Central Committee and its bureau the resolution of problems and issues which for the most part are the responsibility of others. As previously, we are being called upon to fulfill functions that the party is relieving itself of and will continue to relieve itself of in the future. This is one of the fundamental requirements of perestroika. Today as never before it is required of each of us that we carry out our own obligations and answer for the role we perform in the present state of affairs. This applies particularly to the role of the law enforcement agencies.

With respect to deficiencies in the performance of the bureau, of which there are many, we make no attempt to hide them, but are instead trying to correct them, taking into account the prevailing views of the communists.

Fruitful work continues to be accomplished by the republic Supreme Soviet and the commissions operating under it, carrying out legislative work on such vital issues as the status of a republic citizen, the application of Union laws in Georgia, the regulation of migration patterns, and calls for compulsory military service for the establishment of military units in Georgia.

In view of the multinational composition of the population, the republic government has adopted a new and non-standard approach to resolving social and political problems, and this policy is deserving of universal support.

The renewed Communist Party is called upon to raise international relations to an entirely new level, adapting traditions fashioned by our people over the centuries and reflecting their way of life with due regard for the new realities.

A subject of particular concern to the Communist Party of Georgia in the future as well as now will be encouraging all available means of developing the national culture. A shining example of this concern is promoting passage of the state's program for the development of Georgian language, history, and culture, together with the state program for the development of the Abkhaz language. Important measures have also been worked out for the development of the Ossete language as well as the languages and cultures of other peoples living in Georgia. This reflects a basic tenet of our policy. As the sovereignty of Georgia acquires strength, the creative and cultural potential of each nationality and ethnic group will be broadened.

The coercive pressures of arbitrary administrative tactics and the usurpations of rights and freedoms had a wholly negative effect on all social institutions, cultures,

and peoples. Nor were the economic, social, and political spheres and, of course, the field of international relations free from their influence.

The in-depth development of democratic processes and the restoration of the sovereignty of the Communist Party of Georgia is directly bound up with the problems of the rights and freedoms of the individual in society. Conditions must be developed so that people residing in the republic of every nationality can take full part in the common creative endeavor. The centuries-old historical experience of the Georgian state bears witness that the people here have always lived side by side in peace and friendship, and by doing so have made a major contribution to the struggle for national independence and to the betterment of life throughout the country.

The Communist Party believes that no inter-ethnic problems exist in Georgia that cannot be resolved on the basis of dialogue, mutual respect, and mutual understanding—without external interference. This is true of the languages and cultures of the autonomous areas and regions as it is of social and economic development. For the resolution of problems, however, not only spontaneous public meetings are needed but specialists, organized power, and public institutions, as well as competence and objectivity, leaving no room for doubt and, of course, taking into account existing realities.

A precondition of paramount importance for our making progress is achieving a consensus on a Union scale as well as on a republic scale.

We believe that today, as never before, we are obligated to demonstrate a special attitude, a special concern, for party cadres and for each and every communist.

It should be acknowledged that in this respect we have been extremely slack and have applied ourselves only in recent months. A stepped-up effort is needed for a number of objective reasons. Today each communist is in need of material support, as are the secretaries of party organizations, city and rayon party committees, and even the secretaries of the Central Committee.

Recent meetings with labor collectives, party committees, and party organization secretaries, which have been frank in analyzing the social and political processes taking place in the republic, have convinced me that our party ranks are heterogeneous.

The realities of the present situation clearly shows who has entered the party and for what reasons; what kind of motives, convictions, and views a member holds with regard to the present and the future. It shows, too, how personal ambitions and careerist striving can change a person, more often than not suppressing and reducing a person's sense of selfhood. Such people the party can do without—our force is measured in terms of quality.

The complex social and political events taking place in our republic, as in the rest of the country, with the

weakening of the usual and traditional amount of attention paid by the Central Committee and other party committees, has confused to a certain extent some of the communists, including certain officials of the party apparatus. We can and must, of course, support these people by once again explaining the views, strategy, role, functions, and tasks of the party under the new conditions. To a certain degree our present congress serves this purpose.

A majority of the communists, however, continue to firmly adhere to their former civic viewpoints. They remain uninfluenced by political opportunism or the appeals of former party comrades to follow their examples, untouched either by our shortcomings or by the difficulties posed by our social and economic situation.

These are the finest representatives of our intelligentsia, our youth, and our peasant and working classes. They are stalwart, morally superior, hard-working people who stand up for our national interests and constitute our party's golden treasure. They are people who will never renounce their principles in any political situation, and who will make a worthy contribution to the building of a sovereign Georgia.

Notwithstanding the progress we have made recently, I believe we should substantially extend and vary the dialogue with party committees, primary party organizations, and with individual communists. We must not lose a single initiative or viable idea.

It must be said that certain personnel changes have been carried out recently in many city and rayon committees of the Georgian Communist Party. As a rule in resolving such matters, the opinions of the communists were given thorough consideration in each case, and the elections of new leaders were held based on a choice of candidates. If today it is not unusual in places for shortcomings to be detected in the work of a party committee and for certain things to be called by their proper names, this simply confirms the fact that the processes of democratization have become deeply rooted in intra-party life. Needless to say, I do not have in mind certain instances of unjustified and over-zealous pressure tactics. Such cases are to be condemned and in no case do we condone them.

Despite serious difficulties, it is the expansion of intra-party democracy that is in many respects responsible for the renewal of forms and methods of activities within the party organizations, including the primary organizations. Today they are being called upon to play an increasingly basic role in extending pluralism.

The renewal of the party presupposes a radical renovation of the mass media. This is properly a topic for a separate discussion. Nevertheless, it is necessary to focus attention on the fact that substantial changes are taking place in this important field.

The press, radio, and television are entirely free of being dictated to and today represent a continually expanding

range of public sentiment and opinion. The major media outlets have had a marked effect in broadening the process of democratization to adequately reflect public opinion. And this is entirely to be welcomed. We should not, however, rush from one extreme to the other by succumbing to our emotions and resorting to sensational but unsubstantiated reports. Most important, we must not lose our own point of view. It must be borne in mind that the press, radio, and television not only carry the news to the people but help in shaping public opinion. And this is a great responsibility.

Today it is necessary to provide support in every way possible for the Komsomol of Georgia, within which are taking place complex processes of qualitative self-renewal, a search for true identity, and an effort to forge a genuine sense of sovereignty. We owe this to our youth.

Generally, it is incumbent on us to make a more persistent as well as consistent effort with our young people; for they represent our primary obligation—the future of Georgia. Many things concern them greatly, and there are mounting questions and claims of major import in their minds, not a single one of which should remain unanswered. Young people often turn out to be right, and we must acknowledge this fact. We must honestly look them in the eyes and protect their sense of aspiration and morality so that the current conflicts in the social and political situation do not leave an oppressive imprint on their sensibilities and world outlook.

Like the apple of one's eye we must guard the cohesiveness and continuity of succeeding generations—their spiritual as well as hereditary ties with us. Herein lies our force as well as a criterion of our concern for Georgia's tomorrow.

Complex and ambiguous processes are occurring in the union organizations of the republic. Here, too, the main thrust of renewal consists in our fulfilling more fully our primary functions: defending the interests of the worker; improving the conditions of work, leisure, and living conditions; strengthening labor discipline; and affirming social justice.

Copies of the basic guidelines of the Georgian Communist Party, along with its structural and organizational principles, have been distributed to the congress. You have probably noticed that there are disparities to some extent between the party policy guidelines contained in this document and the existing structure of the party as well as various individual positions contained in the draft platform and charter prepared by the CPSU Central Committee.

The achievement of genuine sovereignty requires fundamental changes in party political and organizational efforts and in its structure, together with a thorough review of the policies contained in CPSU documents issued prior to the congress. It is common knowledge that there is no unanimity of opinion on this matter among the delegates. Some of them are of the opinion that the republic Communist Party should withdraw

immediately from the CPSU, while others believe, on the contrary, that everything must be done to preserve unity in the party ranks.

We suggest that the most important thing is to work out a new, original, and independent status for the Georgian Communist Party with new principles for the establishment of inter-party relations. This is the position that should be taken by the delegation representing the Georgian Communist Party to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Thus the proposal of the Georgian CP Central Committee, which was formed in the course of the preliminary meetings and which is supported by a majority of the delegates, is that upon the completion of the first phase of the work of our congress, we continue discussing the policy documents and the future status of the Georgian Communist Party, eliciting the active participation of every communist and the public at large in drafting these vitally important documents. In our judgment this is a most appropriate and necessary proposal if it is approved by the congress.

It is our task to adopt the resolutions that have the support of a majority of republic communists. This is an approach that will ensure the unity of the Georgian Communist Party during its transition to an entirely new status, and it is one that has fundamental significance for the political authority of the party and the successful realization of its political policy in the republic parliament. The forthcoming elections in local as well as republic-wide organs of power, which for the first time are to be carried out on a multi-party basis, will provide a crucial test for communists. The Communist Party has affirmed its readiness to meet this test by voluntarily providing all political forces and movements a maximum opportunity to prepare for the elections and to exploit all its opportunities.

And, of course, we will be victorious—if we receive the full support of the people, and if, in alliance with all the other democratic forces, we succeed in carrying out our own program for the achievement of genuine sovereignty in the republic. In this connection, we should be prepared as well for a different development of events and for the creation of new structures of parliamentary activity as one of the parties within a democratic political system. It is difficult to predict the alignment of the political forces of Georgia in September and October. Much will depend on the decisions made by this congress, on the vigor of our political initiative, and on the amount of our real progress.

However events turn out, we may be confident that the formation of the republic parliament on a multi-party basis constitutes a major victory for the democratic forces of the party as well as part of a larger historical process that will transform the Communist Party of Georgia into a genuinely political organization.

The communists, who are struggling to win seats in the parliament on an equal footing and under equal conditions with the other political forces and movements, are

becoming visibly aware of new advantages, new trust, and new public support. This is of the utmost importance if we truly wish to find ourselves members of a modern civilized political party and citizens of a democratic republic. We believe that no efforts and energies must be spared to achieve this purpose. Henceforth this principle will be one of the fundamental tenets of party work.

Unity provides a guarantee of the greatest importance in precluding the possibility of opposition, confrontation, and a split in the ranks of the Georgian Communist Party. It is necessary to rise above personal and group ambitions. We need to bring about real consolidation on the basis of pluralism. This unity of purpose will make it possible to move steadily forward towards a new and humane society—towards a democratic and sovereign Georgia!

We are convinced that this represents the historic mission of the Communist Party of Georgia in the 1990's.

May we enjoy success in this endeavor!

Speeches From 28th Georgian CP Congress

Council of Ministers' Chairman Chitanava

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17 May 90 pp 2-3

[Speech by N.A. Chitanava, chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers]

[Text] This congress is exceptionally important, a special phase both in the history of Georgia's Communists and in the life of the Georgian people. It is also to provide a clearly defined orientation for the rebirth of the nation and the republic. We therefore do not have a right to err. It is our duty to adopt the only correct decision, wise and far-sighted, to choose from the many possibilities precisely that path which will lead the people and the republic to progress and prosperity. Today's forum must accomplish this extremely difficult and, I would say, historically important task.

The responsibility with which each of us is charged is also historic. We cannot correctly determine the future—particularly given the many attractive (not always scientific) outlooks based on the weak social base of pluralism, which weighs psychologically on our still immature political thinking, and until we profoundly and thoroughly understand the reality, its processes, symptoms and trends.

The report period, which coincides entirely with the restructuring years, was neither simple nor the way it seemed to many people before the reform, including the initiators of the restructuring: the party and its leadership. It is impossible in general to direct public life strictly according to a pattern worked out in advance. No matter how brilliantly the turns and deviations on the path of renewal are taken into account, no matter what

kind of political and social forces advance along the given path, in my opinion, life, influenced by a development or a factor which might at first glance appear insignificant, has the capacity drastically to alter the direction and the intensity of a movement and to reveal approaches and positions differing from the original ones. And precisely at this time we must analyze the actual reality at all phases of the movement, based on its specific features, if only to arrive at a precise and well conceived definition of the current task.

It should be acknowledged that the restructuring did not begin developing the way it was presented to us, or at least not the way we—most of us at any rate—expectantly received it. It has begun to grow at such a speed and to shatter the stagnant reality on such a devastating scale and with such powerful psychological pressure that if we do not work out proper political thinking, if we continue not to understand what we should destroy and what we should preserve, if the hysteria does not lessen, the people and the entire nation could find themselves facing a disaster.

I consider it essential to single out three elements in the report period.

The first is our performance during the period 1986-1987. During that period there were difficulties in perceiving the innovation of the restructuring and a lack of a correct strategy and clearly defined tactics, and we had to feel our way through the thicket of new processes and developments, while the inertia of the old forms and models of political work held us back. While unconditionally rejecting everything from the past, we did not build anything new. A vacuum formed.

This political development is known as destabilization. I would call this situation an imponderable of political life.

Naturally, it foregrounded a particular period (1988-April 1989) in the report period. The impetus of the restructuring accelerated the emergence of new political forces and created the organizational basis for the formation of many parties and public associations. The result was political struggle on an unaccustomed scale and the emergence of conditions conducive to an outpouring of pent-up energy and dissatisfaction in the people, exacerbated by the lack of modern forms and methods of political struggle.

The social volcano was about to erupt. We were unable to foresee this. What had to happen, happened. Various opinion, ideas and positions came into conflict during that turbulent period. Human thinking, freed of its fetters, sprang like a released spring against the wall of reality. The individual's world outlook began a wave-like development. This prevented the confrontation of opinions from being channeled onto the proper course. There developed the danger of a conflict of individuals, groupings and public movements occupying mutually exclusive positions. We did not notice the moment approach.

The result was the tragedy of 9 April, a bleeding wound on the Georgian soul and the national body.

The next phase of the Communist Party's activity goes from the events of 9 April to the present day. Each day had its own political and psychological weight. And difficult tasks had to be performed each day. The ethnic crises began during that period. We were witnesses in space and time to the bitter reality. Abkhazia, Kvemo Kartli and Shida Kartli were about to be turned into ranges for launching civil war. Georgia avoided tragedy several times during that period. Specifically, in November of last year and January/February of this. I recall days on which any hour could have brought sorrow and disaster for the people. How did we avoid it? Let history answer that question, but I would still point out one main circumstance. Flexible forms of dialog and a comparison of opinions and positions were found through interaction among various parties and associations. I considered that to be the right way, and I still do today. A remarkable event has occurred: The multiparty principle has been acknowledged in the Constitution of the Georgian SSR. The Georgian CP Central Committee had fairly good experience in working within a real multiparty system and, in my opinion, used it well.

An important document, the Plan for Georgia's National Development, has been approved, and the basic principles of the republic's economic independence have been formulated. The Supreme Soviet has adopted decisions on many fundamental political issues.

Despite certain positive changes, political life in the Georgian SSR is still complicated and tense. At first glance, it might appear balanced. If we do not properly control the processes underway, however, it could become explosive at any minute, because the temporary balance of forces hinges on acute, interdependent, conflicting factors.

What are the general features and trends of socioeconomic development on the path we have traveled.

The economy is in a profound crisis. Accumulations are being reduced, the capital-output ration is dropping, and the ratio of materials per product is increasing. There is 3.5 billion rubles worth of incomplete construction, which is 152 percent of the annual capital investment.

Industry's technological level is very low. As much as 30 percent of the equipment and machine tools are over 10 years old. It will take 40-45 years to replace it at the present rate. The republic's economy does not have the basic conditions for autonomous functioning. External ties account for more than half of its economic turnover.

A considerable part of the enterprises and organizations face bankruptcy. There is a real danger of a breakdown of national economic ties and a drop in resource supplies.

In this difficult situation it is planned to convert to a market economy in the nation. This is inevitable also for

us. Unfortunately, Georgia is not prepared psychologically, organizationally or materially to provide for normal functioning of the sick economy under the rigid laws of a free market.

I can state with firmness that the first period in the transition to market relations will certainly cause a significant drop in production output, price increases and unemployment. I consider the latter to be the most harmful.

There appeared to be a turn toward the social sphere in recent years, but there have not yet been any perceptible advances. The housing problem is still acute.

The education system does not meet the demands of the future. Do not be deluded by the big figures for the existence of specialists with diplomas. We have an extremely acute shortage of highly skilled cadres. Dilettantism is ruining things.

On the one hand, Georgia is first in the world with respect to doctors per 10,000 residents. On the other, we are at the level of the underdeveloped nations with respect to child mortality.

We are in last place, even within the nation, in per capita production of food and nonfood items.

In this situation the state of the society and the social and psychological state of individual segments of the population could only be tense, complicated, conflicting and opposed to the existing political and administrative structures.

What are the moral aspects of the period we have gone through?

The restructuring has caused profound changes also in morality.

Morality, as we know, is a separate category within each political party. The inconsistency between the party's proclaimed moral principles and their implementation is one of the main reasons why corruption, bribery, duplicity and adventurism are no strangers to us today.

This has greatly harmed the party's prestige. Nor has its honor been enhanced by attacks on the history of the Soviet nation and the Communist Party by individual political forces and trends, the denigration of our undeniable achievements or the shifting of the blame for all the distortions and crimes exclusively to Stalin's personality.

Abusing the people's trust is the most immoral act of all. Unfortunately, various forms of this are not rare today. Is it not immoral and irresponsible to foist upon the society from dilettante positions our own erroneous opinions on the extremely complex problems in the people's development and to plant in the national soil

alien patterns borrowed from various, frequently mutually exclusive political theories and doctrines? Particularly today, when we must make fateful decisions on the path toward Georgia's political and economic independence?

Unfortunately, fertile soil has been produced for one of the most dangerous trends of immorality, adventurism in the restructuring. Adventurism nourishes and sets up political tragedies. It has acquired an extremely distinctive feature: the ability to mask itself.

Unfortunately, some of our comrades and acquaintances, protected by their party cards, are fighting their own party, reviling and abusing it and duplicity. For what? They yearn for the name of a protector of the nation or, as they say, "every egotist wants to be a leader."

It is clear to everyone today that precisely because of this kind of duplicity and unscrupulous political game on the part of some, the people are losing their faith and have doubts about the ability of the Communists themselves to eliminate social injustice, to protect the national interests and take Georgia out of its crisis.

The above summarized assessments of the political, socioeconomic and moral aspects of the current period provide a basis for stating that a powerful political force is needed for Georgia's future, and we are convinced that a renewed Communist Party is that force.

We have come to the most difficult question which the congress must answer: What are the Georgian Communist Party's place, role and functions to be in Georgia's modern political structure and in its life?

The Georgian Communist Party must be independent. It must itself work out and approve its program, define the forms, methods and ways of implementing it and, most important, its principles.

Therefore, it must be independent. Everyone is of the same opinion about this. But what kind of independence? Should the Georgian Communist Party set itself apart from the CPSU or remain a part of it and devote all of its political and organizational work to restoring Georgia's complete political and economic sovereignty?

The question of questions for us is what kind of independence is most important for us right now: party or state? Which of them is the main objective, and which is the means, the factor for achieving that objective?

There is a logical linkage, primarily political, between them, of course. It is unerring, in-depth consideration of this political logic, far-sightedness and perception, and maximum activeness, prudent activeness based on unerring political deliberation, which are essential today.

A study of the reality shows that it would be a gross error even to raise the question of removing the Georgian Communist Party from the CPSU today, in the current situation.

It is incumbent upon us to follow the zigzag processes occurring in the nation intensely and most importantly, professionally. The founding of the Russian Communist Party will result in the formation of a new system of relations among the Communist parties. I believe that the alliance between the republic Communist parties will become more realistic than today's relations, which are based on the principles of democratic centralism.

Based on the proposals put forth here today, following the conclusion of the first phase of the congress and during the national discussion and comparison of the positions formulated, it will be realistically possible to precisely define the status of the Georgian Communist Party, its place and role in the republic's political structure, its program and the basis for its organizational development.

The matter of the Georgian Communist Party's unity is extraordinarily important today. I shall briefly discuss this problem.

The Communist Party's unity is immutable and essential to Georgia.

Why?

In the first place, a split in the multinational Communist Party will incredibly rapidly create a real danger of party organizations functioning on a national basis. And this, I shall frankly say, will give powerful impetus to the awakening of factors conducive to civil war which presently exist. Essentially, however, this is exactly contrary to the Georgian national character, tolerance and centuries-old traditions of fraternal relations with other peoples. We must not permit the insulation of Georgia's regions. We must have national unity and harmony today.

In the second place, division and demarcation will produce the psychological, organizational and especially the political preconditions for pitting the Communists against other parties, on the one hand, and the Communists against one another, on the other. This can result in the shifting of political responsibility from one to another, evoke reprisals and ultimately retard the consolidation of political forces. In short, it will lead to all-round confrontation.

In the third place, today, when the national movement is intensifying (and it will grow even stronger in the future), when there is a consolidation of people with various outlooks and positions, will a split in the Georgian Communist Party contribute to the dynamic of this process? What can actually follow if we permit this to happen?

Let us consider this matter within a somewhat unusual truncation, using just the basic component of the state: the family, the Georgian family, and its kinship ties.

Imagine a family or families linked by close kinship ties, which will contain not just members of different political

parties (and there were many examples of this in independent Georgia), but even Communists espousing different platforms. The problem of politicizing family members in Georgia, particularly with different platforms, is not an clear-cut or simple one. It is for now an unstudied and unclarified phenomenon, and it is therefore extremely difficult correctly to determine its effect on the nation's life.

Georgia will particularly feel the acuteness of this problem, the politicization of the family, in the future. This should be pointed out today in order not to find ourselves suddenly with a fait accompli.

In the fourth place, the Georgian Communist Party has acquired a great deal of experience in running the government. It makes no sense to deny this categorically. A disruption of this management process is precisely what a split would promote. In the new situation, as I have already commented, the Georgian Communist Party must be able to cooperate with other parties to influence our complex public and socioeconomic life and direct it toward its main objective, that of thoroughly protecting the national interests and achieving prosperity for the people.

Furthering these goals and performing these tasks, the Georgian Communist Party will not give up its positions as easily as it seems to some people today. In the specific situation it is making use of new forms, methods and principles of political struggle (and this is only logical). It has an advantage in this respect, for the Communist Party is made up of the best of the people. It is said that many people will leave its ranks. I consider this a natural process. It is also natural that the greater part of its intellectual strength and many of our worthy fellow countrymen will remain in the renewed party. Many people ignore this reality today. We should not err and be deluded by our calculations. Let us remember from history that it is far easier to gain power than to direct the nation. And cadres are essential for that. No party should forget this unyielding logic, at least not here in Georgia.

An interesting phase of the political struggle is beginning. We Communists more than anyone else know the arithmetic, the algebra of the political distribution of forces. A struggle by any party for real power (if it serves the national interests) has no prospects without internal unity and organizational cohesion. A weak and splintered party surrenders its positions easily, and this means that it slights the interests of certain segments and groups of the society. No one wants to work with a weak party, however. The division in the society will deepen, which will diminish pluralism, lead to the monopolization of opinions and retard the process of democratization and the establishment of a law-governed state. The law of political life teaches us that.

In the fifth place, division and demarcation will hamper the implementation of an effective economic and social policy. As I mentioned before, the nation's economy—and naturally, that of Georgia—is in a crisis. In this

situation the party must be organizationally united. Without this the main strategic area of its work, economic policy, is doomed to failure.

At this point I also have to say that the first steps in political pluralism in the republic's socioeconomic life have revealed a symptom which is cause for serious reflection. A striving for insulation has manifested itself at all levels of management (in the brigades, at enterprises, in the departments and ministries, at educational institutions, in the rayons and cities). Unfortunately, this symptom is frequently masked by a drive for independence. The theory is that everything I have produced belongs to me, and only I should make use of it. The influence of this theory has grown particularly in various regions.

Many people not vested with power and bearing no responsibility before the people foolishly support this theory. I consider this to be a big mistake. We must create for the producer the very best economic, organizational and psychological conditions for highly productive labor. A certain portion of the labor of each, however, must go toward the implementation of a correctly developed socioeconomic policy for the republic. Otherwise, the republic will not be strong. A strong political structure does not exist without a strong economy.

And so, Georgia's leading cadres, the Communists, absolutely must have a common economic policy, common tactics and a precisely formulated position worked out on a unified political and organizational basis. A new economic strategy is being worked out in the republic today. The government will be prepared to submit it to the delegates by the end of the second phase of the congress.

I would like to bring up one other thing in conclusion. The matter of distrust in the current membership of the Georgian Communist Party CC and the demand that they resign, artificially contrived but elevated to the level of a fundamental issue—and not very altruistically, in my opinion—has been raised at certain recent party meetings, at legal or illegal meetings of certain party functionaries and other places.

I have to express my opinion on this matter.

The matter of using the institution of retirement was publicly raised by me myself at a plenum of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee in this hall back in 1987, and there is nothing surprising about it for me. On the contrary, I still support the idea of adopting in our work this principle, acknowledged in the civilized nations but for some reason unaccustomed and unacceptable to us. This is my position.

At the same time, however, I am absolutely opposed to discussing such ideas here at the congress, ideas cooked up by adventurists using eccentric tricks and unscrupulous methods.

Who is raising and who has a right to raise this issue? Everyone has the legal right; very few have the moral right. It might not hurt for some people to take a look back at their past. Perhaps they would conquer the currently fashionable "disease" of memory loss.

I have always self-critically assessed my contribution to and my role in Georgia's political and economic life, and I continue to do so. Unfortunately, there have been many things I have been unable to accomplish. Many things did not work out for a host of reasons. I should obviously have demonstrated greater principle in assessing certain phenomena, processes and events. I can boldly say without false modesty at the congress, however, that I have never betrayed the interests of my people or abused their trust. I have served and continue to serve Georgia with all my being, my knowledge, faith and capabilities, and I have not committed errors which would undermine my official or personal prestige. With respect to shortcomings in the work, I have had plenty of them, and I cannot promise there will be none in the future.

During the past year the Central Committee bureau—including myself as one of its members—has laid the foundation for resolving many pressing problems. Time will judge the correctness of what the bureau members have done.

With respect to the government which has functioned in the extreme situation of a turning point for the Georgian people, it has displayed adequate competence, a great sense of responsibility to the Georgian people and, what is significant, a firm stance in life. I have the grounds for stating this in the name of all members of the government.

It must be admitted that the Central Committee, the bureau and we members did too little to combat duplicity disguised as the interplay of forces, did not reveal its true political nature, were not always principled in implementing cadre policy and have not always been adequately focused in our positions. I also regard as a serious shortcoming of the party Central Committee the fact that we were unable to apply with adequate effectiveness the great potential of the party's organizational and ideological means and did not focus them on implementing the party's political course. We must draw conclusions, since delay is ruinous.

I am convinced that Georgia's Communists have the moral right, the firm convictions, the organization and the solidarity to direct the republic's complex political life into the proper channel.

Abkhazian First Secretary Khishba

90US1010B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
17 May 90 p 3

[Speech by V.F. Khishba, first secretary of the Abkhazian Oblast Committee of the Georgian Communist Party]

[Text] I believe that I will not be mistaken if I say that all of us have a sense of the enormous moral responsibility with which we have been charged by the republic's Communist when they entrusted the delegates to the 28th Congress of the Georgian Communist Party with making the vitally important decision on the republic party organization's future during the establishment of a multiparty system and radical change in the socioeconomic and state structures.

Naturally, the delegation from the Abkhazian Oblast party organization did not come to the congress empty-handed. Our assets include party meetings, city and rayon party conferences and addresses in the press, on radio and television. In short, everything which made up the enormous council of Communists of the autonomous republic on the pregress platform of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Charter. And if we discount the extreme positions of certain comrades, the main conclusion reached during the discussion was to demand a fundamental renewal of the party and the rejection of obsolete relations, both within the party and between the party and the state and public political organizations, and the focusing of all our work on democratizing all areas of party work.

Abkhazia's Communists support the idea of enhancing the independence of the Georgian Communist Party. It must have a real opportunity to restore and strengthen its role in the nation's sociopolitical life.

At the same time, Abkhazia's party organization attaches extremely great importance to the matter of enlarging the rights of the oblast party organization in order to increase its prestige in the society and its legal status with respect to deciding major issues in the autonomous republic's public-political, socioeconomic, cultural and spiritual life.

Finally, as we take part in the discussion of the Georgian Communist Party's status, we believe that in the situation of drastically increased activity on the part of alternative political forces, the establishment of new parties and the extensive promotion and dissemination of populist slogans, the Georgian Communist Party must remain a part of a renewed CPSU and strengthen its ties with the latter, while striving for maximum consideration for the position of the republic's Communists for working out and adopting the program documents of the CPSU.

We must strive to enhance the role of the Georgian Communist Party, to see that it is militant and takes precisely defined positions and to overcome the apathy and disarray which, unfortunately, have become so typical of all of us, from the primary party organizations to the Georgian CP Central Committee. We believe that it is now time for our aktiv and the workers in our party apparatus to adapt to the new conditions for their work, to learn not only to accept compromises and search for common points of view with the opponents but also to

issue a rebuff on fundamental matters pertaining to our party's basic principles and our work within the party.

Specifically, we are absolutely opposed to having someone, using slogans of depoliticization, dictate to the Communists where primary party organizations should function and where they should not, and even try to drive out our party committees.

Dictate, authoritarianism and force are alien to true democracy. Only honorable and open political struggle should be used to help the people make a choice and take the side of this or that party, this or that political platform.

Having openly admitted its errors, our party has no reason to be ashamed or to retreat before forces which, taking advantage of our openness and self-criticism, are attempting to negate all of the CPSU's real gains and to eliminate the party itself and its Marxist-Leninist essence. Communists of the first generations, even those in the minority, as they say, openly charged into battle for their convictions. It is obvious that we too should not exhibit modesty and faint-heartedness in our statements and defense of our views, in the political struggle for power. I refer specifically to the forthcoming elections to the soviets at all levels, the conduct of our traditional celebrations, the protection of our memory of the heroes of the revolution and of the revolutionary, party and state symbols.

We are convinced that if the Georgian Communist Party does not want to be lost among the dozens of other parties and public-political organizations emerging in the republic, it must maintain a firm position of creatively developing the ideas of a humane, democratic socialism, preserve its organizational unity and ideological cohesiveness and have its own, thoroughly party-oriented press and other mass media expressing the will and the opinion of republic Communists. It is our party which must overcome the threat of demarcation of the Georgian SSR's multinational population on a national basis. With respect to this I want to say that despite the striving of the official leadership for international peace and harmony, we have an open and active effort to divide Abkhazia's society based on nationality.

This is convincingly exemplified by the division of the university, the writers' union, the kolkhozes, medical institutions and even the soccer team.

And so, there is a great discrepancy between words and actions with respect to mutual understanding and friendship. Who has an interest in this?

Who is the motivating force behind this confrontation, which is leading to further, unpredictable developments?

It is our request to the Georgian CP Central Committee that it work with us to get to the bottom of what is occurring and make a principled assessment of the organizers.

Now, a few words about the program documents. From this standpoint, it needs to be said that we feel the drafts submitted to the delegates are not clear enough with respect to defining the ideological and theoretical principles of the functioning of the Georgian Communist Party, membership in the party and certain other points. We therefore recommend submitting these documents for general discussion by republic Communists and getting back to their ratification following the 28th CPSU Congress.

Today the Georgian Communist Party faces the task of purifying the public atmosphere of the slightest manifestations of blind rigidity, national nihilism and egoism, and dispelling the fog of mutual prejudice and distrust which emerged among our peoples following the tragic events of 15 and 16 June of last year. It must be stated that, contrary to the desires of certain forces, the blame for this tragedy cannot be placed upon either the Abkhazian or the Georgian people, since we cannot return to the infamous policy, born of czarism and criminally developed during the cult of the personality, of proclaiming punishment of the so-called "guilty" peoples. The responsibility for what happened lies with clearly identified, specific organizations and individuals. We call upon the members of all parties, movements and organizations functioning in Abkhazia and Georgia to stop looking for sore spots, manipulating unverified information and exploiting biased and concocted, sometimes inadequately based or simply juggled facts for resolving contemporary political problems. We call for a joint search for ways to bring together the positions and restore the traditional relations of the Abkhazian and Georgian peoples, who have more unifying goals and tasks than divisive ones today.

Among other things, the Abkhazian and Georgian peoples, like all peoples of the USSR, are striving to enhance their economic and political independence and increase their role in the resolution of long-range and current problems in the development of the autonomous and Union republics. This striving conforms to the main points in the CPSU platform "The Party's National Policy in the Contemporary Situation."

There are other, alternative approaches to these extremely complex problems, of course. We have entered a phase in the development of our republic, however, in which any wrong move, any ill-conceived act, will be not just a manifestation of political short-sightedness and thoughtlessness but a criminal game with the lives of thousands of people. This is why not just we Communists but the leaders of all public-political organizations of Georgia, including Abkhazia, must remember today our responsibility to the present and coming generations of our citizens. We need to firmly assess the actual state of affairs and not divert people away from the truly urgent tasks of national-state, socioeconomic and cultural development. We cannot decide controversial issues with meetings difficult to control, demonstrations and other mass actions. The nation's highest agency of people's power has recently passed an entire package of

laws substantially enlarging the rights of the autonomous republics, which, naturally, meets the interests not just of the indigenous nationalities but of all the people residing in them. We cannot understand the duality of the position taken by certain people who, while striving for complete sovereignty for Georgia, do not consider that the autonomous formations which are a part of it have the right independently to resolve their own thoroughly internal problems, which require a subtle understanding of the specific situations and interrelations, down to individual families and individuals.

It is precisely the absence—and even the impossibility of having—such detailed information and the adoption of decisions without considering the opinion of Abkhazia's party and soviet organs which has had and continues to have negative consequences exacerbating the situation not just in Abkhazia but in Georgia as a whole. The hasty adoption of the decision temporarily to halt the allocation of land plots for individual housing construction and the sale of homes and apartments, for example, resulted not just in a deterioration of the autonomous republic's economic situation but also in the large-scale seizure of plots of land by people who had lost confidence in the strength of decrees passed by the Union and republic governments.

To conclude my address, I would like to assure the congress delegates that Abkhazia's Communists are striving to strengthen international unity in the ranks of the Georgian Communist Party and to enhance its militancy and prestige, and we are confident that this striving will meet with mutual understanding and support in all the Communists and all the progressive forces of our republic.

Komsomol First Secretary Baramidze

90US1010C Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
19 May 90 p 3

[Speech by G.R. Baramidze, first secretary of the Georgian Komsomol Central Committee]

[Text] It is only a matter of days to the end of the process of establishing self-determination now underway in the republic Komsomol organizations. Just a few days ago I became first secretary of the Georgian Komsomol Central Committee.

Many people are no doubt aware that I and my colleagues are forced to work in extremely difficult, almost field conditions.

Unfortunately, people ask us the question: "What did they promise to get you to agree to become first secretary"? It is somewhat surprising to hear it put this way. I answer: Yes, they promised me something. My colleagues and like-minded people promised to stand by and support me. Most important, however, there is a duty to see things through to the end.

I believe the society should have an accurate knowledge of what is happening around us, what we want, what we are striving for, why for 2 days now there have been various actions by the opposition in and around our building (I am not referring to the mass meetings). Why do they lock the doors and try to shut the people up inside the building? Why are there telephone threats to homes? Why the incomprehensible slander? And some sorry excuses for patriots link all of this with a national movement. I believe that this should be illuminated from a certain perspective on the republic scale. One might ask whether this would not overly irritate the people. Possibly. After thinking it all over, however, I believe we must learn once and for all that it is impossible to achieve positive results with such methods. I am not speaking of the existence of or qualitative changes in the Komsomol. It is a matter of a path which some people consider to be the way to achieve the goal but which actually deserves condemnation morally and ethically and from the legal and human standpoint. It is also not right to make a distinction as to who has the right to participate in the national movement and who does not.

Something else. By branding each other as traitors to the people and fighting among ourselves we have lost a great deal historically. The superficial leveling of this very serious accusation and reprisals have become more frequent. This path is ruinous for Georgia!

The present members of the Komsomol and of the Communist Party should not be held accountable for errors committed by our predecessors over a period of 70 years. Today each of us should have the opportunity to believe what his conscience tells him and to associate wherever he desires.

All of this requires not just a declaration of democracy as a form but assistance with the establishment of conditions under which a climate of tolerance for diverse opinions will be possible.

Now, something about the immediate prospects for our youth organization.

The process of self-determination is fairly complex and full of conflict. We are not claiming that our ideas are without fault and are not acting as blind defenders of the Komsomol, but we believe that uncompromising demands and confrontation with one another will only harm our republic's future. This is why we believe now, when the Komsomol is undergoing a fundamental renewal, we should establish a public or public-political alliance free of dogma, which both party members and those who do not belong to the party will be able to join. The renewed organization should reject the old regimented and centralized methods, the minority should have the right to defend their position, and pluralism of opinions should be permitted and encouraged.

As an independent youth organization, Georgia's youth league should focus its efforts on such issues as protection of the youth's interests, first of all. The youth alliance should protect their interests in state organs by

means of deputies elected from the organization, along with the support of the National Plan for the Georgian Communist Party, and should speak out in the state apparatus and public agencies against conservative and reactionary forces.

Georgia's youth league will establish direct relations with progressive youth organizations and movements of the Union republics and other nations where similar changes are occurring. We need to abandon the politicizing of children and students.

Along with other progressive forces, of course, we consider ourselves to be patriots of Georgia. In order to achieve the main objective, a Georgia standing firmly on its feet, we must concern ourselves along with others with consolidating the youth and the people. This is why we are considering the opinions and views of young men and women of all nationalities residing in Georgia for the qualitative renewal of the youth organization, and trying to unite them and eliminate the possibility of various interfronts and intermovements.

The opposition tells us they do not believe in all of this and consider it to be cosmetic action, since we, and myself personally, are not giving up our party cards. Do not think that I am a blind apologist, but I consider such a demand to be unfair, since it will result in a scattering of our already divided national forces and the separation of the youth into party and nonparty categories, to confrontation and reprisals based on nationality. Even in the moral sense, it is incorrect to select parties and mandates based on a situation of this one in this camp, that one in the other. I believe that we are in that extremely important transitional phase in which everything superfluous and an intransigent opposition to the present, real leadership are keeping us from the cherished goal, and I do not believe that the existence of a party mandate has hampered the work performed in the people's interest today.

In short, we are trying to see that the process of reorganization and renewal takes a natural course and that the youth organization merges with the national cause in the current phase.

Finally, we should not confuse the desired with the reality. A thorough, accurate and in-depth analysis and a sober assessment of the current situation provide a solid foundation for moving toward the goal. And time will be the unbiased judge of whether the decisions adopted are the correct ones.

Adzharian First Secretary Khakhva Speech at 28th Georgian CP Congress

*90UN1025A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
18 May 90p 2*

[[Speech by T. S. Khakhva, first secretary of the Adzhar Obkom of the Georgian Communist Party, delivered at the 28th Georgian CP Congress]

[Text] In essence, the role and place of the Georgian Communist Party in the life of the people, and its subsequent fate will depend on the political decisions taken at this congress.

Now that a multiparty system has become a reality, the future will belong to the party that is always with the people, not just in slogans, but with a program of socioeconomic development, policies, deeds and convictions, and that devotedly serves it and expresses its will and interests.

Despite serious mistakes and shortcomings, the Georgian Communist Party has the opportunity to continue to be the republic's political and intellectual vanguard, leading the consolidation of all healthy forces.

The basis for this is the Central Committee's approach to events of the recent period that have been of great sociopolitical resonance, the concept of national development, and the draft documents that have been presented for our discussion. At the same time, in addition to the political strategy and tactics that have been developed, it is necessary, in our view, to find a mechanism that will fully tap the entire potential for organizational, political and ideological work. But the main thing is still for the Communist Party to involve itself organically, with all its energy, in the process of the people's politicization, and in the development of the national movement. That is what should become the most important sphere of activity for regional and primary party organizations.

We, of course, recognize and by no means belittle the role of various parties and public associations in the task of reviving the national movement. In the present political situation there is no other way and approach but serious and businesslike cooperation among healthy forces. The struggle to achieve Georgia's full sovereignty is the key question around which we should come together and unite.

The absolute majority of Adzharia's communists and population fully share the position of the Central Committee and the republic's government in holding that we can attain our desired goal only by employing peaceful forms of struggle, proceeding to that goal consistently, in stages. The other way represents danger and is fraught with the potential for grave consequences.

As a delegate, I make a proposal that we instruct the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress to firmly defend the idea of the equality of sovereign republics and Communist Parties.

I believe that the unity of the party's ranks, their steadfastness and purity are a necessary condition for enhancing the prestige and increasing the political influence of the Georgian Communist Party. The criticism that has been expressed in this connection at all levels is perfectly justifiable and pertains directly to the regional committees and organizations. We are convinced that we must work more resolutely to free ourselves from

wavering and insincere elements, political flatters, and other antitheses, and from everyone whom nothing any longer binds to the party in ideological terms.

In addition, the delegates from the Adzhar party organization are convinced that the republic Communist Party's attitude toward attempts to split it should be firmer and more uncompromising. Any attempt to divide the Georgian Communist Party into factions along ethnic or other lines, like the establishment of the so-called "internationality fronts" and other schismatic organizations, represents a blatant provocation and the intrigues of the enemy.

It is perfectly natural that the party organizations of autonomous formations are obliged to remain inseparable from the Georgian Communist Party, and to provide active support for it in implementing its unified program.

The accomplishment of this responsible task, and the management of the political situation in the republic demand that we actively master forms and methods of relating to the people and to other parties and organizations. The experience that has been accumulated in a short period of time persuasively shows that meeting regularly with the public and informing it in a timely and objective fashion on matters of current importance have extremely great potential. It is necessary to hold constructive dialogue with people of various views, and to cooperate with them when necessary.

It is no secret that sometimes hasty conclusions are expressed and unacceptable slogans and offensive statements voiced at assemblies and rallies. Unfortunately, some people attempt to use political actions to advance their own overweening purposes, to pit the authorities and the people and various parties against one another, and to spread mistrust and suspicion. The spreading of various provocational rumors, and attempts to separate people from one another according to locality, religious beliefs, party affiliation, etc. are not uncommon.

Granted, the activities of parties and movements whose goals are violence and the kindling of ethnic- and religious-based strife are not allowed by the Constitution, but these matters must be elaborated concretely in legislation, and we must speed up the creation of a mechanism that ensures the unconditional fulfillment of constitutional requirements and provides full guarantees of the observance of every citizen's rights.

Lately the status of Adzharia's autonomy has once again become a subject of discussion in public speeches and certain published items. Unfortunately, sometimes other issues, as well, are treated in a one-sided fashion and in a tone of irritation. I am convinced that the ideals of the population of Adzharia, this most ancient corner of Georgia, are inseparable from its motherland, genuine spiritual unity, and the eradication of any sort of isolation.

As for autonomy and the distinguishing religious characteristics that continue to exist, they should be perceived as the result of the historical vicissitudes of Georgia's fate. With regard to this issue, it is necessary to show great tact and patience and take the public's wishes into account. This is precisely the position expressed in the party's programmatic documents, which point out that the most important questions should be decided after preliminary consultations with the people.

The Adzhar Oblast Party Organization considers one of the most important programs of today to be the consistent and steadfast accomplishment of the tasks stemming from the Concept of Georgia's National Development and Economic Independence. This is the perspective from which a draft set of principal guidelines for the region's socioeconomic development is being drawn up; after public discussion, the guidelines will be formulated as the oblast party organization's election platform.

They envisage bringing various form of economic operation and property into accord with the requirements of a market economy, showing particular concern for the socioeconomic problems of mountainous regions, following an active demographic and environmental policy, developing predominantly the economic branches that are characteristic of local natural conditions, and expanding foreign-economic ties. The resolution of these and other important issues should become one of the chief tasks of Adzharia's communists.

The situation in the autonomous republic's economy and social life is complicated by the problems of the exodus and resettlement of the inhabitants of regions that have suffered from natural disasters.

Thanks to the responsiveness, help and support of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, the republic's government, the public in all corners of the republic, and representatives of public organizations and movements, in a short period of time great capabilities were found for regulating the extremely complex process of resettlement. On behalf of Adzharia's inhabitants, I express sincere gratitude for the statesmanlike, genuinely paternal concern for solution of extremely important problems of Adzharia's present and future.

Under the conditions of economic sovereignty and local self-government, Adzharia's party and soviet agencies are called on to make great efforts to simplify existing administrative structures and decentralize management at all levels, and to actually turn power over to the soviets. In this matter we accord special importance to holding the upcoming elections in the new way, especially because our experience in organizing the recent election campaign was not particularly enviable, during it, absolutely unacceptable confrontations and misunderstanding among party, soviet and economic-management officials occurred within single election districts.

In conclusion, I will speak of the drafts that have been presented. Our proposal, to avoid the threat of a split in

the future independent Georgian Communist Party, is to define in the draft party Program and Statutes, as well as Georgia's Constitution, political, social and economic guarantees of identical status as citizens of Georgia for other peoples living in the republic, taking their distinguishing historical and national features into account.

We share the general view of congress participants concerning the need to stabilize the social and political situation in the republic. Among us in Adzharia the situation is also complicated and tense, but by no means unmanageable, and dependent on the overall situation in the republic.

We would like to convey to the Communist Party's leadership and the republic government a request from Adzharia's working people that greater resolve, firmness and consistency be shown in assessing phenomena that are unbefitting of our people, weaken an economy that is already in a state of crisis, and deprive people of faith in justice and social protection. The request, of course, is not for extreme measures, but for order and discipline under the conditions of humanism, democratization and pluralism of opinions, which are so essential in a society based on the rule of law.

For our part, we recognize the need to enhance organizational and political work in all areas, and recognize our great responsibility at the present, critical stage.

Gumbaridze Closing Speech to the 28th Georgian CP Congress

90US1027A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
18 May 90 p 1

[Speech by G. G. Gumbaridze, First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, at the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress, 16 May 1990]

[Text] Comrades!

Two years ago there is probably not a single one of you who could have imagined that the agenda of our congress would be so critical, timely and relevant, or that it would in such a principled, large-scale and thorough fashion discuss the problems connected with a fundamental renewal of the Georgian Communist Party and attainment of the republic's full political and economic sovereignty.

For a long time now communists, the people and the entire public have been concerned by these problems. They have gradually accumulated and matured, and naturally, they could not help finding some expression. A great deal has already been said about them. At our congress and at the stage of preparing for it, in primary party organizations and labor collectives and at meetings with communists, intense discussions, candid dialogue, and an exchange of views were held that were increasingly more constructive and positive in nature. Such cooperation and such relations, of course, should be

continued in the future. We should make them systematic in nature and make them more effective, many-sided and representative, actively enlisting our society's healthy forces in them.

The fact that acute issues that have developed over the course of many years were raised at our congress and discussed in a thorough and concerned fashion will indisputably contribute to the consolidation of our society, to the development of a common position, and to the constructive search for ways to solve urgent social and nationality problems.

It is also noteworthy that during the congress the desire for unity and positive cooperation distinctly manifested itself. **Despite the natural range of opinions, in every speech one sensed the main thing—the unity of approaches to fundamental problems. That is an extremely important tendency, for it indicates, above all, that we are moving from unity based on the administrative-command system to unity based on genuinely ideological, programmatic and democratic principles.** And at the present stage, that is our primary task. Such a necessity was emphasized in delegates' speeches at the congress. I think that the arguments that were expressed by the Kutaisi delegation concerning the preservation of the integrity of the republic Communist Party and the need to do everything possible to strengthen our party ranks and the unity of generations as a whole unquestionably merit attention. It is very important that the speeches of other comrades were also suffused with such a spirit.

Today party unity is of extreme, fundamental importance for all of Georgia. **The republic's Communist Party has firmly embarked on a path of achieving genuine distinctiveness and independence. And the more closely united our ranks are, the more successfully we will traverse that path.**

Many speeches at the congress expressed trenchant criticism of existing serious shortcomings in party work. It was said that the forms and methods of the work of many party organizations, bureaus and committees are not in keeping with the requirements of perestroika, democratization and glasnost. Our ties with the people, labor collectives and the public are often insufficiently strong. This pertains to both the republic and lower-level units, starting with the primary party organizations and ending with the Central Committee. We unquestionably should draw the necessary conclusions from that.

It was also said at the congress that people should invariably be at the center of the party's work, that we are obligated to show concern for their well-being and know their needs. This pertains to all spheres of our life and to every member of our society. In this respect, in our opinion, the ideas expressed by Prof Mariam Lordkipanidze and certain other delegates unquestionably merit consideration. As you said yesterday, to deal with this issue, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has already set up a special working group that, with the

participation of the republic's law-enforcement agencies, will present appropriate proposals on this issue in the near future.

In its practical activities, the Georgian Communist Party has always strived for integration of the interests of both various social strata, and of the representatives of all nationalities living in Georgia. The congress demonstrated that, by and large, we have correctly dealt with these matters. It is necessary to further deepen and improve work in this area, taking the shortcomings into account.

The congress delegates emphasized that it is impermissible to tolerate unconstructive actions in the republic and attempts to ignore the laws and authorities. That is a correct position, and every one of us is required to reckon with it.

The first stage of our congress is drawing to a close. You will probably agree with me that it unquestionably has performed its mission in both the form and content of the way it has been conducted, and in the depth of the discussion of the problems that have been dealt with.

The congress has confirmed that the Georgian Communist Party has taken a stand of renewal, self-determination, party sovereignty and independence. As we carefully weigh everything, let us maintain unity and live and work on behalf of the people's interests, and we will thereby unquestionably enhance the prestige of the Georgian Communist Party and make it a genuinely influential political force. And that is our chief task. According to our yesterday's agreement, the congress's editorial commission met this morning, and on the basis of proposals made by the delegates on a whole series of issues, it has drawn up proposals that will be presented to the congress. Allow me to acquaint you with them.

1. In connection with the draft Basic Provisions of the Program, Organization and Structure of the Georgian Communist Party, it is deemed advisable to instruct the editorial commission, taking the critical remarks and proposals into account, to prepare the draft for publication and distribute it to the primary party organizations for discussion. And to reflect in the draft an objective analysis of the stage that has been passed and of today's realities, goals and aspirations, and the strategy and tactics for realizing them.

The draft Basic Provisions of the Program, Organization and Structure of the republic Communist Party should be supplemented with an introductory section where it must be clearly stated that the Georgian Communist Party recognizes and condemns the mistakes and deviations that have been committed over the course of its history and that are incompatible with our party's new programmatic goals. Here, too, the principal motives and reasons for the creation of this important document should also be clearly formulated.

The oblast, city and rayon committees are to conduct a discussion of the draft Basic Provisions of the Program,

Organization and Structure of the Georgian Communist Party, and to present the criticisms and proposals that are expressed to the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee.

The congress's editorial commission should be instructed to systematically analyze and generalize the proposals and criticisms that it receives, and taking them into account, to thoroughly prepare a draft of this document for discussion at the congress's second stage. After it has undergone such a broad discussion and been approved, it is to be considered the fundamental basis for the activities of the republic Communist Party.

2. To provide for the delegates' purposeful work in the congress's interim period, the following commissions are to be formed: —a commission on drafting proposals for the membership of the Georgian Communist Party's elective leadership bodies; —a commission for drafting the Georgian Communist Party's election platform; —a commission for drafting the resolution and other documents of the congress; —a commission for drafting a specific program for implementing the Concept of Georgia's Economic Development.

Coordination of these commissions work, as well as generalization of the proposals received in connection with the further improvement of the Concept of National Development, should be carried out by the editorial commission.

It is deemed advisable to place the congress delegates on these commissions with due regard for their desires. And to instruct the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee to staff these commissions and resolve organizational questions pertaining to their work.

3. Taking the criticisms and proposals expressed at the congress into account, it is necessary to formulate the position of delegates from the Georgian Communist Party to the 28th CPSU Congress; that position should include the following: —The Georgian Communist Party should be an independent political organization of republic citizens who have voluntarily joined together that will be guided by Georgia's Constitution and set itself the goal of building a humane and democratic society and ensuring in practice the priority of human rights and supremacy of the interests of the people as a whole; —the Georgian Communist Party will operate on the basis of its own programmatic and normative documents, which should thoroughly take into account the specific features of the republic's national-state, socioeconomic and cultural development. The principles of the Georgian Communist Party's interaction with the CPSU and the union-republic Communist Parties should be completely new; —it is necessary to create absolutely, qualitatively new relationships, based on parity, among the republics' independent and equal Communist Parties.

On the basis of the aforementioned considerations, it is necessary to make appropriate changes in the appropriate provisions of the CPSU's Platform and draft Statutes by the 28th CPSU Congress.

In accordance with the proposals that are received, a specific program for realizing the Concept of Georgia's Economic Development is to be drawn up and presented to delegates in the second stage of the congress.

4. On the basis of the recommendations made at the congress, it is deemed advisable to raise before the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet the question of preparing proposals on a constitutional mechanism for restoring and strengthening Georgia's full state sovereignty.

Those are the proposals that the editorial commission formulated, taking the delegates' opinions into account. What will the proposal be? If you approve, I ask you to raise your credentials. Who is in favor? Who is opposed? One. Who abstains? One. Thus, all five proposals are adopted.

It is the general opinion of the delegates that our congress's work is not ending today. We should actively take advantage of the experience gained in the period preceding the congress. It has already been stated that it has been practically more than a month that the congress has been going on. We have had fruitful contacts with communists, primary party organizations, labor collectives and representatives of the public at large. Business-like, interested and intense discussions and dialogues have been held. The congress's interim period should be equally constructive both in the center and locally. The party Central Committee should set an example of this. It should do everything possible to utilize the whole congress interim period to radically renew the forms and methods of party work, its style, and its ideological and organizational structure. A discussion of the Georgian Communist Party's program documents should be conducted in all party organizations, cities and rayons, and autonomous formations. It should absolutely be ensured that the documents adopted at the congress express the opinion of the majority of communists and actually become new program documents for our renewed party.

We accord exceptionally great importance to the active participation in this discussion of the working class, our peasantry, the scientific and creative intelligentsia, young people, and people of all nationalities inhabiting the republic, to the participation of all those who are interested in our party's future, its radical renewal and perestroika, and the enhancement of the Communist Party's role in Georgia's social and political life.

I want to thank everyone who has actively supported the republic Communist Party in an extremely complex and important time for it, and who has spared no effort, energy and ability to help it master the new requirements and accomplish those large-scale tasks that our present day, perestroika and glasnost, and history have placed before it.

Perestroika and the activation of sociopolitical life have fundamentally changed the face of the republic Communist Party and of all society. The diverse spectrum of views and positions is vividly apparent. Our task is to

ensure the correct political balance and find political levers for consolidating not only our party ranks but all of society's healthy forces, and concerting their efforts. Such is the historical mission of the Georgian Communist Party today, a mission with which the complex, contradictory, but extremely interesting and important times have entrusted it.

If you agree, with this we can end the first stage of the congress, although we have no doubt that during the interim the delegates will actively work in the commissions and working groups; systematically present us with the views of the primary party organizations, labor collectives and every individual communist; and make their contribution to the discussion and preparation of the congress's program documents.

Who is in favor of ending this stage of the congress at that? I ask you to confirm so by raising your credentials. Who is opposed? None. Who abstains? One. Thus, the proposal is adopted. I want to express the certainty that we are all suffused with a single goal and single set of objectives—to serve our people and serve Georgia's tomorrow.

Information Reports from Kazakh Supreme Soviet Session

24 April

90US1002A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 1

[Information Report on the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Sessions]

[Text] On 24 April, in Alma-Ata, in the meeting hall of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet, the first session of the 12th convocation of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet began its work.

In accordance with the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR, the session was opened by the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for the Election and Recall of People's Deputies of the Kazakh SSR, G. N. Korotenko.

The state anthems of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR were performed.

Then the Mandate Commission of the Supreme Soviet was formed.

In the speech of its chairman, Deputy V. A. Brynkin, the Supreme Soviet recognized the authority of the 340 people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR elected thus far.

A working presidium for the session was elected. The session continued under the chairmanship of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet chairman, Deputy N. A. Nazarbayev.

The deputies formed the session's working organs—a secretariat and an accounting group.

An agenda for the session of the Supreme Soviet approved by the assembly was confirmed:

- election of a Mandate Commission;
- on temporary rules for the Kazakh Supreme Soviet;
- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On instituting the post of president of the Kazakh SSR and introducing amendments and additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Kazakh SSR";
- election of the president of the Kazakh SSR;
- election of the vice president of the Kazakh SSR;
- election of the chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet;
- election of the deputy chairmen of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet;
- on the draft resolution of the Kazakh SSR "On the procedure for shedding light on the sessions of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet and its permanent commissions and committees through the mass media;
- confirmation of the editors of the newspapers KHALYK KENESI and SOVETA KAZAKHSTANA";
- appointment of the chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers;
- on the program for the government's upcoming activities and the makeup of the Kazakh Council of Ministers;
- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On the permanent commissions and committees of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet";
- formation of the permanent commissions and committees of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet;
- election of the People's Control Committee of the Kazakh SSR, the Kazakh Supreme Court, and the judges of the oblast and Alma-Ata municipal courts;
- appointment of the chief state arbiter of the Kazakh SSR, confirmation of the Kazakh State Arbitration Board;
- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On constitutional oversight in the Kazakh SSR";
- election of the chairman of the Kazakh Constitutional Oversight Committee;
- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On the procedure for publishing and enacting the laws of the Kazakh SSR and other acts passed by the Kazakh Supreme Soviet and its organs";

—on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On compensation to the people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR for their activities and for their expenses in connection with their deputy activities";

- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On the land";
- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On property";
- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On local self-government and local economies in the Kazakh SSR";
- on the draft laws of the Kazakh SSR "On the local congresses of people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR";
- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On peasant economies in the Kazakh SSR";
- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On the judicial system in the Kazakh SSR";
- on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On the permanent commissions of the local congresses of people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR";
- on confirming the decrees of the Presidium of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet.

After considering the proposals received, the Supreme Soviet decided to include in the agenda as well the issue of the Semipalatinsky nuclear testing ground.

The deputies approved the working schedule, according to which the plenary sessions of the Supreme Soviet are scheduled for 24-27 April. From 2 to 12 May, the permanent commissions and committees formed by the Supreme Soviet will examine and prepare conclusions on the draft laws and resolutions, as well as on the candidacies to be elected or appointed by the Supreme Soviet. On 14 May the plenary sessions of the Supreme Soviet are supposed to continue.

The Supreme Soviet moved on to an examination of the issue of the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On instituting the post of president of the Kazakh SSR and introducing amendments and additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Kazakh SSR." On this topic Deputy S. S. Sartayev, a member of the commission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet that prepared the draft law, spoke.

Taking part in the discussion of the speech were Deputies S. Z. Zimanov, A. A. Khodov, A. D. Frezorgner, P. V. Svoiyik, A. I. Bektemisov, K. Primkulov, V. M. Tretyakov, N. V. Zadorozhnyy, T. A. Mansurov, and N. A. Kayupova.

Deputy N. I. Akuyev, chairman of the editorial commission responsible for polishing the draft law, gave a speech in the commission's name.

The Supreme Soviet passed the law of the Kazakh SSR "On instituting the post of president of the Kazakh SSR and introducing amendments and additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Kazakh SSR."

At the evening session, which was chaired by the first deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, Deputy S. A. Tereshchenko, the Supreme Soviet took up an examination of the issue of electing a president of the Kazakh SSR.

After thorough discussion, in which Deputies I. N. Tutevol, S. K. Nurmagambetov, V. D. Tretyakov, I. N. Tasmagambetov, F. A. Novikov, and M. Nurtazin took part, the candidacy of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP, N. A. Nazarbayev, was entered on a secret ballot. According to the voting results, N. A. Nazarbayev was elected the first president of the Kazakh SSR.

Kazakh President N. A. Nazarbayev took the oath of office.

Then the Kazakh president gave a speech.

With this the evening session was declared closed.

On 25 April the session will continue its work.

25 April

90US1002B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 90 p 1

[Information Report on the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Sessions]

[Text] On 25 April the first session of the 12th convocation of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet continued its work. Chairing the morning session was Deputy S. Shaukhmanov.

The floor went to Kazakh President N. A. Nazarbayev. He moved to elect as vice president of the Kazakh SSR S. A. Tereshchenko, who works as first deputy chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet.

The Supreme Soviet elected S. A. Tereshchenko vice president of the Kazakh SSR.

Then the session moved on to a discussion of the issue of electing the chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet.

Speaking to this issue were Deputies A. T. Alimzhanov, A. S. Sarin, V. Z. Dumchev, A. K. Dzheganova, S. Z. Zimanov, Yu. M. Sukhov, U. A. Dzholdasbekov, S. T. Takezhanov, S. T. Pachin, P. A. Atrushkevich, and others.

Nominated as candidates for chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet were Deputies Ye. M. Asanbayev, Z. K. Nurkadilov, and S. S. Sartayev. As a result of a secret vote, Ye. M. Asanbayev was elected chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet. He spoke to the session.

Chairing the evening session was the chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet. At his suggestion, Deputies S. A. Abdildin and Z. L. Fedotova were elected deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

A resolution was passed "On the procedure for shedding light on the session of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet and its permanent commissions and committees through the mass media."

The editors of the Supreme Soviet's newspapers were confirmed: S. Akayev for KHALYK KENESI, and Yu. A. Tarakov for SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA.

The deputies passed a resolution on the declaration of the Kazakh Council of Ministers about the composition of its authorities.

Kazakh President N. A. Nazarbayev introduced for the Supreme Soviet's consideration a proposal to appoint Deputy U. K. Karamanov chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers.

This proposal was supported by Deputies A. F. Khristenko, M. S. Karbayev, A. M. Kuchinskiy, P. I. Krepak, G. T. Turgambayev, and others who spoke to the session.

The Supreme Soviet passed the resolution to appoint U. K. Karamanov chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers.

U. K. Karamanov gave a speech "On the program for the government's upcoming activities and the composition of the Kazakh Council of Ministers."

The session is continuing its work.

26 April

90US1002C Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 1

[Information Report on the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Sessions]

[Text] On 26 April, at the morning session of the first session of the republic's Supreme Soviet under the chairmanship of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Chairman E. M. Asanbayev, a discussion began of the report "On the program for the government's upcoming activities and the composition of the Kazakh Council of Ministers."

Speaking were Deputies U. B. Baymuratov, I. N. Aymagambetov, and L. V. Kochetova. At this the debate was cut short. It was decided to return to this question after the government's report is examined in the Supreme Soviet's permanent commissions and committees.

Deputy Z. L. Fedotova, deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, gave a speech on the draft law of the Kazakh SSR "On the permanent commissions and committees of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet."

After speeches by Deputies Zh. Kaliev and V. B. Vodolazov, the editorial commission was instructed to prepare its conclusions on this draft law and present them to the Supreme Soviet.

At the afternoon and evening sessions the Supreme Soviet's permanent commissions and committees were formed, for the most part chosen by their chairmen.

The session is continuing its work.

27 April

90US1002D Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 p 1

[Information Report on the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Sessions]

[Text] On 27 April the first session of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet continued its work. Several committee chairman of the Supreme Soviet were elected.

Deputy N. I. Akuyev, chairman of the editorial commission, spoke on the commission's conclusions regarding the draft law "On the permanent commissions and committees of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet." The draft law was passed in the first reading.

Kazakh President N. A. Nazarbayev introduced a proposal to elect V. B. Isayev chairman of the republic's People's Control Committee. After discussion the Supreme Soviet passed the proposal to elect B. V. Isayev chairman of the Kazakh People's Control Committee.

Then, at the suggestion of Kazakh President N. A. Nazarbayev, T. K. Aytmukhambetov was elected chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Court.

The issue of appointing a Kazakh chief state arbiter was discussed. At the suggestion of Kazakh President N. A. Nazarbayev, I. A. Teterkin was appointed to this position.

The director of the session's secretariat, Deputy P. I. Krepak, made an announcement about the suggestions, declarations, and complaints of citizens addressed to the first session of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet. A resolution was passed on this topic.

After a speech by Deputy M. K. Izbanov, the law "On the procedure for publishing and enacting the laws of the Kazakh SSR and other acts passed by the Kazakh Supreme Soviet and its organs" was passed.

Passed as well was a resolution "On compensating the people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR for their activities and their expenses in connection with their deputy activities." I. G. Arkhipov presented information on this topic in a speech.

For the most part the staffs of the permanent commissions and committees of the Supreme Soviet were confirmed.

The Supreme Soviet passed an appeal to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the supreme soviets of the union republics, all the congresses of people's deputies of the USSR, which is being published in the press.

In accordance with the previously approved schedule, the next session of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet will be held on 14 May 1990.

Biographic Information on New Kazakh President Nazarbayev

90US1003A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 1

[Biographic report: "Kazakh President N. A. Nazarbayev"]

[Text] Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev was born in 1940 in the village of Chemolgan, Kaskelenskiy Rayon, Alma-Ata Oblast, a Kazakh. He has been a member of the CPSU since 1962. His higher education consisted of graduating from the factory-technical VUZ of the Karagandinskiy Metallurgical Plant and from the Higher Party School of the CPSU Central Committee by correspondence.

His working life began in 1960, after graduating from Dneprodzerzhinskoye Technical School, as an unskilled laborer in the Domentstroy construction administration of the Kazmetallurgstroy trust in the town of Temirtau, Karagandinskaya Oblast. Then he worked as an ironworker with casting machines in the blast furnace shop, as a blast furnace worker, as a blast furnace controller, as a gasman, and as a senior gasman for the blast furnace of the Karagandinskiy Metallurgical Complex. In 1969 he transferred to party work, as head of the industrial-transport department of the Temirtau Gorkom. During the period 1969-71 he was first secretary of the Temirtau Komsomol Gorkom. In 1971 he was chosen second secretary of the Temirtau Gorkom. Then from 1973 to 1977 he was partkom secretary of the Karagandinskiy Metallurgical Complex, from 1977 to 1979 secretary and second secretary of the Karagandinskiy Obkom, and from 1979 to 1984 secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee. Since 1984 he has been chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers.

In June 1989 N. A. Nazarbayev was chosen first secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, and in February 1990 chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet.

N. A. Nazarbayev is a member of the CPSU Central Committee and a people's deputy of the USSR and of the KaSSR. He has been awarded the Red Banner Order of Labor, the Medal of Honor, and medals of the USSR.

On 24 April 1990 the Kazakh Supreme Soviet elected N. A. Nazarbayev president of the Kazakh SSR.

Nazarbayev Speaks on Presidency, Economic Reform, Independence

90US1003B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 1

[Speech of Kazakh President N. A. Nazarbayev at the First Session of the Twelfth Convocation of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Honored people's deputies!

Citizens of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic!

An act of the utmost significance has just occurred. For the first time in the history of Kazakhstan, the republic's Supreme Soviet has established the post of president of the Kazakh SSR. I have been invested with these high and most crucial obligations.

Thank you so much for the great trust and honor you have shown me. I am sincerely grateful to you for the warm parting words and the support heard here. I consider the voting results a sincere approbation of the political course that you and I are following today—the course leading to perestroika, to a renewed, democratic, and humane socialism.

I want to assure you first and foremost that it is a matter of principle to me that I use the power as president of the republic you have given me for the good of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the entire population of our multiethnic Kazakhstan, in the name of its economic, social, and spiritual flowering.

I have already had occasion to say that the introduction of the institution of president is by no means a blind mimicking of larger national structures. The very logic of life demands a consolidating principle for executive power, to ensure the balance and efficacy of the entire modern state mechanism.

I think that a subject of special concern for presidential power will be taking measures to strengthen the national governmental and political sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR, imbuing it with new, real content within the framework of the Soviet socialist federation on the basis of a more precise delimitation of the authorities of the USSR and the republics.

Until recently, authoritarian methods in the area of national-state construction have led to the principles of Soviet federalism not simply being violated but being transformed into a mere assertion, a frank fiction. Substantive issues vitally affecting the interests of the republics have simply been ignored; everything has been subordinated to the interests of the central departments, whose dictates have often acted as a brake on the economic and social development of the regions and have stood in direct contradiction to the Leninist conception of the federative structure of the Soviet state.

Current realities are such that powerful aspirations to overcome the harmful consequences of Stalinist "autonomization" are making themselves well heard. Under their influence and at the instruction of USSR President M. S. Gorbachev, the country's Supreme Soviet has begun work on reviving the 1922 declaration regarding the formation of the USSR and on preparing a new agreement among the republics. In late March, at the first session of the Council of Federation, this issue underwent broad and lively discussion. In my speech there I spoke in the name of the republic for full-blooded

federation, the most sensible and most effective state structure not only for this century but also, I believe, for the next.

I hope you will support me in the idea that in today's frankly far from stable situation it is important to manifest calm and statesmanly wisdom. There can be no dashing from one extreme to the other—neither toward confederation nor toward a unitary state. Federation too must be built upon new, modern principles. In particular, there should be a speed-up in the passage of the kind of laws that would harmonize all-union and republic interests, would reliably defend the rights of citizens of all nationalities, and would envisage differentiated federative ties in accordance with the concrete life circumstances and socioeconomic potential of each republic.

Like other republics that are part of the Union and are sovereign and equal socialist states, the Kazakh SSR must possess full governmental authority over its own territory with the exception of those powers it has voluntarily, by agreement, delegated to the country's central organs of state power and administration. In the process, a mechanism must be devised to allow the resolution of collisions that occur between the national organs and the republic: in one instance halting a law's enactment, in another enjoining the national government to repeal a law that contradicts the republic's Constitution and interests.

A mechanism is also needed for realizing the republic's constitutional right to participate in the resolution of problems delegated to the conduct of the USSR. After all, if we're talking about a rule-of-law state, then not only must the republic be responsible to the Union, but the Union must be responsible to the republic.

A very important legal act affirming the sovereignty of the republics and their right to self-determination has been the recently passed law "On the procedure for resolving issues connected with the secession of a union republic from the USSR." It has already gone into effect. One could argue, of course, over specific articles and individual provisions. But here we might do well to recall the oriental wisdom on this account: he who has not known freedom can choke on one gulp of free air. Emotion is simply inappropriate here. We need to proceed calmly to bring the republic's legislation into accordance with this law.

By no means does this mean that with its passage the issue of exercising the right to secede from the Union will come up tomorrow. We declare once again, with all resolve and responsibility, that our flag has been and will remain red, that our goal is humane socialism in the Leninist understanding of that word, and we fully support the thesis of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress to the effect that "the weakening and especially the sundering of our

interpenetrating ties would lead to negative consequences difficult to predict for all peoples" of our country.

As president I feel that the Kazakh SSR and the republic's local congresses ought to be considered a legal entity and as such the legal owner of the land and its minerals, water, forest, and other natural resources. The locating and functioning of production and farming sites, regardless of their ownership, including those belonging to the military, can come about only with the permission of the republic and the local congresses or on the basis of mutually agreed-upon principles.

The republic must retain full competency for deciding issues related to satisfying the entire spectrum of interests and requirements of the population, including the rational utilization of labor resources, the creation of safe working conditions, the preservation of the environment, and foreign economic activities.

On 1 January 1991, the USSR law "On the bases for economic relations between the USSR and the union and autonomous republics" will go into effect. An understanding exists that in the next two months the Council of Ministers will present the necessary decisions to secure the implementation of the law as well as repeal all its acts that contradict the passed legislation.

At this point, a difficult struggle may well ensue, given that the USSR Council of Ministers has been governing the republics for all intents and purposes since the 1920s, and in that time it has passed thousands of diverse documents that have reduced the republics' rights to a minimum. I don't think the central departments are going to rescind them so easily or quickly, especially those affecting their vital, fundamental interests.

We are well aware of what led to departmental dictate here in Kazakhstan. The mass destruction of people during forced collectivization, the alienation of the people from the riches of their own land, the impoverished state of dozens of rayons inhabited mostly by the core population, the beggarly state of hospitals and schools, kindergartens and VUZes, towns suffocating in their own industrial miasma—and this is far from a complete list of the negative phenomena with which the central departments have rendered us for the use of Kazakhstan's mineral wealth. This cannot go on any longer. I'm convinced the day is not far when Kazakhstan as a sovereign state will build its relations with the USSR and the other republics on the basis of mutually agreed-upon principles and, having worked out a strong, independent policy, will begin its energetic rebirth.

When we talk about strengthening economic independence, about shifting the republic to principles of self-government and self-financing, in no case do we have in mind rejecting existing agreed-upon relations regarding the exchange of production. It is another matter that this exchange has to be carried out according to prices based on the law of cost, in accordance with the conditions of

the planned-market economy. Our principle is to preserve existing horizontal ties but take another look at prices for the industrial and agricultural production sold by the republic's enterprises. The model will necessarily improve when it takes into account new forms of management and circumstances related to the shift to a planned market economy.

I think there is no need to prove the pressing need for market relations. We have been brought to this point by the logic of economic reform as well as the entire logic of perestroika, based on the Leninist conception of building a socialist society. It is no secret that some people think we are retreating from socialism, that by introducing a market economy we are returning to the capitalist path of development. I'm not going to get into a theoretical discussion—our view of this problem has been expressed quite precisely and clearly in the report to the jubilee session on the 120th anniversary of Lenin's birth. I will say only that our generation has had befall it the honor to revive the genuinely Leninist teaching on socialism, to come to a full understanding that the new Leninist economic policy is not a forced retreat from socialist ideals but a logical, objective step in the transitional period from capitalism to another, more perfect social structure.

The path to truth has never been simple. Stalin's conscious distortion of the Leninist course, his elevation to an ideal of the principles of "war communism" for the sake of achieving unlimited personal power, has cost our people dear. Even now all is not yet in the past. The return to the high road of socialist development will be beset by real economic, social, and political difficulties. We have to be prepared that in the initial stage of the shift to a planned market economy, in the first one and a half to two years, there will be significant losses, a lowering in the population's standard of living, and other negative moments. However, we must understand that for us there is no other way to achieve a sharp rise in the economy and to break with the structure of dictate and monopolism. We must consciously tackle this steep turn in public awareness, creating in the process an atmosphere of general concern and businesslike initiative and providing widescale explanations to the people as to the essence of the problem.

We need to take exhaustive measures to neutralize as much as possible people's negative attitude toward the idea of the market. As president, I shall utilize all available and possible means to strengthen the social security of the republic's population during this difficult period, especially those groups and strata in the most disadvantaged material position.

All of us face difficult decision, and all of us shall bear responsibility for them before the people of Kazakhstan.

After the formation of a government, the deputies will have to approve its program for overcoming the crises in the economy and the basic directions for the development of the Kazakh SSR in the future. I call upon you to

manifest balance and wisdom in evaluating the situation and defining practical measures which can then become the basis for the formation of our plans. As far as our most fundamental and critical problems go, I would try to look for their resolution in these priority directions.

First, there is the creation of a solid base for the shift to the republic's economic independence, the decisive inculcation of new economic relations, from elementary leasing, the development of production cooperatives, and other forms of property based on worker's self-management, to various forms of associations, joint stock companies, and associations involving the participation of state enterprises and their workers. We must revive the entrepreneurial spirit, develop the enormous creative potential inherent in the laws of property, land, leasing, as well as in the law on peasant farming in the Kazakh SSR, which will probably be passed at this session, and in the other legislative acts of this package.

The most important clause relates to the reexamination of the relationships between the center and the republic in the area of foreign economic activity. Today it is perfectly clear that "domestic" sovereignty will be incomplete and inferior without foreign economic, hard currency sovereignty. Access to the international market, the creation of joint enterprises with the participation of foreign partners—herein lies an important route to economic independence. I see one of my primary tasks in implementing this policy.

Second, there is the structural perestroyka of the republic's economy on the basis of the newest technology and equipment, the curtailment of ineffective production, and the organization of research-intensive production, the reorientation of the economy toward the output of consumer goods and the rendering of services, and the creation of a full-blooded domestic market.

As a rule, in discussing perspectives for the development of revamped production, the center cites its obligations with respect to the division of labor among rayons, the specialization of enterprises in the European part of the country, and the need to supply them with raw materials. They talk in this regard about the impossibility of violating existing economic ties inasmuch as that would idle our forces and cause unemployment. Such considerations are serious and understandable. But then we have to start talking about establishing an equivalent exchange for raw materials, especially for the output of the mining industry and agriculture. This must be done either with through fair pricing or through a special distribution mechanism. The republic cannot go on indefinitely being a raw materials appendage and incurring losses every year of hundreds of millions of rubles that they could have had by producing end product.

In this regard, new principles and trends should be apparent in the activities of the republic's Gosplan. We need to put the Leninist injunction to transform Gosplan into a scientific-technical center into practice. Gosplan must increase its organizational role in perfecting the

economic mechanism, within the limits of its authorities try to create conditions for the development of a socially and economically strong, sovereign republic, do everything in its power to try to develop trade-monetary relations and partnerships, express concern for the observance of the principles of paying one's own way and self-financing in all spheres of economic activity, and at all levels conduct an innovative policy that takes into consideration the economy's future structure. It is the responsibility of the Economic Council created at the last, 16th session of the current convocation of the republic's Supreme Soviet to coordinate all this work.

Third and last, it is necessary to take all possible measures to improve labor, plan, and contractual discipline, to bring order into all spheres of life. Here I rely heavily on the support and high consciousness of the working class and the peasantry, which are themselves insisting on this. We simply do not have the right, comrades, not to take this change in the public mood into account. Everyone needs to understand: the guarantee of the improvement of our well-being is economic growth, but without precise, conscious discipline, that can never be achieved. I'm certain that decisive steps to strengthen discipline will meet the sincere and active support of all Kazakhstaners.

In evaluating the situation, it is impossible not to see that social issues have become increasingly burning in the republic. Today they have taken center stage and demand immediate resolution. We are right to talk about the real process initiated to reorient the economy to the social needs of the people. However, it will take great, even extraordinary efforts to make a cardinal change in the situation. We possess the real possibilities for this.

I fully share the concern regarding the resolution of such extremely important socioeconomic problems as ensuring employment for the working population of the many regions of Kazakhstan. The lack of jobs and low salaries are felt especially acutely in remote rayons inhabited primarily by the core population.

Of course, one way or another the problem is being resolved. A series of resolutions have been passed in this regard by the Kazakh CP Central Committee and the republic's government. Nevertheless, a more complex approach is probably needed, one that takes into account the historical and national peculiarities of the regions and the psychology and way of life of the population. It probably makes sense for the appropriate permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet to give some thought as well to preparing special legislation on employment.

I have no doubt that the Supreme Soviet, in examining its priorities in social policy, will also make one of its top priorities the issue of raising the standard of living for the low-income portion of the population—pensioners, families with many children, orphans, and invalids. In

May of this year the country will mark the 45th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. Our holy duty is to care for our veterans, to support them both morally and materially.

As you know, following the instruction of M. S. Gorbachev, the country's parliament has worked out and passed a resolution "On urgent measures to improve the status of women, to protect mothers and children, and to strengthen the family." Solving the problems outlined in it is also our prime concern. If we don't provide for the family, protect mothers and children, and provide the necessary means to do so today, then our future goals will be put in question.

A very complicated problem is the resolution of the housing problem. The republic has met the five-year plan for new housing and by the end of the year will have the ability to fulfill another year's quota. But the situation remains acute for thousands and thousands of people in the towns and villages. Therefore we are going to have to persist in our search for new opportunities, to take advantage of all sources for expanding housing construction, especially individual housing construction, which now makes up only 14 per cent of the total volume.

The main burden of responsibility for the practical realization of these and other measures rests above all on the local organs of administration and, naturally, on the government. But there is no doubt that we will not be able to manage without direct presidential intervention in key questions. Clearly decrees will be needed that precisely set the tasks, terms, and personal responsibility of the implementers.

When we talk about reorienting the economy toward the development of the social sphere, we mean that a change must be brought about not only with respect to the individual but also to the environment, insofar as without a healthy environment we cannot guarantee either the economic or the social goals of perestroika.

Aral was a true economic disaster, not only for Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia but for the entire country as well. Now it is rightly asserted that this tragedy has taken on world significance. Add to this the nuclear tests, spaceship launchings, strip mining, plowing up of extensive land area, construction of industrial giants, and so on. The result? A trampling, swamping, and salting of the earth in some rayons, desertification in others, an increase in slag heaps from mining operations, a spread of water and wind erosion and other destructive processes, and a fouling of the atmosphere with hydrogen sulfide and sulfurous anhydride. And this is far from all. Future generations will never forgive us if we leave them a spoiled environment.

At the present time a republic ecological program has been developed. I predict, however, that in the process of its implementation sharp struggles will take place, insofar as we will be significantly hindered by national ministries, especially the industrial ones.

In protecting the environment, we need to carry on work in parallel for the welfare of the villages and towns, for the improvement of their sanitation. Look at Alma-Ata—dirty, neglected, demanding immediate reconstruction of its entire municipal management!

Comrades! Our session is completing the creation of a new, integrated structure for the republic's congresses of people's deputies within the framework of the second stage of political reform. The reconstruction of the representatives organs, the expansion of their rights and authorities, the apparatus's unconditional subordination to them—this is the first condition for returning to the congresses the real levers of power and government. We have taken this step. In the oblasts, as you know, presidiums have been created to direct and coordinate the congresses' activities.

But this is not yet all. The congresses must acquire not only full juridical powers but also the real levers of power. The new law "On the general principles of local self-government and local management in the USSR" gives the revived congresses a reliable orientation for determining their course. But it is also necessary for the Supreme Soviet to work out and pass as quickly as possible legislation regulating local self-government in the republic, as well as republic laws about property and land, and for the Council of Ministers to carry out a complex of measures involving preparing the local economy, a material-financial base for working under conditions of self-government, and new economic and legal relations.

We obviously need to construct the work of the deputies' commissions and committees in such a way that these important documents are introduced for discussion and passage in the second session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Along with the local congresses, a list must be drawn up specifying the property to be transferred without compensation to the communal property of the various territorial levels, and norms for the budgetary provision for a single inhabitant must be established.

At the same time, once and for all, we need to put an end to the tutelage of the congresses on the part of party committees, direct interference by the latter in the solution of concrete governmental and economic problems. And under these questions I as president see my task in getting the congresses, as fully empowered organs of popular self-government, to learn the best way to make use of their authorities, to begin working at full strength. Moreover, in this new system of congresses I see the same mechanism on which the president can rely on in carrying out the responsibilities invested in him.

The issue of well-trained personnel arises of itself. The task of the congresses is to identify, advance, and stimulate organizational talent, to form from them true government professionals. True, our apparatus is much criticized and cursed today. But at all times, in any civilized country, a self-respecting organ of power has always supported the authority of the apparatus and

concerned itself with the conditions of its work. After all no matter can be executed in the state without literate and competent government workers. Therefore the question now is this: this link must correspond in the best possible manner to the complex tasks of perestroika. Today we need the kind of apparatus that is capable of competently executing its functions, of rendering all types of assistance to the congresses, enterprises, and organizations, of putting into action decisions guaranteeing a stable and effective development of the territories. No unbiased person can fail to see the changes going on both in republic and in the country. Today we are not what we were yesterday, to say nothing of what we'll be the day after tomorrow: in five years we have traversed a path that has given us all many lessons. One of them is that we finally seem to have stopped confusing democracy with permissiveness and antisocial dissipation. It is, after all, on this field that the seeds of extremism, even direct anti-Sovietism, flourish and uncertainty, fears, and pessimism are distilled.

Look closely and you will see that some work while others rush around day in and day out, round up meetings, spread disinformation, ignite intolerance, attempt by all methods to undermine belief in perestroika. They put pressure on the state and public organs by means of all manner of ultimatums.

This is why it is so important to strictly observe procedure in the conduct of meetings, marches, and demonstrations, to rebuff all extremist manifestations in a timely manner. No one should forget that democracy is inseparable from order and organization, the strict observance of the law. The peacekeeping organs must decisively cut off anticonstitutional acts, energetically oppose crime, undertake effective measures to strengthen public order and legality, proceeding from the necessity for a reliable defense of the citizen's life, dignity, and property. We need to realize without delay a complex of measures to curtail speculation and violations of the rules of trade.

In strengthening its sovereignty and independence, the republic must take upon itself responsibility for safeguarding the civil rights of people of all nationalities on its territory in accordance with Soviet and international laws.

Propaganda of ethnic hostility, dissemination of nationalist, chauvinist, and separatist slogans or calls to strife or religious intolerance must be mercilessly cut off. The full force of the laws of our country must be directed toward this.

The Supreme Soviet should bring the republic's legislation into agreement with the USSR law "On strengthening responsibility for infringements on the national equality of citizens and the violent violation of the unity of the territory of the USSR."

At the same time I want to be correctly understood: we are going to strive for cooperation, to consolidate forces with all social movements that support the positions of

perestroika and profess humanistic values, even if they have their own point of view, different from ours, on the processes under way.

Destabilizing, explosive processes are a great burden on the people's moral well-being, and decreasing them requires a solid, stable, reliable, and effective authority capable of consolidating the multi-faceted interests of the various social forces to stabilize the republic's development. It is essential to support civil peace and ethnic accord by all available methods and decisive practical actions. After all, the fate of Kazakhstan depends largely on this. Any "mountain" can be overcome if the efforts of the peoples of the republic are united: Kazakhs and Russians, Germans and Ukrainians, Uigurs and Tatars, Koreans and Dungs—everyone who holds the land wherethey were born and raised dear.

As head of the republic I shall work ceaselessly to harmonize interethnic relations, so that each person, whatever his nationality, can feel safe in Kazakhstan, can live and work confident of tomorrow. In this I see one of the chief tasks of the Presidential Council now being created as well. This organ represents a unique concentration of mindpower whose task is to work out recommendations for fateful issues in the life of the republic, suggestions for taking essential operational decisions in very complex situations.

It can be put this way: the president's activities are by their essence a concentrated expression of the interests of the entire people. But the constructive work of the people is the ultimate basis for effective presidential power. At the same time I think—you will agree, comrades—that no power is capable of replacing moral foundations, without which a normal human community is impossible. We have stunted on culture for a long time, ignored spirituality, and now we are paying for that dearly. This bitter historical experience must finally be made conscious, it must be understood that what is needed are other, concrete solutions, a protective attitude toward science, education, and art—that is, toward culture in the broadest sense of that word. It is essential in all our social, economic, and political plans that we give this aspect of public life the highest priority and thereby ennoble by all possible means the atmosphere of human relations.

Great hopes for augmenting the people's intellectual and spiritual potential rest with our intelligentsia, which, according to Lenin's famous statement, possesses the keenest social sensitivity for all social changes. In my meetings with representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia, I have purposely emphasized its special responsibility for society's consolidation and reminded them of the duty of those who people see as their spiritual mentors.

Today I would like once again to return to this but at the same time to talk about the concern that the national and republic economic organs are obliged to express about the material-technical base for science and culture, about

creative and scientific personnel, about making available to them all the necessary conditions for fruitful labor.

Each people's inherent originality, its culture uniqueness, must be inculcated from the earliest years, literally from the preschool age. It is no coincidence that the issue of reviving the cultural-creative mission of the school, about the shift to a culturally educative system of education has been posed so sharply. School and culture are not isolated concepts but inseparable parts of a single whole. Therefore it is necessary that we overcome with all due speed the separation of pedagogy from society, from national traditions and characteristics, from the concrete conditions of life in various regions, in order to achieve its organic merging with the real world of daily life, the community, and labor. It is my deep conviction that the school in general must be elevated decisively above the surrounding cultural background and stimulated to develop. The harmonious combination of national-cultural independence and common human culture—this is how the path for our school is envisaged. After all, wherever there is true culture, national strife, one people opposing another, is impossible.

I shall make full use of my powers as president to further strengthen and develop friendly scientific and cultural ties between Soviet Kazakhstan and the country's fraternal peoples, especially our closest neighbors—the workers of the Russian Federation and the republics of Central Asia, to which we are linked not only by deep cultural and spiritual traditions but by a commonality of historic destinies.

Comrades! I cannot conceive of fulfilling my presidential duties without relying on the Communist party of Kazakhstan, its Central Committee, party committees and local party organizations.

The changes introduced into articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR shall be a turning point in the development of democracy in our society. The Kazakh Communist Party, on a level with other political organizations, will participate in elections and by democratic means work to achieve the right to form a government for the republic and the local congresses.

It should be particularly emphasized that this proposal on the procedure for a lawmaking initiative was introduced to the Supreme Soviet by the Kazakh CP Central Committee. We shall continue to try to secure the power of the party masses, to extend the rights of the primary party organizations, to increase the role and authority of the electoral organs, and to create conditions for the free exchange of views, collegial discussion, and decision-making and for respect for the opinions of minorities and every Communist.

However, we need to talk about the fact that, through conversations about removing the party from its leading role in society, modern social demagogues are leading people into error, to put it mildly. It has to be obvious to each of us today that we are not talking about simple ambition of individual people but about whose hands

power will wind up in and, consequently, what the future development of the political process will be like. I'll be frank: the very existence of the socialist structure, the future of our people, has been put on the table. Under these conditions an understanding is taking shape in the consciousness of more and more people that now the party is the sole consolidating and organizing force capable of heading up the processes of perestroika and accomplishing the noble ideals proclaimed by it at the historic April plenum exactly five years ago. Everything else now is politically barren.

Life itself shows that no other groups, however clamorous or sharp-tongued their representatives, have offered one single even vaguely constructive program of action. The open letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the country's Communists, "For consolidation on a foundation of principle," speaks to this quite correctly.

As first secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, I want to assure the Supreme Soviet and all workers that the republic's party organizations, decisively ridding themselves of the mistakes and deformations of the past, are going to fundamentally restructure their activities. This work has been especially active lately, in the pre-Congress period. By taking into account the suggestions submitted by party committees and organizations, the Central Committee is democratizing its activities and perfecting its structure, style, form, and methods of work.

In the course of deliberations over the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress, the new party regulations, the platform of the Kazakh CP Central Committee's platform for its 17th Party Congress, and the election of delegates to the party congress, a broad discussion has been going on over the most pressing problems of our life, and there has been a crystallization in practice of radically renewed norms of activity for the party, which is entering a new stage in its history. This work it began of its own accord, striving to recapture its vital soul—broad intraparty democracy, the traits of a genuinely avant-garde public-political organization, rather than a closed-off, privileged caste.

In conclusion I want to address the portion of society that is the most active, dynamic and genuinely welcoming of perestroika—the young people. It is up to you, dear friends, to develop and strengthen those democratic foundations that are being laid today. It is up to you to squeeze the fruits of today's difficult, extremely intense nationwide work. You have the opportunity to pass through the marvelous school of social renewal, to take with you into tomorrow the precious political and social experience that, I don't doubt, shall sharply transform the life of future generations, shall become a foundation for constructing a genuinely rule-of-law—in the full sense of that word—socialist state. Don't skip this school. Try to derive maximum benefit from its lessons. I firmly hope we will have the support of young people in all our upcoming affairs as well as its active participation in perestroika and mutual understanding.

Allow me to assure you, honored comrade people's deputies, and the entire Kazakh people, all the nationalities and ethnicities residing in our republic, whom you represent, that I shall never use my high position to the detriment of the republic or the conquests of democracy. I shall give all my energies, experience, and ability to the further flourishing of my native Kazakhstan and its progress down the path of economic, social, and national renewal within the family of fraternal peoples of the USSR.

Kazakh President Proclaims Extra Benefits for Invalids, Veterans

90US1003C *Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 1*

[Decree of the Kazakh President: "On Supplemental Benefits for Invalids, World War II Veterans, Soldier-Internationalists, and the Families of Fallen Servicemen"]

[Text] In recent years there has been a rise in the level of social and material security for war veterans, the parents and widows of soldiers who have died in battle for the Homeland and in the course of fulfilling their international duty.

At the same time the republic and local organs and the directors of enterprises and organizations have not fully expressed their concern for improving the living conditions of war veterans, have permitted a callous attitude toward their needs and requirements, and have halfheartedly carried out the government resolutions of recent years regarding a fundamental improvement in housing-living and medical services.

For the purpose of further improving the living conditions of war veterans and the families of fallen soldiers and in connection with the 45th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, in addition to the benefits established by the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of 14 April 1990 "On undertakings in connection with the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War":

The Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Communist Party, its ministries and departments, oblispolkoms, the Alma-Ata and Leninskiy gorispolkoms, and the enterprises and organizations shall in 1990 provide housing for invalids and in 1991 for veterans as well as their dependents and the families of fallen servicemen on the waiting list for 1 January 1990.

They shall cancel rent payments for participants in the Great Patriotic War, for soldier-internationalists, and for families of fallen servicemen. They shall extend the benefits envisaged for invalids of the Great Patriotic War for payment for communal services (heat, water, gas, and electricity) to participants in the Great Patriotic War and soldier-internationalists. They shall present participants of the Great Patriotic War with the right to

acquire at no cost the government and departmental houses and apartments in which they live as their own private property.

In 1991 the Alma-Ata Gorispolkom shall begin construction of a Republic Clinical Hospital for Invalids of the Great Patriotic War and Soldier-Internationalists. Until construction is complete, it shall transfer the building of the 760-bed first municipal hospital to house the hospital.

The Kazakh Council of Ministers shall extend to participants in the Great Patriotic War and soldier-internationalists the same per diem payment for food and medications per patient in the hospitals (departments and wards of hospital institutions and dispensaries) established for invalids of the Great Patriotic War.

It shall in the course of 1990 install telephones in the apartments of invalids of the Great Patriotic War, the families of fallen servicemen and their dependents, and, during 1991, the apartments of participants in the Great Patriotic War and soldier-internationalists.

It shall designate 1,500 automobiles from the 1990 market supply to sell to invalids and participants in the Great Patriotic War and soldier-internationalists for their personal use.

It shall designate the necessary financial means for acquiring and delivering to participants in the Great Patriotic War memorial gifts valued up to 100 rubles, as well as set up a procedure for designing means for these purposes in cost-accounting [khozraschetnykh] enterprises and budgetary organizations.

The Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, its ministries, departments, oblispolkoms, and the Alma-Ata and Leninskiy gorispolkoms shall undertake additional measures to execute the present decree.

N. Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR
Alma-Ata, 26 April 1990

Citizens' Congress Faults Latvian Government

90UN2297A *Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 90 p 6*

[Report by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh: "The Session of the Citizens' Congress"]

[Text] The 2-day meeting of the 2nd session of the Latvian Citizens' Congress concluded today with the adoption of an entire range of documents; the structure was created as an alternative organ of power to the current republic Supreme Soviet, and in effect, is claiming to be the single authorized representative of state power in the future. Therefore, of course, there is no getting around a special resolution on this issue.

The resolution regarding the current Supreme Soviet states that it "is not conducting substantive measures for the factual restoration of the independence of the Latvian state," specifically, so they say, the issue of

"de-occupation and de-colonization is not being resolved and the activity of the CPSU and the KGB has not ceased, and the service of Latvian citizens in the USSR Armed Forces has not yet been abolished; the activity of military commissariats is being financed," etc. The Supreme Soviet is called upon to "formulate its position toward the aforementioned issues unambiguously and in the shortest possible period."

Among the other documents is a decision on the fundamental principles of the law on citizenship, which proclaims that "Only the constitutional institutions of the Latvian Republic after the de facto restoration of the Latvian Republic are authorized to adopt the new law on citizenship, as well as to grant citizenship of the Latvian Republic to concrete persons." That is, the current Supreme Soviet is supposedly not authorized to resolve this issue.

The "authorized representatives" also formulated in some detail the "fundamental principles of the normalization of relations of the Latvian Republic and the USSR." An entire range of points of this document concern the activity of the USSR Armed Forces and the law enforcement organs. In particular, it is specified that the USSR withdraw from the land territory and the territorial waters of Latvia all its Armed Forces, evacuate the military colleges, together with the students, close down the KGB institutions, recall to the USSR certified staffers working in the Ministry of Internal Affairs system, USSR citizens, and of military persons, including retirees, only citizens of the Latvian Republic have the right to remain. It was also noted that the USSR demobilize Latvian citizens serving in its Armed Forces and give them the opportunity to return to the republic when they wish it.

The ultimatum nature of the formulations of these and other documents adopted at the session testify to the fact that the Citizens' Congress is striving to make itself known and struggle for power at any price.

Latvian Agrarian Reform Legislation

90UN2297B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jul 90
Morning Edition p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA Staff Correspondent I. Litvinova: "Agrarian Reform in Latvia"]

[Text] Riga—The Latvian Parliament adopted the resolution, "On Agrarian Reform in the Latvian Republic."

This document states that the "forced collectivization of the republic's agriculture was erroneous both from a political and an economic viewpoint, and the methods of its realization were unlawful."

Agrarian reform, the document says, is being conducted for the purpose of restructuring land relations and property relations in the national economy. Within the framework of agrarian reform, the Government is faced

with implementing land reform, as well as reform of economic relations and the administration of the agrarian branch.

The land reform will be conducted in two stages. First of all, the land will be granted to physical and legal persons for utilization. All those wishing to do so must file the appropriate applications by 20 June of next year. These must indicate the period of the beginning of land utilization, but this must take place no later than 1 November 1996. The "term of reconsideration" first and foremost takes into account the interests of the Latvian emigration, which could, in time, return to the republic.

At a press conference in the Supreme Soviet devoted to agrarian reform, it was noted that only citizens of the Latvian Republic will have the right to property on the land, but all residents of Latvia will have the right of utilization. For the time being, one of the main issues troubling the peasants during the course of the reform remains open: for whom does the law establish priority rights to receive a land allotment—for those who are now working on it, or for the former property owners and their heirs?

Godmanis on Latvia's Economic Agenda

90UN2290A Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 24, 25 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Latvian Prime Minister Ivar Godmanis by Aynar Vladimirov and Ervin Grandavs, ATMODA: "The Prime Minister Likes a Game Without Emotions"]

[Text] The formation of the Latvian Republic Government has been completed. A fully staffed Cabinet of Ministers is ready for work. What the Council of Ministers' work style will be primarily depends on its leader—Prime Minister Ivar Godmanis.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] First of all, what laws will the government submit for Supreme Soviet consideration?

[Godmanis] Many draft laws have been referred to the parliament; one of the most important among them is the "Law on Banks." Second in importance is a draft law on taxes that unfortunately is being delayed for the time being in the government. Besides these, many other draft laws have been prepared about joint stock companies and about entrepreneurship. However in my view, these laws are secondary in nature.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] You recently said that privatization is the first and foremost task of the new government. How and when does the government contemplate implementing privatization of Latvia's national economy?

[Godmanis] First of all, I would like to precisely state that under privatization I do not have in mind a process during which ALL state property will be transferred into private hands (to its former owners). This is precisely how our opponents in the Latvian Communist Party are trying to frighten the people. The privatization process is

the conversion of one (state) form of property into several equal forms (joint property, collective property, family property, joint stock companies, etc.). One of the essential directions of the privatization process is the process through which laborers of currently operating governmental enterprises acquire property, that is, workers must become property owners.

Estonians, not waiting for the adoption of any laws, opened private stores with government authorization alone. If development of privatization legislation is held up in parliament, our government will act in a similar manner.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] Popular opinion is that you should introduce a Latvian currency, the lat, as quickly as possible. What do you think about that?

[Godmanis] An emotional approach to the question worries me most of all. Before we introduce our own currency, we must have a clear idea of the mechanism of this process, how to introduce it, how to support it, how much it will cost us, and how to tie the lat to the ruble. Yes, first of all with the ruble and only then can we think about the dollar. Of course, we need our own money if only because the ruble is not printed here, it is freely transferred and therefore we can produce as much as we want, but we do not have control over commodity-money relations. However, until the mechanism for currency introduction has been developed in detail, I would refrain from this step. At the same time, we need to firmly hold the course toward our own money, indeed, there will be no control over the economy without control over finances.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] How will establishment of direct economic relations progress to prevent an economic blockade by the USSR?

[Godmanis] Such talks have not yet been concluded at the governmental level, but specific work is being conducted in the ministries. The ministers have tasked themselves as follows: First, to conduct a complete inventory (how much and from where we import, how much and to where we send our products); second, to form a group of responsible workers in every sector which is engaged in establishing direct ties with all of the republics. Governments are only just being formed in many republics and this process depends on the readiness of both sides.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] Today, Latvian cooperatives certainly have closest horizontal ties with the Soviet Union. [What is] your attitude toward the massive loss of cooperative production in neighboring republics?

[Godmanis] I have no objection to cooperative enterprise activities in principle except for one important factor. The majority of Latvia's cooperatives export products and only import money. In essence, this is one more pump which is pumping superfluous money into Latvia. If we also had a normal commodity-money situation with the USSR, then thanks to that Latvia

might really become a "little Switzerland." But now it is necessary for cooperatives to import goods or raw materials to us. This must be stipulated in tax legislation. Otherwise, this picture will result: While purchasing and processing raw materials in Latvia, cooperatives will make a large profit while taking advantage of the commodity market in Russia. As a result, inexpensive half-finished products (knitted material, fabrics, etc.) are disappearing from our counters and superfluous money will appear. Our grocery and automobile markets, the most expensive in the Soviet Union, attest to that.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] Are we establishing economic ties with Western partners?

[Godmanis] For the time being, our intercourse with foreign guests is proceeding on two levels. The first is the level of familiarity. Various official and unofficial representatives are arriving and we are talking and clarifying the situation. The second is business. Unfortunately, a qualitative change has not yet occurred here.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] What is interfering with this?

[Godmanis] I can list the reasons impeding real cooperation: First, politically unstable relations with Moscow, and second, lack of a network of ties and communications. Without independent channels of communications (so that every conversation need not be routed through Moscow) no sane businessman will begin to engage in anything with us. Third, there are no offices for the firms' representatives. First of all, it will be necessary to find offices, albeit temporary ones, and we need to begin construction of a special trade center in the future that resembles the Hammer Center in Moscow.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] Why is there not even one representative of the opposition in the government?

[Godmanis] First of all because there was no initiative on the part of the opposition despite the fact that I discussed ministerial candidacies with several opposition representatives. At present the opposition does not have its own constructive concept, they have only a political and not an economic position. Another reason is that in general, right now, it is very difficult to form a capable government. Few people wish to assume the responsibility. A minister's seat is probably considered to be very unstable. As for the composition of our government, I think my colleagues are capable of doing good work. Our government differs from traditional Latvian postwar governments in that we do not consider our elections a guarantee for the entire five-year period. Everything will depend on the results of our actions and not on a prescribed time period. If we do not achieve positive progress, the cabinet will resign.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] How is the Cabinet of Ministers planning to solve economic problems?

[Godmanis] Economic problems will not be solved at government conferences alone. In this connection, I have introduced two proposals: first, to create an operational

economic response body. Right now everything is changing so rapidly—consumer market conditions, competition, and manufacturers; all of this demands an effective response. And we need to man an economic forecasting group. This requires exact calculations, figures, percentages, determination of capabilities and, the main thing, a search for alternative variations. Up to now, no one has been working on this. This concerns economic science in Latvia in particular. I talked with the leadership of the Academy of Sciences, with VUZ [Higher Educational Institution] economists, and with the heads of economic institutes about this. We need to create a government institute of economic advisors in the near future that is capable of forecasting, making calculations, and submitting and assessing alternative variations.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] At the initiative of local soviets and social organizations, people's public order squads are being formed right now. How does the government regard this?

[Godmanis] I oppose social organizations forming detachments that assume purely militia (police) functions. The local soviets should do this. Then it will become the first step toward municipal police. I think that maintaining local order is a matter for a specific municipality.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] Latvian residents are interested in our government's price policy.

[Godmanis] First of all, in my opinion, a portion of the goods must be sold according to commercial prices (I have in mind non-food commodities—gasoline, luxury goods, and also a portion of stocks, for example a publishing house's paper). During the transition period, obviously commercial prices and [ration] coupons (for prime necessity goods) will co-exist for a time in our markets.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] How long is your work day?

[Godmanis] More than 12 hours. I try not to work on Sunday but it is difficult to manage.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] Who, in your opinion, will win the World Cup (Soccer)?

[Godmanis] I have not had time for such things for a long while, but I always support the Germans. I like their precise, confident and persistent style of play without excess emotion.

[Vladimirov/Grandavs] Thank you for the interview.

June Baltic Assembly Documents

90UN2290B Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 24, 25 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Three June Baltic Assembly Documents, Yurmala, 16 June, 1990: "Appeal to the Russian (RFSFR) Supreme Soviet on the Decision for Intergovernmental Relations

with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia According to the Principles of the Peace Treaties of 1920"]

[Text] **Appeal to the Russian (RFSFR) Supreme Soviet on the Decision for Intergovernmental Relations with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia According to the Principles of the Peace Treaties of 1920.**

The Russian Socialist Federated Republic [sic] concluded peace treaties with the Estonian Republic on February 2, 1920, the Lithuanian Republic on July 12, 1920, and the Latvian Republic on August 11, 1920. The RSFSR "unconditionally [recognized] the sovereignty and independence" of all three Baltic states and renounced "voluntarily and forever all sovereign rights which belonged to Russia with regard to" the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian peoples and their land. The treaties stressed that "no obligations arise with relation to Russia" from the fact that these peoples and their territory formerly belonged to the Russian Empire.

However, in 1940, the Soviet Union, while attempting to satisfy its imperial ambitions and based on the criminal Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, flagrantly violated the peace treaties with the Baltic countries and occupied and annexed Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

At the present time, the situation is radically changing: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declared the restoration of their independence and they consider it necessary to maintain equal and good-neighbor mutual relations between Russia and the Baltic states.

In the year of the 70th anniversary of the peace treaties with Russia, we appeal to the Russian Supreme Soviet to return to the principles of the treaties mentioned in relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Yurmala, June 16, 1990

Estonian Popular Front Latvian Popular Front Lithuanian Movement "Sajudis"

Statement On the Baltic States in the Helsinki Process

The Baltic problem is a regional problem and is not an internal affair of the USSR, but a subject of international law.

On May 14, 1989, the Baltic Assembly adopted an Appeal to the heads of the member-states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to the Secretary General of the UN, and to the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with a request to pay attention to the Baltic nations' aspiration for self-determination and independence in a neutral, demilitarized zone of Europe and to the need for a solution to this problem on the international level with the participation of plenipotentiary representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Adhering to the principles set forth in the first Baltic Assembly Appeal and taking into account that the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic countries have announced

the implementation of state independence, we think it necessary to begin [seeking] a practical solution to the Baltic problem and with this goal:

1. Convene a conference of the member-states of the Treaty on Security and Cooperation in Europe and create an international commission to promote implementation of the Baltic countries' independence.
2. Discuss the question of the Baltic states at the preparatory meetings of the Helsinki-II Conference with the participation of representatives of the three Baltic countries and the subsequent inclusion of the Baltic question on the conference agenda.
3. We propose that the governments of all Helsinki Conference member-states recognize the democratically elected governments of the Baltic countries.

Yurmala, June 16, 1990

Estonian Popular Front Latvian Popular Front Lithuanian Movement "Sajudis"

A Resolution on the Soviet Union's Continuing Occupation of the Baltic States

On June 14, 1940, the Government of the USSR presented the legitimate government of the Lithuanian Republic, and on June 16 the legitimate governments of the Latvian and Estonian Republics ultimatums through which the Soviet Union demanded the right, at its discretion, to bring its troops into these countries and quarter them there. They essentially demanded the right to occupy Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia submitted to coercion in the hope of avoiding destruction of their peoples.

On June 15, 1940, the Army of the USSR occupied Lithuanian territory, and on June 17 the territory of Latvia and Estonia. On June 17 in Lithuania, on June 20 in Latvia and, on June 21, 1940 in Estonia, the forces of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] with the direct participation of the Armed Forces of the USSR overthrew the legitimate governments and established collaborator governments which were controlled by the USSR.

On August 3, 1940 Lithuania, on August 5, 1940 Latvia, and on August 6, 1940 Estonia were annexed to the USSR.

The annexation of the Baltic states, accomplished in accordance with the secret treaties between the USSR and Germany in 1939, are an illegal act from the point of view of conventional international law, whose principles were maintained and recognized in treaties concluded between the USSR and the Baltic countries.

Since any occupation is in essence temporary, it does not automatically alter the legal existence of the occupied state, no matter how long it lasts.

International law does not recognize occupation or annexation as the basis for ending the existence of a state.

The desires of the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were suppressed under threat of force for many years. But now the peoples of the Baltic states have expressed their will, both themselves and through their elected organs, for the first time since 1940. But the realization of this expression of will is encountering opposition. Despite the clearly expressed will of the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and their peace-loving attempt to restore their sovereignty and independence, threats and incitement of a climate of fear is continuing from the USSR's apparatus and maintenance of major units of the armed forces and state security forces and their use against the people, their elected representatives, and state institutions.

We are experiencing a continuing occupation in the Baltic countries. If the possibility of German unification has been recognized by all countries that participated in World War II, then the sole unresolved consequence of the war continues to remain the trampled independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not only victims of the crimes of Stalinism. The policy of the current leadership of the USSR, which is conducting a policy of occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, continues to remain criminal.

The peoples of the Baltic states continue their peace-loving struggle for the sake of ending the occupation by the USSR!

Yurmala, June 16, 1990

Estonian Popular Front Latvian Popular Front Lithuanian Movement "Sajudis"

Appendix

Based on the Resolution "On the Continuing Occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union," the Baltic Assembly commissions the Baltic Soviet to compile a list criminal acts by occupation troops in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Yurmala, June 16, 1990

Estonian Popular Front Latvian Popular Front Lithuanian Movement "Sajudis"

Future of Latvian Army Assessed

90UN2796A Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 24, 25 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Janis Baskers, deputy chairman of the Association of Latvian Riflemen, by Tatyana Andrianova: "What Path Will the Latvian Army Take?"]

[Text] Janis Baskers, deputy chairman of the Association of Latvian Riflemen, shares several views concerning the question asked in the title.

[Andrianova] Mr Baskers, how do you think the relations between the Latvian Republic and the USSR Armed Forces will be constructed at this stage?

[Baskers] Everything will depend upon how the political situation in Eastern Europe, including the Baltic republics, develops in the future. For example, if the Soviet troops are withdrawn from the countries of the former socialist camp and are deployed on our territory, we shall prove to be, in a way, hostages. The situation would not be dangerous in the event that we already had the status of a neutral state.

Much depends upon the relations that we shall have with the neighboring Soviet state: friendly or hostile. In the event of concluding bilateral treaties with the USSR with regard to arms reduction, the transitional period will still last some definite period of time. Hungary and Czechoslovakia are also giving a year or a year and a half for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. We will gradually become rid of nuclear and chemical weapons and the troops intended for aggressive actions will be withdrawn. It is necessary to strive for a situation in which the internal troops and the civil defense units, and the naval and ground border troops, are transferred to the Republic's jurisdiction. Proceeding from the broadly advertised Soviet defensive doctrine, we have the right to refuse the services of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Andrianova] Let's be optimists and assume that the USSR government will carry out a reasonable policy. In that instance, what path will the Latvian Army take?

[Baskers] As a result of the transitional period we can arrive at where we began in 1939: a limited contingent of Soviet troops at bases and garrisons, and then the demilitarization and gradual withdrawal of the troops.

We will need only border troops—naval and ground—and protection of the air space, combined with a system of controlling the civil air fleet. And also a ceremonial subdivision to serve during official ceremonies.

[Andrianova] Will the Republic be able to train military cadres at a sufficiently high professional level?

[Baskers] I think so. I feel that it is desirable to open a general educational institution that will combine the instruction of the contingent of the internal services (police, customs service) and the border troops.

[Andrianova] Who will be the instructors at that educational institution?

[Baskers] We have specialists. For example, those having work experience at the current military departments. We can also bring in instructors from the civilian higher educational institutions. Finally, we have the opportunity to invite foreign specialists to provide instruction and to direct our students to instruction abroad.

[Andrianova] What do you think about using the intellectual potential of the instructor staff at the military schools currently existing in Latvia?

[Baskers] Professional knowledge and experience are valued in any state.

[Andrianova] Why do you think that the International Front, the CPSU, and the army are acting in a single bloc today?

[Baskers] Well, the first two organizations constantly repeat that the army is their support. But the army is also nonhomogeneous in its attitude toward what is happening. I know officers who speak awkwardly about the 15 May events in front of the building housing the Presidium of the Republic's Supreme Soviet. Not everyone adheres to such aggressive views as those of, say, Colonel A.F. Kolbin, the former inspirer of the 15 May riots.

[Andrianova] Do you think that the army in Army should be professional?

[Baskers] For the time being, our state cannot afford a professional army. In my opinion, the officer complement must be cadre, but the middle level (that is, the noncommissioned officers) can work temporarily, on the basis of contracts, and, for the time being, it is still necessary to preserve the system of inducting young people. With the sole difference that they will perform their military service in their home republic, and normal, decent conditions will be created for them.

Readers on 'Latvia for Latvians' Debate

90UN2288A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
6 Jun 90 p 2

[Letters to the editor: "Concerning Mister E. Berklavs' Frank Statements"]

[Text] The first thing that causes doubt, as Mister E. Berklavs asserts, is that "we (that is, the DNNL [Latvian National Independence Movement]—A. Riskin) shall remain a movement, without becoming a political party." It seems to me personally that for a long time the DNNL has had all the features typical of a party: political identification; the striving for power; a mechanism for renewing the membership base, promoting cadres, and forming leaders; and a structure for working out, making, and implementing decisions. In addition, the DNNL is a purely national party, or one might even say nationalistic. It could not be otherwise if one proceeds from the basic postulate of the DNNL, which was expressed as follows by E. Berklavs: "We want the Latvians to be in the overwhelming majority in Latvia."

The attempt to prove that, in the striving to achieve a "numerical preponderance" of the Latvian population, no infringements would be made on the other inhabitants of the republic appears to be demagogic. One can scarcely be convinced by the statement that "all the

programs of the NFL, LSDRP [Latvian Social-Democratic Workers Party], and the DNNL assert complete equality in the social sphere." First, the experience of life indicates that these organizations and movements change their programs. Suffice it to compare the NFL programs that were adopted at the front's first and second congresses. Where are the guarantees that, under the pressure exerted by the radicals, the movements and parties that are speaking out in favor of independent will not reject a course aimed at "social justice"? Secondly, in the very next sentence in his interview, Mister E. Berklaivs, essentially speaking, disowns his own words, asserting that only a citizen of Latvia can possess real property. Where, then, is the logic? Especially since citizenship is not waiting for everyone.

But the most remarkable thing in the statement made by the leader of DNNL is the assertion that the limitations in the right to citizenship can depend upon "loyalty with respect to the government, the political system, and the indigenous nation and its language." Who, then, will engage in checking people for their loyalty? We shall create our own secret police system. And how will that look against the background of the numerous slogans about democracy and the pluralism of views?

Something else that is curious is E. Berklaivs' idea concerning the property qualification. Does that mean that a brawny market trader from the distant tangerine south can become a citizen of Latvia, but a talented engineer who has been invited by some plant to come from Moscow does not have a chance of having his political right and freedoms recognized?

I am ready to agree with him that "even two years from now, not everyone will know the Latvian language." And that is not only in those rayons where non-Latvians constitute the majority. Too many words have been said about real bilingualism and too little has been done to implement it. So already the notorious premise concerning "degrees A, B, and C" has already become a valid one. Incidentally, we might recall that the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] Duma disowned that "unique" document on the eve of the election to the Supreme Soviet. Now, obviously, having won the majority in the parliament, everything is returning to its former state.

It is impossible to achieve any noble intentions by using forcible means, however one attempts to disguise them. It is impossible to unite the proposed methods of Latvianization and the democratic norms that are typical of a civilized world. It is impossible to invent a "just and peace-loving" law that would force people to leave Latvia after they had sprouted their roots here, had grown with those roots firmly in the ground, had invested their labor in it, and who, finally, had spilled their own blood to liberate it from fascism. Actions like this cannot be measured by material compensation.

A. Riskin, Riga.

E. Berklaivs, DNNL leader, member of the NFL Duma, and at the same time member of the republic's parliament, is distinguished by the frankness of his statements, which he considers to be indisputable. He clearly demonstrated that in his interview.

Mister Berklaivs, without batting an eyelid, confidently divides people into grades, defining who is worthy of being a citizen of Latvia and who should be refused such an honor.

The parliamentarian asks, "Why does independent Latvia need a citizen who has no property—either money or real estate?" You have to take care of him and feed him. But he can express his dissatisfaction, can demonstrate his disloyalty to the government or can decide that he does not want to follow the example of certain other people and flit from one party to another. Who knows, it might be necessary to establish special quarries for them, as happened under Ulmanis.

And as for those who are not fluent in the state language, they cannot think of becoming a citizen. Let them take examinations, and, if they pass, they might be accepted as candidates.

And Mister Berklaivs expresses yet another idea that is simply remarkable: on the basis of genuinely just and peace-loving decisions, the eviction from the confines of Latvia of persons of nonindigenous nationality, but, of course, with the appropriate compensation and only the eviction of those who want to leave. We might note that Mister Berklaivs definitely does not call upon people to grab the migrants by the scruff of the neck and chase them out. He—merely!—states in a completely peace-loving way the undesirability of their further presence on Latvian land.

G. Serebryanskiy, teacher, Riga.

Lines from Letters

Mister Berklaivs states that Latvians have to make material sacrifices, that is, they must pay compensation for the material losses incurred by those who want to leave Latvia and go back where they came from. If that were to happen, and the departing people had any hope of obtaining an apartment in their new location, I think that there would be a large number of people wanting to move. People currently are living in a strained situation, without knowing what will happen to them tomorrow, but they are holding onto their apartments. They are still being governed by the fear of finding themselves without a roof over their head.

I myself am a Pole, and I do not have any confidence about my future. I am worried about what life will be like for my children and my grandchildren who live here.

Nothing good will happen if this reciprocal animosity continues—everyone knows what it leads to.

V. Bondar, Daugavpils.

The frank statements made by Mister Berklaivs indicate once again what is awaiting many residents of Latvia,

and not only non-Latvians, but also everyone who does not accept the bourgeois system or who does not want to lose his USSR citizenship, replacing it by citizenship in the so-called independent Latvian Republic.

We demand a referendum before making a decision concerning the future state system in Latvia.

Zelmenis, Riga.

Latvian Legislature 'Disorganized'

90UN2288B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
7 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by E. Lapidus, SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA parliamentary correspondent, under rubric "How the Parliament Operates": "Roses for the Ministers"]

[Text] Two unusual events marked the parliament's regular work week. For the first time the majority faction (131 deputies from the NFL [Latvian People's Front]) refused to participate in the voting. For the first time our parliament "went into reverse": it intends to cancel... its own decision.

But we shall discuss that somewhat later. For the time being, let us look at the calendar... On 3 June a month had passed since the day that the parliament began its work. Are the deputies satisfied with their activity? Are they satisfied with what the voters are hearing and—less frequently—seeing?

People can still remember well how, at the 1st Congress of USSR People's Deputies, in general the entire country learned parliamentary experience from representatives of the Baltic republics. And a very large number of people—some obviously, and others secretly—were proud of that circumstance.

But seeing during the past month the republic's parliament moving with great difficulty ahead, frequently getting bogged down in the procedural shallows, and getting stuck on the operating-procedure reefs, one can understand that the rating scale today is completely different.

Quite often, one and the same questions and claims that have exceedingly bored both the persons who ask them and those who listen to them travel like nomads from one plenary session to another.

Certainly the aktiv of the parliament in general, and of the presidium in particular, must be aware that there still is no firm work procedure. Even that which is adopted on a particular day, not even to mention during the week, is constantly revised. Decree drafts are distributed just before the session begins. Is it possible in this instance to count on any meaningful consideration of the question? How long will the parliament be operating: a month, two months, three?... No one knows.

There are no stenographic records of the plenary sessions. The deputies have to remind the secretariat and the presidium two or three times each about their

questions and queries. No one knows the fate of the letters and telegrams addressed to the Supreme Soviet: is it really so complicated to make summaries of them for the parliamentarians?..

These and other problems, large and small, were mentioned by representatives of the majority and minority factions at the morning plenary session on 4 June.

The presidium, unlike the situation last week, was in full complement: A. Daudiss, A. Gorbunovs, D. Ivans, and A. Krastins. But the "faucet of discontent" was opened by deputy A. Providenko. The essence of his brief statement: in addition to politics, there is also the matter of economics; it is high time to engage in what has been disturbing people most of all. So the deputy proposed listening to the government's report on the economic situation in the republic. Getting slightly ahead of myself, I might say that, in the final analysis, that proposal was passed.

But A. Berzs, a deputy from NFL, added a hefty spoonful of tar to the stream of criticism. The instructor from the Liyepaya Pedagogical Institute, after making a number of comments concerning the presidium's work, unexpectedly announced for all to hear: "The demagoguery that one hears here in Russian leaves a heavy impression."

None of the four presidium members reacted in any way to that pearl: either they did not hear it, or they did not attach any importance to it.

It was necessary for the representatives of the "Equal Rights" faction to defend themselves and to announce a protest.

As early as 11 May the session had discussed the question of a pretender to the position of the republic's minister of internal affairs. At that time V. Skudra's candidacy had not gone through. On 4 June, Prime Minister I. Godmanis recommended A. Vaznis for the vacant position.

Inasmuch as the MVD is a union-republic department, the first questions asked by the opposition deputies included the following one: "Has A. Vaznis' candidacy been coordinated with the USSR minister of internal affairs?" However, it proved to be impossible to grasp any truth from the prime minister's extremely vague answer.

Presenting his program to parliament, A. Vaznis stated, in particular, that "[it is] completely subordinated to the legislative acts of the Latvian Republic," [and that he] "does not agree with the 11 May resolution of Riga's militia workers," and "will execute the orders of USSR MVD if they do not contradict Latvia's legislative acts."

The minority faction took a negative attitude toward A. Vaznis' candidacy, assuming that B. Shteynbrik, the current minister, was coping completely with his duties.

"Shteynbrik has stated," deputy P. Shapovalov, chief of the "Plyavniye" Militia Department of the OVD [Internal Affairs Department] of the Riga Moskovskiy Rayon Ispolkom, for example, said, "that he will not leave his position so long as the USSR minister's order is in effect. Consequently, if a new minister is confirmed, some of the militia will support him, and some of them will support the previous one. And that is a step toward civil war."

This time the presidium heeded the words very sensitively. Unlike A. Berzs, parliamentarian P. Shapovalov immediately received from A. Gorbunovs, who was presiding, a dressing down for his "threat"—in the form of a protest and a forthcoming special investigation.

Before the vote, the opposition asked for 20 minutes to think things over. After small squabbles, the timeout was granted to them, but was cut in half.

On the basis of the results of the voting (114 in favor, 40 against, 2 abstentions), the Supreme Soviet appointed A. Vaznis as Latvian minister of internal affairs. The new member of the government was given a bouquet of roses.

Subsequently roses were also given to Ya. Okherin, minister of industry; V. Skudra, minister of justice; I. Emsis, chairman of the Committee to Protect the Environment; and R. Labanovskis, chairman of Latvian Radio and Television.

Inasmuch as we all, in one way or another, are linked both with radio and with television, I shall present a few items from the main points in R. Labanovskis' program: "Radio and television must present different points of view that are expressed by the different parties and organizations. Also, the adherents of the opinion shared by the majority in the parliament will be given the time priority. It is necessary to devote more attention to transmissions in the Russian language, so that the inhabitants of Latvia will be able to receive timely and truthful information. The parties will be able to express their views in the discussion-type broadcasts."

Thus, the formation of the cabinet of ministers was completed.

The "Equal Rights" faction insisted extremely forcibly on the need to have parliament ratify a union-level Pensions Law. The deputies, substantiating their proposal, stated that a very large number of the republic's elderly inhabitants were disturbed by the question of pensions: would they continue to be paid out in the future? For how long? And in what amount?

In order to calm people down and to remove the tension, if only in this regard, the opposition tried to prove the importance of ratifying that law.

Representatives of the majority did not support that idea. Their motivation? Already, for something like four months, the NFL has been developing a republic-level

Pensions Law that they claim will definitely be better than the union-level one and that will not offend anyone living on Latvian soil.

It was decided to carry out a roll-call vote. But no one in the auditorium had seen the ritual that was usually performed by J. Dinevics, the chairman of the NFL faction: the extended hand with the thumb pointing up, to indicate that we are voting "pro," and with the thumb pointing down, to indicate "con." The majority refused in general to vote on the question of ratifying the union-level Pensions Law.

And here is a curious item. Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Gorbunovs took part in the vote, but he rejected the opposition's proposal, voting against it.

The ratification did not occur.

The monetary "allowance" that the parliament defined for itself has already been discussed. We might recall that the salaries paid to the deputies exceed the average republic salaries by a factor of 2.5.

At the end of the 4 June session, A. Gorbunovs reported a "very unpleasant bit of news": it was necessary to reconsider the session's decision concerning the material support of the people's deputies and to bring it into conformity with the allocated budget."

So the morning of 5 June began with the consideration of that question. The discussion took various directions, and different opinions were expressed. Including, for example, this opinion stated by one of the deputies in the majority: "How can we cancel a decision that we ourselves passed only a few days ago?" Well, this is truly a case of "make haste slowly"...

The deputies argued back and forth, and they assured the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet that within two weeks they would work out the question and submit it to the session.

Just before the closing of the plenary session, the deputies once again (it would be interesting to know for which time) started a discussion of rough spots in the parliamentary mechanism.

The presiding A. Gorbunovs, remarking that "all the comments concerning our overall lack of organization are justified," reported: at the next Presidium session a number of problems will be resolved. And there is something else. In June and July the deputies will have to work; no vacations are planned in the parliament until August.

Suspension of Latvian Declaration Urged

90UN2288C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
8 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by A. Rubiks: "Appeal to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic; Copy to: USSR President, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev"]

[Text] The Committee for the Defense of the Constitutions and Rights of the Citizens of the USSR and Latvian SSR has been receiving numerous letters and appeals from the republic's workers and citizens in which they persistently demand the suspension of the Declaration for the restoration of the independence of the Latvian Republic, which Declaration was adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet on 4 May 1990.

In accordance with an Ukase of the country's President, that declaration has not had any legal force since the moment it was adopted. On their initiative, more than 200,000 inhabitants of Latvian SSR have already signed the demand to conduct a referendum relative to the republic's future status.

The workers of Latvia justifiably feel that the provocative actions of the republic's Supreme Soviet and the ignoring of the Ukase issued by the USSR President can lead the republic down a sociopolitical blind alley and can result in a serious aggravation of the interethnic relations and a lowering of the standard of living. A graphic example is provided by neighboring Lithuania. The attempts by its Supreme Soviet to ignore the Constitutions of the USSR and the Lithuanian SSR and to force upon the country's government its conditions for the beginning of negotiations are not finding support even in the West.

Lithuania's bitter experience shows convincingly that our republic today has only one path for resolving the question of self-determination—the path of negotiations, the path of respecting the Constitutions of the USSR and Latvian SSR. One cannot forget that the many years of integration as part of the Soviet Union cannot be annihilated by a poorly thought-out decree that has been hurriedly enacted on a unilateral basis; such an action would cause catastrophic economic consequences for both sides. It is possible by nationalistic positions only to attract a segment of the population, but not to feed them.

Recognizing our responsibility for Latvia's future and for our children's future, we call upon the republic's Supreme Soviet to demonstrate prudence, to become aware of the total perniciousness of the unilateral approach to the resolution of the fates of our republic's peoples, to suspend the action of the Declaration concerning the restoration of the independence of the Latvian Republic, and to begin negotiations with state agencies of the USSR to conclude a new union treaty.

The time has come to become aware that it is only this approach that can open the path to the resolution of the crisis problems that have accumulated in the republic.

A. Rubiks, chairman of the republic Committee for the Defense of the Constitutions and Rights of Citizens of the USSR and Latvian SSR.

6 June 1990.

Latvian Communist Party Appeal to Economic Leaders

90UN2288D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
9 Jun 90

[Unattributed article, under rubric "Under the Flag of Perestroika: Today the 25th Latvian CP Congress Will Continue Its Work in Riga": "Appeal by the Latvian CP Central Committee to Enterprise and Organization Administrators—Communist Party Members and Non-Party Members"]

[Text] Comrade administrators!

An extremely complicated political and economic situation continues to exist in the republic. The government and the agencies of power have not succeeded in stabilizing the state of affairs in the national economy. Production is in a slump, inflation is increasing, and the shortage of food products and everyday necessities is becoming worse.

The political, economic, and social tension in the labor collectives and among the population has been aggravated even more by the hurried adoption, under pressure from the NFL [Latvian People's Front] Duma, on 4 May 1990 by a session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet of the Declaration entitled "Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic."

By crudely flouting the USSR Constitution and the Latvian SSR Constitution, the declaration created a real threat to the destruction of the system of social protection of the workers and caused a distrust toward Latvian enterprises on the part of their partners in the other union republics, a situation that can lead to the breaking of the economic ties that took many years to develop in receiving supplies of raw and other materials and components, and can lead to the complete destabilization of production and to mass unemployment.

The unjustified hastiness in the enacting of laws and the government's lack of any programs for developing the republic's economy and satisfying people's social interests are causing them to be increasingly alarmed and unsure about what tomorrow will bring.

Despite the increased political participation by the population, the republic's new leadership proclaims so-called depoliticalization, which is aimed at the practical elimination of the primary organizations of the Latvian Communist Party from enterprises and institutions and simultaneously at the expansion and strengthening of the NFL structures.

Under these conditions many administrators are being subjected to psychological pressure as a result of their ideological convictions and their adherence to the true independence of the workers collectives, an independence that does not recognize the diktat either of the union departments or the republic ones. Certain of them

have completely lost control of themselves and are seeking an answer to the question of what to do and what choice they should make.

In this regard, the Latvian CP Central Committee appeals to all the administrators of the republic's enterprises and organizations—both Communist Party members and non-party members—to remain faithful to the socialist choice of perestroika, to take consistent and persistent actions to implement the economic reform, and to continue to participate actively in the work of their party organizations.

The Latvian CP Central Committee expresses its conviction that at this contradictory and complicated time the administrators and specialists in the national economy will display their competency, high level of professionalism, initiative, and enterprise in the search for a way out of the crisis situation and will channel their talent and energy into the consolidation of the collectives, the reinforcement of their independence, the increase in the responsibility for the results of their activity, the creation of mechanisms for the social protection of the workers, and the improvement of their working, everyday-living, and recreational conditions.

In this important and complicated work, the administrators of the worker collectives can count on the assistance and support of the Latvian CP Central Committee, the party's city and rayon committees, and the primary party organizations.

(Adopted at the 4th Plenum of the Latvian CP Central Committee, 8 June).

Exodus from Latvian Communist Party Ranks

90UN2288E Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
9 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with V. Varnas, member of the Latvian CP Central Committee, and rayon first secretary. (Recently V. Varnas was appointed deputy chief of the Party-Organization and Cadre-Work Department of the Latvian CP Central Committee), by S. Shcherba: "Stability Test"]

[Text] The schism that occurred at the 25th Latvian CP Congress has left its imprint on the life and activity of all the republic's party organizations. The demarcation process that is being encouraged by the adherents of the NFL [Latvian People's Front] and the NKPL [Independent Latvian Communist Party] is continuing. There have been instances when, because of their fear of losing their jobs, economic administrators are rushing to separate themselves from their previous convictions and are announcing their withdrawal from the CPSU. Our correspondent S. Shcherba had a discussion about the situation that has developed in the party organization of Balvskiy Rayon with V. Varnas, member of the Latvian CP Central Committee, and rayon first secretary. (Recently V. Varnas

was appointed deputy chief of the Party-Organization and Cadre-Work Department of the Latvian CP Central Committee.)

[Shcherba] Vytautas Pavlovich, how are the Communists in the rayon reacting to the attempts by representatives of definite circles to convince people that the Communist Party has lost the confidence of the labor collectives?

[Varnas] To a certain degree that confidence has been undermined, but it is not lost. Despite the difficulties that the Communists have been experiencing after the 25th Latvian CP Congress, our rayon party organization is continuing to function. With the exception of three primary organizations, the structural network of our party has been preserved, and most of the Communists are executing in a precise manner the duties as specified in the party rules.

If one speaks about sifting out, it must be admitted that some of the Communists did not withstand the stability test after the formation of NKPL. At a recent bureau session alone, we considered 168 requests [for resignation from the party]. More than 400 persons have left the CPSU.

Incidentally, I would like to say a few words about the name of the new party. It is definitely not communist, and certainly not independent. It is yet another wing of the NFL, which is being formed with the purpose of putting up organized resistance to the Latvian Communist Party.

[Shcherba] Is it possible as early as today to define the dominant motivations for persons who are leaving the party?

[Varnas] Most frequently the underlying reason is the instability of their political convictions. But there are other contributing factors.

For example, veterans are leaving the party. These are people who have traveled a long and complicated path during their lifetime, who have done a lot in the past to develop the Communist Party.

As a rule, these requests are satisfied, and the Communists thank the veterans for their long years of conscientious work in the party organization.

I would also like to mention here certain other views with regard to this category of people. For a long time, proposals concerning the status "Honored Party Member" have been made. On behalf of a Central Committee commission with the past makeup, such proposals were also sent to CPSU Central Committee. If they had been accepted, we would have retained many veteran Communists in our ranks.

Here is a second consideration.

If, for 40-50 years, a Communist supported the party materially, it could have returned to him during his

declining years part of those dues in the form of a monthly supplement to his pension from the party budget. That is very important currently, when the articles in the Constitution concerning the party's guiding role in society have been annulled.

The second group, that also is rather numerous both in the city and in the countryside, includes the rank-and-file workers who are still in their prime. In most instances they are conscientious, hard-working people who at one time were used as an example for others. In order to create the appearance of a high level of political awareness among these people, they were simply subjected to a propaganda campaign urging them to enter the party. They continue to work well, but they have no intention of entering the political struggle. They are not fighters. After becoming thoroughly acquainted with the position taken by these people, and after explaining to them the essence of the events that have been occurring, we offer them the freedom of choice. I am convinced that, with the passage of time, some of them will return to the Communist Party.

Yet another group is made up of those who leave the CPSU for ideological reasons. There are not too many of them. Out of the 168 requests that were considered at the recent raykom bureau, only nine persons stated that they were entering other political parties. Incidentally, a few people wrote in their request, "as a result of changing over to another party." I would like to re-emphasize: there cannot be any changing over, or any transferring. The phrasing, in my opinion, should be as follows: "exclusion from membership in the CPSU as a result of his having entered another political party."

There exists a rather large group of Communists, both rank-and-file and administrators of various rank, who trust the Communist Party, but who are intimidated by the demand to "depoliticize" on the part of their superior administrators, who have not been able to resist the pressure by various NFL currents, and have left the party, but who, deep down, support its goals and tasks.

And, finally, the last category. It is made up of those who sneaked into the party for opportunistic reasons. Sometimes they did not believe in anything, but only simulated energetic action during all the periods when the party was the leading one. After receiving everything that they could get from the party—education, a position, material blessings, and many other things—those persons, sensing the possible changes, deserted the Communist Party and became hypocrites. The level of their convictions depends directly upon their salaries and other blessings.

Unfortunately, such people also existed both at the farm level, and at the level of the republic agencies of administration and power, including the party's Central Committee. At a particular moment, these people can have the appearance of authority, but in the long run this category will never enjoy people's respect or understanding.

[Shcherba] How has the tendency toward people's leaving the party affected the party's raykom, bureau, and apparatus?

[Varnas] The makeup of the raykom and the bureau has been cut in half. The raykom apparatus remains true to the ideas of the CPSU and defends the positions of an independent Latvian Communist Party that cooperates closely with the Communist Parties of the other republics and that coordinates its activities with the CPSU as a whole.

[Shcherba] What has the depoliticizing been under the conditions of Balvskiy Rayon?

[Varnas] I do not accept the term "depoliticizing." That idea probably floated to the surface for the first time at the last session of the republic's Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, when jurists pushed through a legislative act concerning the depoliticizing of the agencies of justice. I voted against that act and to this day I do not understand how people who were called upon to propagandize the observance of laws could carry out punitive functions on behalf of the state with respect to those who violate the laws, or could enact a document that is so contradictory in all respects.

Then the apparatuses of the various departments began to "depoliticize," and a number of primary organizations of the Communist Party temporarily stopped their political activity.

The epidemic also got as far as Balva. Ya. Gagaynis, chairman of the rayon soviet, and Yu. Salmanis, his deputy, announced that they were leaving the CPSU. The raysovet ispolkom headed by V. Shlyakota decided that its apparatus did not need a Communist Party organization. Whoever has remained a Communist has had his records maintained at the territorial party organization under the party's raykom and continues his sociopolitical activity.

I also want to mention something else. First, no "depoliticizing" is actually occurring. Rather, it is a process of "repoliticizing." The very same deputy chairman of the rayispolkom, A. Zaykovskis—a proponent of depoliticizing—was elected the leader of the so-called independent Communist Party and is attempting to create its structures in the rayon.

As a result of the "depoliticizing," the Popular Front structures have begun penetrating more deeply into the agencies of administration and state power.

Secondly, one is struck by the naivete of the judgments concerning depoliticizing, regardless of the level on which they are made. Because, in the long run, a person's membership in a particular political current is defined not the existence in his pocket of a party card or other document, but by his convictions. One can adopt any laws or decisions to disband party organizations or to require the handing over of party cards under the threat of being fired. However, a person's convictions, if they

do exist, are not subject to authoritarian decisions from even the highest agency of power.

[Shcherba] How do you evaluate the level and importance of the mass media at the present stage?

[Varnas] It would be desirable for our newspapers to provide more complete and more objective information. I know of authenticated instances when, to the advantage of definite forces, information has been provided in distorted form. For example, on Victory Day we had a rally in our city, at which one of the NKPL leaders—A. Zaykovskis, first deputy chairman of our rayispolkom—made a speech in which he attempted to cast a shadow on the Soviet Army and to disparage the role of the Victory. Those present simply would not listen to him. I shall not paraphrase what the war veterans told the unlucky speaker. The terminology was definitely not diplomatic. You can imagine the readers' surprise when, in the next issue of VADUGUNS newspaper, there appeared an item attempting to rehabilitate both Zaykovskis and his statement.

Here is another example. When TSINYA newspaper was running a series of articles on the topic "What Kind of Newspaper Should We Be?", we in the party's raykom re-addressed to the editorial office 14 letters from readers who demanded that the TSINYA collective remain in positions of an agency of the Latvian Communist Party, rather than the NKPL. A short while later, that newspaper published information according to which it had received from the entire republic only four letters whose authors did not agree with the TSINYA's changeover to the "independent" camp. Now that's pluralism for you...

And there is something else. The informals accuse the Latvian Communist Party of inciting passions, of issuing appeals for confrontation, but they themselves are publishing items that demand the restoration of the formation of aizsargs and the creation of detachments for self-defense and the protection of law and order. Who, then, is promoting confrontation?

[Shcherba] What today is the main thing in the activity of the rayon's party organization?

[Varnas] It is most important to go to people, to explain to them the goals and tasks of perestroika, and to convince them that the path to prosperity is in the unity between the population of Latvia and the workers of the other republics. Alienation and confrontation are a blind alley from which it will prove to be unbelievably difficult to extricate oneself.

[Shcherba] Thank you for having this discussion with me.

Tasks for Party Restructuring in Moldavia Outlined

90UN1969A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 4 May 90 p 3

[Article by V. Stati, party secretary of the Ethnography and Art Studies Department, Moldavian Academy of Science, under rubric "Discussing Party Perestroika": "What Lies Beyond the Curve?"]

[Text] The revolutionary quality and uniqueness of perestroika, combined with the specific features (historical, demographic, geographic) of the republic, on the one hand in many ways explain the current socio-political situation while, on the other, they compellingly demand radical changes in party ideological work. Familiar standards, it appears, don't work, foreign models don't fit, and as far as the current situation is concerned, the classics have left neither guidelines nor answers to the questions: What is to be done? What lies beyond the curve? It is, therefore, appropriate to recall Lenin's words: "We now have to extricate ourselves" (Complete Works, Vol. 45, p. 84).

The recurring questions from different audiences are: Why has this happened? What next? And one has to reflect, to the best of one's ability, on, for instance, the underlying causes of the current socio-political and interethnic situation.

An observant person can't help noting the growing fluctuation of ideas in our society. And that is good. But even the most democratic society must be able to defend its principles and uphold its system of views and ideas. It would be lacking in objectivity to pretend that there are, at present, no ideas which, for example, question, at first timidly and then openly (and not only on the pages of the "alternative" press, but in official, departmental, youth and other publications), the national self-consciousness of Moldavians, the name of their language, the historical name of their state. These ideas are being persistently and consistently injected into the public consciousness. Thus a philosophical (ideological) background is gradually being fostered which retrospectively rejects scientifically validated, historically established facts of life... It is interesting and instructive to tabulate, and certainly to analyze, how many times the republican press, including party publications, and radio and TV broadcasts have directly or indirectly questioned the self-consciousness of the region's main ethnic group, and then to analyze how many times that concept has been challenged. A simple comparison of the results would explain why some concepts—perhaps not the most justified, including concepts about the role and significance of the party in present-day conditions—have been gaining credence among the masses, while those conceived in pain and suffering make little headway. That would be an evaluation of party ideological work. And it would be one of the answers to the question, How can this be? It is with such examples and in such situations that the ability of ideological workers (their ability to generalize, see the

overall picture and define the trends in the evolution of events), and their ability to influence the thinking and moods of people in a timely and convincing fashion, is verified.

But how are we acting today? As before. Here is one banal example. In October 1989, a section chief, citing instructions from a Central Committee secretary, asked for an article to be written on the historical roots of Moldavian self-consciousness. He assured that publication would be guaranteed. The article was written and even approved. However, it still remains unpublished. It is not a matter of author pride, but that since then numerous articles based on other concepts have been published. Has the truth gained from this? It is doubtful. And secondly, in that case one shouldn't reproach "certain scholars" for "going underground." With such an approach all appeals to look for approaches and active involvement in the formulation of new variants are but hollow sounds.

Yet without the comprehensive and concerned involvement of modern intellectual (social science) forces in party work, without trusting their efforts, quests, doubts and proposals, it is hard to resolve the problems facing the party ideology corps.

Unfortunately, in my view party ideological work still retains vestiges of post-war unconditional subordination, "universal approval," and the requirement to speak right, i.e., about everything and nothing, but "in line." Because, as we see it, authority still remains in the hands of people who continue to rely in personnel selection on the overwhelming standards of the Procrustean bed of biodata forms, which favor mediocrity and rigidly see to it that a person recommended for a certain position conforms with all other requirements, invented no one knows when, such as the requirement to be, for example, an agronomist, livestock expert or, at the very least, an engineer-economist...

Another priority concern is the restructuring of party work in the sense of its humanitarianization and, as a consequence, the humanization and democratization of the party ideology corps, its replenishment with philosophers, sociologists, historians and political scientists, and a revision of the methods of selecting them. **A decisive role in this belongs to primary party organizations and meetings of communists capable of reliably judging breadth of outlook and ability to conduct substantiated debates, use persuasion, and respect one's opponents.** These well-known qualities are always important, but especially today, when the party is beginning to work in unfamiliar multiparty conditions.

Party workers and firm communists can look forward to highly charged and extremely interesting times: They will have to prove the truth and attractiveness of their objectives and tasks every day, every hour, and with their own example. They will have to upgrade and rally all their knowledge, foster and display the qualities of a tribune who sticks to the point, upholds his ideas and the

party's positions firmly and with conviction, not only before approvingly nodding or silently endorsing audiences, but in fierce clashes and heated debates with professional opponents whose ideas are shared by a certain segment of the people (it is essential to keep the latter in mind). That is when the true qualities of communists and the professional level of their leaders—from secretary of a primary organization to Central Committee secretary—will come into play.

Another problem which, in our view, requires immediate consideration is that of radically restructuring relations between the republican party organization and its press organs. **It is, quite obviously, too much of a luxury when newspapers feel as if they were embarrassed to stand up—of course, with telling arguments and conviction—for their sponsor's positions, or when they avoid alternative views, either because they don't coincide with those of the editors or out of fear of being ostracized by other organizations.** It is hardly beneficial or safe for the vitality of a given party's ideas when its media outlets avoid carrying many articles because they (or their authors) are unacceptable to some scientific or intellectual circles. Moreover, they do so at a time when the press organs of those circles, one must give them credit, ably and consistently propagandize their own concepts regardless of whether the ruling party likes them or not. It is necessary to act professionally, i.e., to display constant concern for one's own system of views and ideas and for keeping them from being shunted off the pages of their own publications. And one should not, as occasionally happens, haughtily dismiss the efforts of the ever shrinking *aktiv* which, laboriously, with occasional mistakes, dares to uphold those views and ideas. As A. N. Yakovlev reminded in his article, "The Enemy Syndrome: Anatomy of a Social Ill": "A normal democratic process presumes competition in everything, creative competition... One can argue with any position, with any point of view... But one cannot deny a person the right to publicize his views" or "hound him only because he doesn't share certain views and convictions, still less set others on him with misquotes, labels and concoctions..."

It is hard to get rid of the feeling that we are still unable to free ourselves from the prison of methods and devices of discrediting and silencing people so deftly and persistently held out for our consumption.

What we will yet encounter—indeed, are already encountering—are **unprincipled attitudes towards the ideological positions of our opponents, attempts to flirt with them, to act with an eye on their views, regardless of whether they are justified or not.** Here another paradox comes into play. Many of those who openly regard themselves as adherents of true communist ideas and uphold, to the best of their understanding and abilities, the party's aims of perestroika have limited or even no access to the party mass media. Others are even worse off. Some party newspaper editors blandly declare that this is done so as not to irritate or anger those who speak at mass meetings and rallies, as well as their press organs. But for all the popularity and growing influence of those

people, they have yet to prove that they are the sole bearers of truth. In fact, it is hardly appropriate for anyone to make such claims. Of course, consolidation is our noble goal and daily task. But it is apparent that it can be achieved only on the basis of sincerity and responsibility of all sides, on the basis of truth, however stark and bitter. Consolidation means mutual movement towards one another.

Another fact of life already encountered by the republican party organization involves cases when, beneath the camouflage of perestroika-type slogans of fighting the party bureaucracy and the heritage of Bodyulism, some communists, and even secretaries of party organizations who have been supported, promoted and cuddled by the party, may desert to other organizations and even join their leadership. It is hard to ignore the moral aspect of such actions, but one can try. But in any case, it is impossible to brush aside the question: What keeps us from timely recognizing the symptoms of such metamorphoses? And if we do see and recognize them, why don't we characterize such actions for what they are and evaluate them objectively? There was a time when some people did everything to join the CPSU. But, having achieved their personal goals with the help of the party, they now make it appear that they were forced to act as they did. These are not isolated cases; it is a phenomenon, and it is hardly wise to ignore it.

Today party ideological activists at all levels must in fact move their work of persuading the masses of the truth of their objectives and feasibility of their programs directly to the collectives (production, scientific, artistic, academic, etc.). While they should not avoid debates and polemics with other organizations and parties, they must also understand that it is only there that the party can restore its reputation and trust, not at rallies. Rallies, we know, are more suitable for displaying moods, not forming opinions. Experience (and not only in our republic) has shown that at rallies the most noble appeals to reason go unheeded. On the contrary, those reasonable appeals can well spark unpredictable reactions.

We think that speeches by officials or scholars in city squares are not the most fruitful form of dialogue. It would seem much more appropriate to speak before collectives. Mutually frank, sharp debates at the Alfa and Plodselmash plants, with party and administrative personnel in the town of Bendery, with the teachers of Rybnitsa, and in other places, show that it is possible to relieve tensions even among the most radically minded audiences. I am confident that the formation of permanent clubs at large enterprises with multinational worker collectives for political debates concerning the role of the party in present-day conditions, on interethnic relations and timely intensive party political work by specially formed teams of linguists, historians and lawyers in Tiraspol and Rybnitsa would rid us of many complications. After all, there are reasonable people everywhere who understand objective information and respond to reasonable arguments.

Since for decades certain social groups—kolkhoz members, workers, women, and others—were excluded from active public life and political relations, it is essential, we feel, for the Moldavian Communist Party to change its style. This was most graphically apparent during the last election campaign, and it is reflected in the make-up of the deputies. In order to productively utilize the massive explosion of activity, the universal desire to participate in political life, it is necessary for as many people as possible to learn the rules of social relations in a democratic society. This aspect emphasizes the need to organize party clubs (of voters, candidates, future politicians, etc.) which would study the political structure of society, the role and place, rights and duties of party leaders and government executives; they would offer an initial course in political action, teach ways of conducting debates and taking political approaches to the solution of difficult problems. We think that the sooner this is realized and implemented the more effective will the results be of stepped-up party political activity within the still passive social groups that want something but don't know how to achieve it.

The need to restructure the political and ideological work of the Moldavian Communist Party in the context of Eastern European processes seems obvious. The events in neighboring foreign countries (Bulgaria, Rumania) and their subsequent evolution will have a tangible impact on the people's mood in the republic and on the ideological foundations of the *aktiv*. Continuing political and ideological work on the basis of negation and rejection is simply inappropriate, inasmuch as it is unscientific and looks like a vestige of the policies of the 1960s and 1970s. The elaboration of new ideological and political approaches for the Moldavian Communist Party in the current situation is an extremely delicate and difficult job, but it is also inevitable. This once again emphasizes the acute need to involve in party political work knowledgeable specialists possessing initiative, a non-traditional mentality, and not necessarily ideal "background statistics."

We are going through a stage when the party is returning to its roots, when it is recovering the status and mode of action of a political party. Beyond the curve, tomorrow communists can expect unfamiliar situations, when it will be necessary to act not only using political methods, but also alongside and on an equal footing with other public formations, with only the law above. It is necessary to adapt to this as we move: to restructure our ranks, clear away the ideological rubble of stagnation, and verify our bearings according to the compass of our time.

Moldavian Supreme Soviet Session Report

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14-20 May pp 9, 14

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Eduard Kondratov under rubric "Hot Points": "Collision of Icebergs. Notes From Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] God only knows when the session of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet, which began back on April 17, will end. The euphorious newly elected parliamentarians are bent, it seems, on cutting the knots of all the problems they have been bandying about for months at rallies and election meetings. That is why the 35 items of the initial agenda were expanded by almost as much again, though later, to be sure, they decided to restrict it to just 15 more. The others will be taken up later by the standing commissions.

Procedural questions took an enormous amount of time. In the first three weeks the session only managed to discuss the floor time-limit, elect the President of the Supreme Soviet, pass the law on new national symbols, and a decree to go over to local time: minus one hour from Moscow time.

From the very first day the session has been engaged in a contentious, usually far from mannerly struggle. The inevitability of this was easily predictable, insofar as it reflects not so much the political pluralism of our time as the clearly defined ethnic confrontations that have developed in Moldavia. They grew sharper about a year ago, with the beginning of the public debate on the draft language laws. The laws were passed last fall, when the session was preceded and accompanied by protest strikes organized by the non-Moldavian population of several industrial cities, which literally rocked the republic. Since then the Presidium of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet has on numerous occasions had to declare invalid decrees of the Tiraspol, Bendery and Rybnitsa city Soviets on civil disobedience, nonrecognition of the language laws, on conducting a referendum in Tiraspol, which was held nevertheless. Today the situation is no better. As a result of the elections one-quarter of the Supreme Soviet deputies are Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians; the rest are Moldavians. Most of them share the platform of the Moldavian National Front, and some side with even more radical movements. They rarely acknowledge this out loud, from the podium, but the turbulent ocean of parliamentary passions is transparent. Beneath the legal, historical and political arguments of this segment of the corps of deputies is clearly discernable the submerged bulk of the iceberg: a stubborn desire to get rid, as quickly as possible, of "Moscovian, imperial, Russian dictate," or, euphemistically speaking, to acquire full Moldavian sovereignty. That is why such intense interest is concentrated on 1940, the year when Bessarabia merged with the Moldavian ASSR and the Union Republic was formed. "We didn't enter the USSR, so we can't speak of leaving it," some deputies echo politicians from the Baltic republics.

To be sure, there seems to be no talk at the session of seceding from the Union. They are speaking of a new federation or, more often, confederation. They also declare that the Constitution of the USSR is "not mandatory" on the union republics and that it is necessary to rewrite the "Stalin-Brezhnev" Moldavian Constitution as quickly and as radically as possible. What should the

new constitution be like? So far the talk is only of amendments to the old one. It is around them that passions are surging.

For example, several deputies have come up with the idea of renaming the Supreme Soviet itself, of abandoning the Union pattern and calling it "Sfatul Tarei," that is, what the supreme authority was called during the revolutionary years and the brief existence of the Moldavian Republic. However, that proposal was scuttled because it failed by a mere 12 votes to win the required two-thirds majority. Recalling that it was the "Sfatul Tarei" which in 1918 adopted the decision for Bessarabia to join Rumania, the non-Moldavian parliamentarians jointly opposed the resurrection of such "traditional" names. Deputies representing the Unity Intermovement, as well as areas with Gagauz and Bulgarian populations and inhabitants of the Dnestr River left bank, saw the idea of changing the Supreme Soviet's name as yet another attempt to "Rumanianize" Moldavia and Moldavians. First, they said, the Latin—that is, Rumanian—alphabet was introduced, then the press began speaking of "Rumanians" instead of "Moldavians," now they want "Sfatul Tarei"... What next? Accession to the neighbor?

The parliamentary majority's disappointment was great indeed. Its extremely painful reaction aggravated the confrontation even more. The session repeatedly discussed voting procedure: electronically or by show of hands? Most of the Moldavians reject computerized voting, fearing the possibility of a deal between the party-state bureaucracy, which had prepared the session, and the opponents of national revival. The latter, it is thought, can be brought in line by roll-call voting, followed by publication of the results in the press. Let the electorate know... Non-Moldavian deputies, for their part, insist on secret ballot, because they don't trust the vote counters...

In this way, suspecting their opponents of every possible sin, the deputies are advancing with tremendous difficulty from one item of the agenda to another. On some issues the session simply grinds to a halt. "A parliamentary crisis," they joke bitterly in the lobby. Every now and then the icebergs collide. For example, the sides clashed when they were deciding the minimum vote needed to amend the Constitution. It states that this requires two-thirds of the number of elected deputies. That is the position of representatives of the ethnic minorities. But the Moldavian majority considers that a simply majority—50 percent plus one vote—would be quite sufficient. "That would mean that the minority would lose any possibility at all to influence decision-making," the Russian-language deputies say. "In that case, why attend the session at all? After all, you will always be assured a mechanical majority." Their opponents counter that the minority cannot be allowed to block decisions, whether by voting against, not voting at all, or simply walking out, as has already repeatedly

occurred at the Kishinev City Soviet session. Obstruction, they say, will simply make the parliament unworkable.

In other words, the opposing sides are certain in advance that it is basically impossible to pass any laws that would serve all citizens of the republic regardless of nationality. But in that case, what about laws on property, leasing, land ownership, pensions, and the republic's economic independence? After all, the deputies of the current Supreme Soviet, who bear the legal and moral responsibility for whether life in Moldavia will make a turn for the better or not, will have to work together for five years. Alas, at the session they rarely think of things that unite people. Instead of looking for constructive solutions that would satisfy all, there is a selfish, uncompromising struggle. Each evening session ends with the reading out of sharp protests, angry declarations and statements which, as a rule, spark emotional outbursts and occasionally unparliamentary attacks.

One such outburst was caused by the session's passing of a law changing the national symbols. On 27 April the blue-yellow-red "tricolor" with coat of arms became the Moldavian SSR state flag. True, the session hasn't endorsed the coat of arms yet, having announced a contest for the best design. The national symbols were initially discussed by a commission of the Supreme Soviet. Historians published lengthy articles in newspapers, explaining just why the "tricolor" expresses Moldavian traditions. To be sure, its appearance has already become customary at rallies and demonstrations, of which there has been no shortage over the last few months. So it would appear that passage of the law was a foregone conclusion. However, the inhabitants of the trans-Dnestr regions, which up till 1940 had been part of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR, did not think so. For them, as well as for the non-Moldavian population in general, introduction of the "tricolor," moreover without a coat of arms, meant one more step towards the "Romanianization" of Moldavia: after all the colors are the same as those of the neighbor across the Prut River. A heated debate on the issue at the session could have been expected.

But it never happened. It had no chance. The chairman simply refused to give the floor to the opponents of the "tricolor" lined up in front of the microphones. This was probably done so as not to arouse the passions of millions of TV viewers. Just one hour after the vote the three-colored flag was ceremoniously hoisted over the Supreme Soviet building. Demonstrations began in the city as tens of thousands of Moldavians celebrated their national victory till nightfall. But on the eve of the May holidays it became known that the inhabitants of Tiraspol, Bendery and Rybnitsa refused to recognize the "tricolor." Public opinion there wasn't prepared for such a change: no one had discussed the problem of the "tricolor" with the trans-Dnestr people. Be that as it may, but on the left bank and in neighboring Bendery the law was declared null and void.

The consequences were soon to come. When the trans-Dnestr people read a declaration at the session in which they refused to accept the tricolored flag, because it does not represent Soviet traditions and, moreover, is identical to the flags of Rumania and the Republic of Chad, the hall erupted into a storm. The deputies threw the gauntlet at the leaders of the Tiraspol and Bendery City Soviets. There was no longer any room for parliamentary niceties. The rebels were called criminals, there were demands to punish them, bring criminal cases against them... Meanwhile, down in the street hundreds upon hundreds of Kishinevians surrounding the Supreme Soviet building were listening to the live broadcast from the session and also boiling with indignation. As a result there was an attempt to physically attack the deputies opposing the "tricolor" as they left the session, they were insulted and threatened...

Nor was that the first time. Today the session hall and the street listening to it with intense attention are like communicating vessels.

Psychological pressure on the Supreme Soviet deputies could be felt during the election of the Supreme Soviet President, when two candidates were nominated: Mirchi Snegur, president of the presidium of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, and Petr Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party. The masses, inspired by the Popular Front, saw the party leader as "the hand of Moscow": he had, after all, been away, working outside the republic in the CPSU Central Committee, for too long. Banners screamed: "Luchinskiy, hands off Snegur!" "Snegur, Snegur!" chanted the streets. And although the Central Committee secretary was fairly flexible, still, he lost by 36 votes. The rejoicing in the streets reached a crescendo when the newly elected president appeared at the threshold of the Supreme Soviet palace. His victory immediately softened hearts as, along with congratulations addressed to him, cries of "Hurray for Luchinskiy!" could also be heard. Both were showered with flowers.

The icebergs increasingly display their underwater might. But at times the deputies, casting diplomacy to the winds, reveal their views with utmost frankness. "Moldavia is not a multinational republic," declared Georgi Gimpu, one of the Popular Front leaders, from the rostrum. "It is inhabited by one nation. No one authorized non-Moldavians to represent their peoples in our parliament." In response there were, naturally, outbursts of indignation, demands of retraction—which never came—and angry declarations. Deputies for the ethnic minorities openly accused the Supreme Soviet's Credentials Committee of ethnic discrimination because it had refused to accept the credentials of deputies of Unity Intermovement—the Popular Front's main opponent—claiming election irregularities.

As I watch, listen and take notes I increasingly realize how difficult it is to hope for achieving interethnic concord when the deputies reaching out for the microphones refuse

to make reciprocal concessions. But today neither side wants to even hear of them. The confrontation increasingly ossifies the political stereotypes that have been formed. The proponents of "Renashterya"—national revival—are convinced that the deputies representing ethnic minorities are at one with the party functionaries and rabidly opposed to any change, calling for the salvation of the "empire," that in principle they reject the ideas of perestroika and, in particular, the attainment of genuine independence by the Moldavian people. Another stereotype—its antithesis—is: Moldavian, pro-Rumanian extremists are pushing the republic into the chasm of petty-bourgeois mononational dictatorship, which will make the future of representatives of other peoples hopeless.

The extreme radicalism of both stereotypes exposes their fallacy. Because there are at least as many sincere adherents of democratic change and genuine people's power among the Russians, Gagauz, Ukrainians, Bulgarians and trans-Dnestr Moldavians as there are among Popular Front supporters. And, conversely, it would be a mistake to see all the Moldavian deputies in the same light. After all, the majority constitute the moderate, sober-minded center. But when the hall suddenly hears news of rallies in Tiraspol refusing to recognize the "tricolor," so dear to the Moldavian heart, or left-bank opposition to already adopted laws, then the extremists and the moderate centrists immediately rally together under the national flag.

This difficult session has been dragging on for weeks, and I am still waiting for the moment when a Moldavian at long last mounts the rostrum and addresses the concerns of the Gagauz dreaming of exercising their small people's right to self-determination. Or when he

says that, instead of pressurizing Russians having difficulty mastering the state language, they should be helped in their transition to genuine bilingualism. I keep waiting for a statement by a deputy from Rybnitsa or Tiraspol, who would call from the rostrum on the people of their cities to take into consideration the national dignity of the people whose name the republic bears. Who would say, no, it's not worth wasting gunpowder on an already senseless struggle with symbols instead of concentrating on the practical implementation of the ideas of economic independence for their enterprises and regions. And I keep waiting when a deputy—regardless of what is written in item 5 of his passport ("nationality")—gets up and says that it is time for all together to lead the republic out of the critical situations in culture, ecology, housing construction, the economy. The calamity which struck a month ago—the frost which caused more than a billion rubles in damage—makes the situation this year truly threatening. Why has no one spoken of that?.. Is it necessary to wait for the establishment of standing commissions?

In connection with the Congress of the Moldavian Communist Party, which starts 17 May, the session, in which 83 percent of the deputies are communists, has declared a recess until May 21. During the final days of its work it managed to amend articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Constitution of the Moldavian SSR, which deal with the status of political and public parties and movements. The article regarding the leading role of the Communist Party has been removed. Perhaps for the first time, there was no inter-ethnic division: the amendments to the Constitution were passed by an overwhelming majority. That would seem to be the most important thing in present-day Moldavia.

Language Proficiency Requirements for Moldavian Workers

90UN1980A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 12 May 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the Moldavian Council of Ministers: Procedure for Determining Language Knowledge Level Necessary for Performing Labor, Service and Official Duties"]

[Text] The Moldavian Council of Ministers by its decree has approved the procedure for determining the language knowledge level needed for performing labor, service and official duties as submitted by the Moldavian Academy of Sciences, the Moldavian Ministry of Education and the Moldavian State Committee for Labor and Social Questions.

1. The category of employee and the sphere of his activities serve as the basis for establishing the proficiency in Moldavian, Gagauz (in localities with a population of Gagauz nationality) and Russian languages needed for performing labor, service and official positions.

2. In accord with the demands placed on the employees in the area of the mastery of the grammatical system and the basic vocabulary of the corresponding languages, four categories of officials are to be established:

1) First category: workers in the bodies of state power and state administration, leading workers of enterprises (associations), organizations and institutions and leaders of social organizations—on a level of fluent mastery;

2) Second category: leaders of structural subdivisions of enterprises (associations), organizations, institutions and their specialists as well as employees the duties of which bring them into contact with citizens (medical personnel, employees of the law enforcement bodies, the bodies preserving public order, state supervision, communications, trade, domestic services, utilities and other sectors of the public service sphere)—on the level of providing explanations for the citizens, analysis and compilation of professional documentation;

3) Third category: white collar personnel and workers in spheres of activity indicated in Subpoint 2—on a level of understanding and making themselves understood in the appropriate languages within the limits of performing their official duties;

4) Fourth category: white collar personnel and workers in the remaining spheres of activity—on a level of understanding speech.

Note. White collar personnel and workers in the fourth category when their duties do not bring them into

contact with citizens are not obliged to master, respectively, the Moldavian, Russian or Gagauz language on the level of making themselves understood, but this should not prevent the fluent functioning of the state language or the language of the corresponding locality in the public measures being carried out. In their speeches they can use (according to the appropriate linguistic legislation) the language convenient for them.

3. The lists of specialties and positions for work areas in accord with the above-listed categories and the lists of the basic terms and names for the appropriate sectors are to be worked out by the ministries, by the state committees, departments, enterprises, institutions and organizations, the executive committees of the rayon and city soviets and by the social organizations prior to 1 June 1990 and submitted to the Moldavian Academy of Sciences (Republic Terminological Center).

4. The scope of the language knowledge (grammatical minimum and minimum base vocabulary) for the corresponding categories of employees is to be worked out by the Moldavian Ministry of Education and the Moldavian Academy of Sciences prior to 1 July 1990 on the basis of the curricula of the secondary general education school.

5. The regulation governing the certification of employees in terms of the level and degree of mastery of languages is to be worked out by the Moldavian Ministry of Education, the Moldavian State Committee for Labor and Social Questions and the Moldavian Academy of Sciences prior to 1 October 1990.

Note. Men and women who by the moment of the adoption of the Language Law (September 1989) have reached the age, respectively, of 55 and 50 years, are not to undergo certification.

6. Certification is to be carried out in stages, beginning with 1994.

7. The language training for employees on the level necessary for performing professional duties is the responsibility of the leaders of the ministries, state committees and departments, the executive committees of the local soviets, the social organizations, enterprises, institutions and organizations.

Note. Courses for improving proficiency in languages should also cover workers who have mastered the appropriate language but not in a literary (oral and written) form.

Financing for the projects provided in the current procedure is to be provided by the state in accord with the submitted calculations and feasibility studies within the limits of funds planned to carry out the measures in the State Comprehensive Program for Ensuring the Functioning of Languages on Moldavian Territory.

Fluctuations in Population Growth Analyzed

90UN2232A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 24, Jun 90 p 4

[Article by Solomon Bruk, doctor of geographical sciences, chief scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Ethnography Institute: "What the Demographic Map Shows Today: A Personal Opinion"]

[Text] Among the socioeconomic types of causes which have brought this country to the verge of a crisis, mention is frequently made of demographic factors, which attest to our country's sharp lag behind the world's developed countries.

Cited most frequently are the following two indicators: the average life span and the infant mortality (i.e., the number of children who have died before reaching the age of one year), in which the Soviet Union ranks in the fourth or even fifth tenth of the world's countries. And although these indicators are virtually the most important ones for ascertaining the demographic situation, we cannot restrict ourselves to them alone. We must also bear in mind that average figures for such an enormous and diverse country as ours sharply distort the true picture. The differences with regard to some indicators in certain regions of the USSR are greater than they are between the most developed and the most backward countries of the world.

Despite all the complexities and difficulties of our development, we have achieved certain definite successes in demographic development, as compared with the prewar period. In the USSR during all this time the population's growth was higher than the other developed countries, the total coefficients of mortality decreased by half, infant mortality declined by a factor of 7.5, the average life span increased by 22 years, the proportion of the urban population doubled, etc. Nevertheless, there are also a number of problems without whose solution the further socioeconomic development of the USSR is impossible. They include the following problems: the population's uneven growth in various regions of the country (in the first place, the low growth rate of the population in regions which are difficult of access for manpower and the extremely high rate for those regions which have a surplus of manpower), the unfavorable age-and-sex structure, particularly in the rural rayons of the Non-Chernozem area, the inadequate increase in the average, anticipated life span of the population, the comparatively high infant mortality rate (for the country as a whole it is quadruple that in Japan or Norway, for example), and especially in the Central Asian republics (in the Turkmen SSR infant mortality exceeds and in the Tajik SSR it almost reaches 50 per thousand new births, a figure that is comparable only to the most backward countries of Africa and Asia), quite a high proportion of divorces (there are 3.6 divorces for every 10 contracted marriages), etc.

According to preliminary data and the Census dated 12 January 1989, the population of the USSR has reached

286.7 million persons (including a permanent population of 285.7 million). During the 10 years between the censuses (the previous census was conducted on 17 January 1979) the country's population increased by 24.3 million persons, or by 9.3 percent. The growth may be considered more or less satisfactory (during the preceding 10 years the population increased by 22.9 million persons, or by 9.6 percent). If we compare these figures with the world indicators, the population's growth rate in the USSR turns out to be substantially higher than it is in the economically developed countries (by 6.4 percent during the years 1980-1990). It is higher than in the United States, where the population grew by 9.1 percent during the past 10 years (moreover, it should be borne in mind that one-fourth of the latter growth is accounted for by an increase in immigration).

The dynamics in the number of the population changes quite sharply with regard to time and especially with regard to territory. Prior to 1964 the average annual growth rate in this country was above 3 million persons, having reached a maximum in 1960 (3.8 million). Then by 1980 it gradually declined to a rate of 2.1 million, though, after that, it began to increase slowly, reaching a maximum in 1986 (2.9 million persons). The specific increase in the birth rate during the first half of the 1980's was connected with implementation of the measures to strengthen state aid to families having children. This was also facilitated by a favorable change in the age composition of women—an increase in the proportion of women at the age of maximum fertility (20-29 years) and the increase of births among women at younger ages.

The entrance upon child-bearing age by the relatively non-numerous generation of women born during the 1960's and 1970's has led, beginning in the years 1987-1988, to a reduction in the rate of the natural increase, which should be intensified by the end of the last decade of the 20th century.

There has been an even-greater change in the number of births, likewise due, fundamentally, to the change in the number of women of child-bearing age. Having reached a minimum in 1968 (4.1 million), it then, gradually increasing, reached a maximum in 1986 (5.6 million), scarcely having approached the prewar level (6.1 million persons).

The differences in the population's natural movement (particularly in the birth-rate indicators) are particularly great with regard to the Union republics. There is no correspondence to reality in the widely prevalent idea that, since ancient times, in Central Asia and in the Caucasus the birth-rate level has been much higher than in the country's other regions. Up to World War II (i.e., to 1940) it was only in the Armenian and Kazakh SSR's that this indicator was considerably higher than the All-Union average, whereas in the Estonian and Latvian SSR's it was much lower (over many decades these last two republics have been marked by an outstandingly low birth-rate level). There was not even much change in 1950, when the group of republics with a high birth rate

was joined by the Moldavian SSR, and the birth-rate level in the Armenian SSR sharply declined. But after 1950 there was an increase in the differentiation in the birth-rate levels between the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia (except for Georgia, where the birth rate never was particularly high), on the one hand, and the remaining republics, on the other hand. During the 1960's the reduction in the birth rate basically affected only the latter group of republics, and nowadays the lowest birth rate is characteristic of the Ukrainian SSR.

The overall birth-rate coefficients for the Union republics in 1988 (per 1000 persons of the population) are as follows:

USSR (as a whole)—18.8

Tajik SSR—40.0

Turkmen SSR—36.0

Uzbek SSR—35.1

Kirghiz SSR—31.2

Azerbaijan SSR—26.2

Kazakh SSR—24.6

Armenian SSR—21.6

Moldavian SSR—20.9

RSFSR—16.0

Belorussian SSR—16.0

Estonian SSR—15.9

Latvian SSR—15.4

Lithuanian SSR—15.3

Ukrainian SSR—14.5

At present the birth-rate level in the Central Asian republics is more than twice as high as it is in the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Belorussian SSR, and the Baltic republics, and it is higher than in the remaining republics by a factor of 1.5.

As to the natural population increase, the differences between the republics are even greater (in regions with a high birth rate, a significantly greater proportion of children, and a lower percentage of elderly persons, it is natural that the overall average mortality coefficient among them must be lower); moreover, in the course of time they are increasing. In the RSFSR during 1988 the absolute natural increase of population amounted to 779,000 persons (as compared with the total population of this republic amounting to 147.4 million persons), while in the Uzbek SSR the corresponding figure was 560,000 (with a total population of 19.9 million persons). The Ukrainian SSR has a 14-percent less absolute natural growth than the Tajik SSR, although the latter's population is less by a factor of 10.1. Of the 2,492,000 persons of the annual absolute increase in 1988 for the country as a whole, the proportionate share of the four Central Asian republics accounts for 926,000 persons (37.2 percent of the entire increase, i.e., approximately 1/5 more than in the RSFSR; however, the proportion of these same republics in the total population is 11.5 percent, while the RSFSR accounts for 51.4 percent).

With an average natural population growth in 1988 amounting to 8.7 per thousand persons in the RSFSR, as

compared to the Ukrainian SSR, the Belorussian SSR, and the Baltic republics, where it is equal to 4.6 per thousand, in the Central Asia republics it is 28.2 per thousand, and in the remaining republics—15.0 per thousand. The differences with regard to this indicator are also great within the Union republics. Thus, in the RSFSR, in the Central and Central-Chernozem economic regions the natural growth amounts to less than 1.0 per thousand, whereas in the Norther, North-Caucasus, Ural, and West-Siberian regions it is more than 7 per thousand, and in the East-Siberian and Far-Eastern regions it is more than 10 per thousand. The greatest concern is caused by those regions where the number of births is already less than the number of persons who have died. They include five oblasts in the RSFSR (Pskov, Tula, Kalinin, Tambov, and Ivanovo) and an equal number of oblasts in the Ukrainian SSR (Chernigov, Sumy, Poltava, Vinnitsa, and Cherkassy); in 11 more oblasts of the RSFSR and 6 oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR there is an extremely insignificant natural growth rate (2.0 and less per thousand). A catastrophic demographic situation has evolved in many of our country's rural regions, which have scarcely favorable conditions for conducting agriculture, and where the natural loss of rural population began from the very first postwar years. Thus, a considerable natural loss of rural population (as much as 10 per thousand in 1988) characterizes absolutely all the oblasts of the Central and Central-Chernozem economic regions, as well as the Novgorod, Pskov, Gorkiy, Penza oblasts, and the Mordovian ASSR within the RSFSR, along with 17 out of the Ukrainian SSR's 25 oblasts. The situation is likewise exacerbated by the circumstance that in these same regions there is an ongoing, albeit to a lesser degree than previously, migration of the rural population to the cities.

The present-day, unfavorable, age-and-sex structure of the rural population in many regions of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, which is playing a decisive role in the ever-more narrowed-down reproductivity of the population, can no longer be explained by the consequences of the war. No less a role was played by the "experiments" in agriculture of the postwar years (the settling of villages "without future prospects," the decrease of farmstead plots, economically unjustified requisition purchase prices on agricultural products, and much else). Such experiments have brought about its crisis, as well as "pumping" rural manpower into the cities of one's own and "other people's" regions (which was caused by the poorly thought-out policy of deploying industrial facilities). Unless a special socio-demographic program is developed, in many oblasts of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR the crisis in agriculture will only get worse.

During the last 10 years the proportion of the urban population has increased by 3.5 percent—from 62.3 percent of the total population in 1979 to 65.8 percent in 1989. A clear or obvious slowing down has been observed for the country as a whole with regard to the

growth rate of urbanites or city people (in 1970 they constituted 56.3 percent of the total population). The differences between the republics with regard to the proportion of the urban population are gradually becoming less. Whereas in 1939 the proportion of urban inhabitants in the Moldavian SSR amounted to only 13 percent, and in the Tajik, Kirghiz, and Uzbek SSR's it ranged from 1/5 to 1/4 of the entire population, nowadays even in the least urbanized republics city people comprise at least one-third of the population (the only exception being the Tajik SSR, where the proportion of city people amounts to 32.6 percent). In 10 of the 15 Union republics the urban population exceeds the rural population. At the same time, nevertheless, we must pay attention to the Central Asian republics, where during the last 10 years the proportion of the urban population (with the exception of Uzbekistan) has decreased. This case is unique in world practice. We know about highly urbanized countries where the percentage of the urban population has declined in recent decades, but we do not know about any countries with an average or low degree of urbanization, where the proportion of city dwellers has declined.

During the inter-census period the number of the urban population increased by 25.2 million persons, including 14.5 million by means of natural increase, by 8.9 million by migrational influx from rural localities, and by 1.8 million persons by the conversion of rural population centers into urban ones.

During the postwar period not only the proportion of the rural population but also its absolute number has constantly declined. Thus, in 1939 it amounted to 130.3 million persons, in 1950—to 109.1 million, in 1970—to 105.7 million, in 1979—to 98.8 million, and in 1989—to 97.9 million persons. Thus, since 1939 the number of the rural population declined by 24.9 percent; on an annual average it declined by 648,000 persons.

Covered by the average figures regarding the changes in the number of rural population are enormous differences and variations as to regions. The unjustified decline in some regions (as a rule, those which have insufficient manpower) and the sharp increase in others (basically, those which have a surplus of manpower) is one of the most acute special and demographic problems. Thus, in the RSFSR from 1939 through 1989 the number of the rural population declined from 72.1 million to 39.0 million persons, or almost by half. During this same period in the four Central Asia republics, which had a relatively modest increase in agricultural output over these 50 years, it increased from 8.1 to 19.8 million persons, or by a factor of almost 2.5 (in the Tajik SSR even by a factor of 2.8). There was also a growth in the absolute number of the rural population in the Moldavian SSR (since 1939 by more than 180,000 persons). All this brought about a sharp increase in the surplus manpower here. The proportion of the rural population also changed unevenly with regard to the major economic regions of the RSFSR. From 1939 through 1989 the absolute number of the rural population in the Central

and Northwestern regions declined by almost two-thirds, in the Volga-Vyatka and Central-Chernozem regions—by a factor of 2.5; it remained virtually unchanged in the North Caucasus; and it increased (by 330,000 persons) in the Far Eastern region.

From 1979 through 1989, when the number of the rural population for the country as a whole declined by less than 1 million persons, in the RSFSR it declined by 3,210,000 (including by 966,000 in the Central Region, by 613,000 in the Volga Region, by 523,000 in the Volgo-Vyatka Region, and by 521,000 in the Ural Region), in the Ukraine—by 2,130,000, and in the Belorussian SSR—by 773,000; at the same time there was a sharp increase in the number of the rural population in the Uzbek SSR (by 2,757,000 persons), in the Tajik SSR (by 969,000), in the Turkmen SSR (by 495,000), and in the Kirghiz SSR (by 487,000).

The examination of only two demographic indicators attests to the fact that, during the last decade, there has been no substantial improvement in the demographic situation. By a number of parameters it has even worsened sharply. It is already becoming obvious that the solution of global socioeconomic problems is impossible without working out a scientifically based, comprehensive, demographic program, one which would take into maximum account the particular characteristics of this country's various regions. This policy must take all measures to facilitate the reduction of infant mortality, increase the life span and the labor activity of the population, the optimization of the age-and-sex structure, and substantially harmonize the parameters of the population's reproduction in various regions; we must develop measures to strengthen the family, create more favorable conditions for rearing and educating the rising generation, combining motherhood with women's participation in work and public activity. We should probably establish a definite sequence in the measures to be outlined. Of top priority, in my opinion, are programs to aid single, old persons, as well as families with many children. However, unless we solve the principal problem—providing manpower resources to the rural regions of the Non-Chernozem Region and employment for surplus manpower in other regions, we will not be able to solve the demographic and socioeconomic problems of the country as a whole.

Survey of All-Union Census Figures on Marriage

90UN1912A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 20, 19 May 90 p 5

[Article by Mark Tolts: "An Unusual Reality: Personal Life as Mirrored by Statistics"]

[Text] Today we begin to become acquainted with the results of the latest (1989) population census. Let's speak for a while about a very important statistical indicator: the average age of people entering upon their first marriage. Behind this indicator lie events which define a person's destiny for a long time, in fact, for his entire life: the

creation of a family, the birth of children, and—to a large extent—the quality of the family, and the nature of parenthood.

For the country as a whole, this indicator has not changed much over the 10 years since the 1979 census. For men it increased by 0.2 years and now amounts to 24.4, whereas for women it has remained as before—21.7. Nor do we see any substantial difference when we compare this result with those of this country's first census, which was taken almost 10 years ago—in 1897. At that time young men in the European part of Russia were marrying 0.2 years earlier than now, while girls were getting married 0.3 years earlier.

Our first families are noticeably younger than is nowadays the case in the developed countries. In the United States, for example, the average age for entering upon a first marriage is 23.3 for women and 25.2 for men; in Japan the corresponding figures are 25.1 and 28.6 respectively. This indicator is also somewhat higher in most Western European countries than it is in our country. There in Western Europe families have been created by somewhat more mature persons over the past two decades.

During the 10-year period in our country the difference in the average age of spouses has increased slightly. In 1979 it amounted to 2.5 years; now it is 2.7 years. In pre-revolutionary European Russia this indicator was approximately the same (2.8 years). But in Siberia it was 3.4 years, and in the Caucasus it amounted to 6.2 years. The largest gap was in Central Asia—9.7 years. Nowadays we do not see such sharp intervals. In most of the Union republics the age differential does not exceed 2-3 years, ranging from 1.3 years in Turkmenia to 3.6 years in Georgia.

In 1989 the earliest marital age was in Tajikistan (20.9 years for women and 23.2 years for men). The extreme indicators were provided by Azerbaijan (23.8 years for women and 25.9 years for men). In Georgia men marry for the first time at an average age of 26.2 years; this was a unique kind of "peak" for the census. But the average age of brides in this republic is 22.6 years.

Thus, the latest census has shattered many of the usual ideas about ethnic customs and the national culture of the republics. To be even more precise, the last few censuses: it was already noted in 1979 that girls in Azerbaijan were getting married later than in other regions—at an average age of 23.3. And we see that this tendency is continuing to develop. During the 10-year period up to 1989 striking changes occurred in Turkmenia: the age of the average bride—statistically speaking—increased from 21.5 to 22.6 years; it is now higher than in the RSFSR (21.8), the Ukraine (21.2), or Belorussia (21.9); there have been virtually no changes in these three republics. Nor have movements been seen in the Baltic republics. For Estonia (22.0), Latvia (22.2), and Lithuania (22.4) this indicator either did not change at all or shifted just insignificantly.

Are we not present at the birth of major changes in the Central Asia republics? On the whole now the situation there seems to be quite stable. But, of course, the age when a person enters into marriage, especially for women, is the determining factor for the number of children and the social status of the wife and mother (education and occupation), and hence, her position in the family and in society. We sense the direction and nature of these changes even more keenly if we pay attention to the results of the 1897 census, when family life for women in Central Asia began at an average age of 17.7 years, and in the Caucasus—at 18.9 years, whereas the bridegrooms were substantially older (27.4 and 25.1 years respectively).

We can supplement this picture by the results of the 1985 micro-census, which show changes in early marriages. How many women who were born during the first half of the 1960's entered into marriage before they were 20 years old? In Tajikistan—almost half (49.1 percent). But in Azerbaijan and Turkmenia—only about half that amount (22.5 and 21.6 percent respectively). In the RSFSR (33.1 percent), in the Ukraine (38.4 percent), and Belorussia (29.9 percent) the proportion of "young and early" ones is even higher. Analogous data for the Baltic republics (Latvia—29.5 percent, Estonia—27.5 percent, and Lithuania—24.9 percent) attest to a departure from the old tradition of women marrying late (in 1897 women entered into a first marriage at an average age of about 26 years).

The opinion has become widespread that in our country there is some kind of fabulous number of men and women who live unmarried lives. The census results testify to something different. By the age of 45-49 (at which time of life hardly anyone enters into a first marriage), only 3.2 percent of men and 3.3 percent of women remain "on the shelf." For the women of Central Asia this indicator is even lower (approximately 1 percent). There is a relatively high level of unmarried persons in the Baltic republics (for women in Lithuania it is 5.1 percent, in Latvia—5.2 percent, in Estonia—6.7 percent; for men the figures are 5.6, 6.6, and 7.6 percent respectively). But this indicator is, nevertheless, lower than at the end of the 19th century, when no less than 1 out of 10 women remained old maids. In world practice it has become accepted to divide the level of unmarriages into low (under 5 percent), medium or average (5-10 percent), and high (over 10 percent). Not a single region in the Soviet Union is characterized by a high level. Only the situation in Georgia draws attention to itself—6 percent of the women here fail to create a family.

1989 All-Union Census Reports Marriage Statistics

90UN2309A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 27, 7 Jul 90 p 15

[Demographer Mark Tolts reviews marriage statistics from the 1989 all-union census, under the rubric "Private Life Reflected in the Statistical Mirror": "Under the Marriage Canopy"]

[Text] Let us continue to familiarize ourselves with the results of the 1989 general population census.

What indicators are used to characterize family well-being? Most frequently, the two which everyone knows: the number of registered marriages and the number of divorces. They are equated and compared and this provides food for conclusions and predictions—lately, alarming ones as a rule.

But there is an indicator which permits a far more complete and thorough representation of daily life and its primary trends. It reflects the durability of marriage, as if it stores up within it the totality of the great number of different events and turning points in the fate of man. The age at which people first start a family, the percentage of men and women who remain alone throughout their lives, the number of divorces and the number of widows and widowers, and the frequency of repeat marriages—this entire motley assortment pours out in the end in the numbers with which I want to acquaint you now.

In the majority of the union republics the law permits a girl to marry at age 18. Families, however, are started even earlier (You will recall that the census reckons marital status based on the assessment of the person himself, regardless of actual registration). Throughout the country as a whole, 3.5 percent of juvenile girls (16-18 years old) declare themselves married—3.7 percent in the RSFSR, 4.1 percent in Moldavia, 4.4 percent in the Ukraine, and 7.3 percent in Georgia. Against this background Tajikistan, where among underage girls the proportion of those who are married is at most 1.3 percent, stands out in sharp contrast. The question arises, do these figures accurately reflect the situation in that republic?

In the next age bracket, 18-19 years old, the proportion of young women who are married reaches 23 percent, while in the 20-24 age group it increases to 62.3 percent. The marriage "peak" for women is the 30-34 age group: 83 of every 100 women are married. In Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan this number is higher than the national average (from 88.5 to 90 percent); in Estoniya and Latvia it is lower (from 77.7 to 90 percent). Data for the RSFSR (82.2 percent) is close to the all-union numbers. In two republics, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the highest marriage level for women moves forward 5 years to the 35-39 age group. As we already know, girls there enter into marriage later and the divorce rate is lower.

Having reached its highest point, the curve reflecting the proportion of married women by generation begins to fall off: 55-59—64.7 percent, 60-64—54 percent (more than half in each republic), and 65-69—40.8 percent. Traditionally, we pay little attention to the marriage rate in the oldest age groups, and this is obviously unfair. In fact, at age 70 and older 17 percent of the women in this country are married. The rate is lower in the RSFSR and in Kazakhstan (16.2 and 16.1 percent)—an obvious

consequence of the war and, perhaps, of the upheavals suffered by the population of these republics in the 1930's. Moldavia has the highest proportion of all of married women in this age group at 22.4 percent.

The general census indicates that from 16 to 49 years of age, women in this country are married an average of 23.6 years. The next decade of life (50-59 years) adds another 6.8 years to this figure. Comparing this data to that of the 1979 general census, we see that the picture hardly changes: also 23.6 years up to age 50 and an additional 6.5 years from 50 to 59. Moreover, there has been no appreciable increase over the entire century. In 1897, the first general population census showed for European Russia a corresponding 25 and 6.6 years. At the end of the 19th Century divorce was practically non-existent but the number of widows and widowers was much larger.

Here are a few words on the marriage rate for men. The curve showing its dynamics looks somewhat different. Throughout the country as a whole, its "peak" (88.8 percent) comes in the 55-59 age group. In some of the Central Asian republics, it comes in much earlier age brackets (Tajikistan—94.5 percent in the 40-44 age group; Uzbekistan—94.1 percent in the 35-39 age group). In discussing the reasons women live alone, many are inclined to blame men who allegedly do not want to burden themselves with a family. Statistical data does not support this. In the 50-59 age group, for example, men stay married even longer than they did 100 years ago (8.8 years against 8.7). In all age groups from 30 to 70, more than 84 percent of men lead a family life. A more important and at the same time more tragic reason for the disparity in marital rates is what demographers call the higher mortality rate among men. Just compare: by the 30-34 age group 17 percent of the women are unmarried while only 15.9 percent of men are unmarried. In the generation which is 10 years older, this gap widens still more noticeably (13.7 percent of women unmarried against 21.4 percent of the men).

The census, to sum up, shows a sufficiently stable and calm picture: there is none of the general chaos or universal disintegration of the family with which some publications frighten us. On the whole, losses which families suffer because of divorce are sufficiently offset by repeat marriages. This picture can be expanded and elaborated upon after examining in more depth the reasons of marriages end. After all, divorce, which is so obvious to everyone, is not the only reason; there is also the loss of one of the spouses. But this is a special topic on its own.

1989 Armenian Census Results

Tabulated Population Figures

90UN2126A Yerevan KOMMUNIST
in Russian 24 May 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by the Armenian SSR State Committee for Statistics: "Results of the 1989 All-Union Population Census of the Armenian SSR"]

[Text] The 1989 all-union population census in the Armenian SSR was conducted in extremely complex circumstances. The devastating earthquake and the events in and around the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] resulted in an intense relocation of a large segment of the population both within the republic and outside its boundaries, which had a negative effect on the preparation and conduct of the census, as well as on its results.

In the nine regions most severely affected by the earthquake (Amasiyskiy, Aragatsskiy, Artikskiy, Akhuryanskiy, Gugarkskiy, Gukasyanskiy, Kalininskiy, Spitakskiy, Stepanavskiy), and in the cities of Leninakan, Kirovakan, Dilizhan, Spitak and Stepanavan the census was conducted in an abbreviated form, as a result of which data were not received for 600,000 persons on marital status, family composition, sources of income, housing conditions and other items.

The State Committee for Statistics of the Armenian SSR, based on automated processing of the census forms, has obtained the final figures on the size and age composition of the population, marital status and family size, educational level, nationality and languages, and sources of income.

The resident population of the Armenian SSR on January 12, 1989 was 3,287,700 persons. Compared to 1979, this was an increase of 256,900 persons, or 8.5 percent.

According to a running calculation, the resident population on January 1, 1989 was 3,448,600 persons. Such a large discrepancy between the census data and the running calculation is explained by the extremely complicated circumstances under which the population census was conducted in the republic.

At a crucial point in the census, over 160,000 persons were evacuated from the disaster area to outside the republic; naturally, they were not included in the resident population.

In addition, over half the evacuees were not included in the republic's permanent population, since second copies of the census forms were not received for them. According to the census data, the republic's permanent population was 3,304,800 persons, up 8.8 percent over 1979. The census results were also affected by the large-scale migration of the population related to the events in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

Therefore, the latest census data cannot serve as a very reliable basis for planning the republic's future social and economic development, and the results of the analysis below must be approached with some caution.

According to postwar data, the dynamics of the population size are as follows.

Size of the Resident Population of the Armenian SSR

	Number of Persons, Thous.				1989 as percentage of 1959	Average annual growth rates, percent		
	1959	1970	1979	1989		1959-1969	1970-1978	1979-1988
Total population	1,763.0	2,491.9	3,030.7	3,287.7	186.5	3.1	2.2	0.8
Urban	881.8	1,481.5	1,992.5	2,229.6	252.8	4.6	3.3	1.1
Rural	881.2	1,010.4	1,038.2	1,058.1	120.1	1.2	0.3	0.2

A relatively high average annual growth of the population was observed in the 1960's (66,000), due to a higher birth rate and a higher natural population growth, while from the beginning of the 1970's the average annual growth rate dropped from 3.1 percent to 2.2 percent. In the 1980's it dropped still further to 0.8 percent, or an average of 25,700 persons per year.

The urban population grew by 237,000 persons in ten years, or 11.9 percent. The percentage of citydwellers in the total population of the republic grew from 65.7 percent in 1979 to 67.8 percent in 1989.

The most urbanized of the union republics are the RSFSR (74 percent), Estonian SSR (72 percent), and Latvian SSR (71 percent). In contrast, in the republics of Central Asia and in the Moldavian SSR less than half (33-47 percent) of the total population lives in urban areas.

The republic's rural population increased in the 1980's by only 19,900 persons, or 1.9 percent; the main reason for the relatively low growth is outmigration of the rural population to the cities.

The most important social-demographic and economic feature of the population is its age-sex structure.

The distribution of the republic's population by age is as follows:

Population Distribution by Age (Permanent Population)					
	Number of persons, thous.		1989 as percentage of 1979	as percentage of total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	3,037.3	3,304.8	108.8	100.0	100.0
including ages					
0-9	619.0	711.1	114.9	20.4	21.5
10-19	703.2	569.8	81.0	23.1	17.2
20-29	571.4	610.3	106.8	18.8	18.5
30-39	301.7	508.3	168.5	9.9	15.4
40-49	369.2	268.0	72.6	12.1	8.1
50-59	230.7	329.1	142.6	7.6	9.9
60-69	123.4	192.0	155.6	4.1	5.8
70-79	86.7	78.3	90.3	2.9	2.4
80 and over	29.2	36.5	125.0	1.0	1.1
age not given	2.8	1.4	50.0	0.1	0.1
below working age	1012.3	1058.5	104.6	33.3	32.0
of working age	1739.9	1858.3	106.8	57.3	56.2
above working age	282.3	386.6	136.9	9.3	11.7

The present age structure reflects past tendencies of natural movement processes, especially the birth rate. They were strongly affected by the Second World War, which not only cost millions of lives but also reduced the number of births both during the war and in the years when women born during the war and their daughters entered active child-bearing age. This is the basic explanation for the differences in the rates of growth (or decline) of the population in individual age groups between 1979 and 1989.

The earthquake also had a certain impact. The number of dead and evacuated to outside the republic, on whom data were not obtained, was disproportional to all age groups.

Of particular interest from the standpoint of formation of labor resources is the size of the population of working age (men 16-59 years old, women 16-54 years old).

Population by Age Groups of the Armenian SSR						
	1979			1989		
	Total population	including		Total population	including	
		urban	rural		urban	rural
Total population	3037.3	1985.7	1051.6	3304.8	2222.2	1082.6
including						
below working age	1012.3	625.6	386.7	1058.5	699.8	358.7
working age	1739.9	1182.3	557.6	1858.3	1277.2	581.1
above working age	282.3	176.0	106.3	386.6	244.5	142.1
Percentage						
below working age	33.3	31.5	36.8	32.0	31.5	33.1
working age	57.3	59.5	53.0	56.2	57.5	53.7
above working age	9.3	8.9	10.1	11.7	11.0	13.1

Over the last 10 years the growth in the working population has been 118,400 persons, or 6.8 percent. For the country as a whole it has grown by 7.0 million (4.6 percent), including almost 5 million (about 70 percent) in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

The process of the aging of the population continued in the 1980's. The number of persons above working age during this period increased by almost 37.0 percent, or more than four times faster than for the total population of the republic. As a result, the percentage of this age group increased over this period from 9.3 percent to 11.7 percent. However, the problem of the aging of the population is not yet as acute for our republic as in certain other regions of the country. For the country overall, this age group accounts for 17 percent of the

total population, including 19-21 percent in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltics, and 8-10 percent in the Central Asian republics.

Of the total population of the republic, men total 1,619,300 persons (49 percent); women, 1,685,500 (51 percent). A certain improvement in the sex structure of the population can be observed. In 1979 there were 948 men for each 1,000 women; in 1989, there were 961.

The preponderance of women begins on average from the age of 20, and is caused by the higher mortality rate of men, though in rural areas this process occurs a good deal later, from the age of 45.

The marriage structure of the population of the Armenian SSR is generally satisfactory in comparison with most of the union republics and the country overall.

Proportion of Persons of a Given Marital Status in a Corresponding Age Group*, Percent

	Men				Women			
	Never married	Married	Widowed	Divorced and separated	Never married	Married	Widowed	Divorced and separated
Total population aged 16 and older	26.6	70.4	2.0	1.0	17.8	66.6	12.0	3.6
16-19	97.7	2.2	0.07	0.03	83.2	16.3	0.2	0.3
20-24	71.2	28.3	0.2	0.3	33.4	64.2	0.6	1.8
25-29	25.9	73.0	0.3	0.8	15.7	79.9	1.1	3.3
30-39	6.7	91.5	0.5	1.3	9.5	82.7	2.8	5.0
40-49	1.9	95.3	1.1	1.7	4.1	82.0	7.7	6.2
50-59	1.1	94.8	2.6	1.5	3.3	76.0	16.1	4.6
60 and older	0.8	86.4	11.8	1.0	2.4	43.1	52.1	2.4

* Minus those covered in the abbreviated census

The proportion of married persons has increased in Armenia in the last 10 years: from 65.4 percent to 70.4 percent of men; and from 59.9 percent to 66.6 percent of women. The proportion of divorced persons has increased at the same time: from 0.9 percent to 1.0 percent for men; and from 3.2 percent to 3.6 percent for women.

For the country as a whole, these figures are 4.7 and 7.5 percent, respectively.

The highest percentage of divorced and separated persons is found in Estonia and Latvia (about 7.0 percent of

men and 10-11 percent of women); the lowest, in the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia (except Kirghizia): around 1-2 percent of men and 3-4 percent of women.

There were 558,500 families according to census data, which is 50,800 families (8.4 percent) fewer than in 1979. The drop in the number of families is explained by the fact that this does not include families living in the earthquake areas, where the census was conducted in an abbreviated form and data were not collected on the number and composition of families, as well as some of the evacuated families on which data were not obtained.

Distribution of Families by Number of Members

	Number of families, thous.			As percentage of total	
	1979	1989	1989 as percentage of 1979	1979	1989
All families	609.4	558.5	91.6	100	100
Families consisting of:					
2 persons	74.5	70.1	94.1	12.2	12.6
3 persons	85.3	77.8	91.2	14.0	13.9

Distribution of Families by Number of Members (Continued)

	Number of families, thous.		1989 as percentage of 1979	As percentage of total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
4 persons	140.9	147.1	104.4	23.1	26.3
5 persons	125.3	115.6	92.3	20.6	20.7
6 persons and more	183.4	147.9	80.6	30.1	26.5

There were certain shifts in the structure of families by number of members. The proportion of families with four members increased, while that of families with six members and more decreased. The latter is basically explained by the massive outflow from the republic, basically from rural areas, of persons of Azerbaijan nationality, who as a rule have large families.

The average family size for the republic as a whole remained unchanged and was 4.7 persons, as it was ten years ago; in urban areas it was 4.6 as against 4.5 in 1979; in rural areas, 4.9 as against 5.2. The drop in the average family size in rural areas is explained by the reduction in the number of families of six and more. The figure was affected both by the unsatisfactory state of housing construction in the republic and by the fact that data in this category were not obtained from part of the population (in the earthquake zone).

Number of Family Members and Singles in the Armenian SSR as Percentages of the Total

	1979					1989*				
	Total population	All family members	Of those, living		Singles	Total population	All family members	Of those, living		Singles
			With family	Apart from family				With family	Apart from family	
Total population	100	98.3	94.8	3.5	1.7	100	98.6	96.3	2.3	1.4
Urban	100	98.2	94.4	3.8	1.8	100	98.6	96.2	2.4	1.4
Rural	100	98.5	95.6	2.9	1.5	100	98.8	96.7	2.1	1.2

*Minus those covered in the abridged census

Of the republic's population, 96.3 percent now live in families. In addition, 2.3 percent of family members live apart from the family but are linked with it by a common budget. For the country overall, these figures are 89 and 5 percent, respectively. There are 1.4 percent who have no family or have lost connection with it (singles). The proportion of family members living apart from the

family and of singles is also low in the republics of Central Asia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, where it is 4-6 percent, and is higher in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltics (11-15 percent). This is partly due to differences in the number of single elderly persons and the higher concentration of students of higher and middle special educational institutions in the European part of the country.

Population With Higher and Middle (Complete and Partial) Education in the Armenian SSR

Population with Higher and Middle (Complete and Partial) Education in the Armenian SSR						
	With higher and middle (complete and partial) education	including				
		completed higher	partial higher	special middle	general middle	partial middle
Total population aged 15 and older, thous.						
1979	1,708.2	219.1	51.6	222.9	681.7	532.9
1989	2,074.7	318.6	53.7	410.7	863.6	428.1
1989 as percentage of 1979	121.5	145.4	104.1	184.3	126.7	80.3
Per 1000 persons aged 15 and older						
1979	814	104	25	106	325	254

Population With Higher and Middle (Complete and Partial) Education in the Armenian SSR (Continued)

	With higher and middle (complete and partial) education	including				
		completed higher	partial higher	special middle	general middle	partial middle
1989	901	138	23	179	375	186
Working population, thous.						
1979	1,250.9	202.8	19.2	198.0	521.6	309.3
1989	1,238.6	249.2	18.8	288.5	507.9	174.2
1989 as percentage of 1979	99.0	122.9	97.9	145.7	97.4	56.3
Per 1000 employed						
1979	868	141	13	137	362	215
1989	954	192	15	222	391	134

The population's educational level rose substantially from 1978-1988. The number of persons with a higher and middle (complete and partial) education increased in these ten years from 1,708,000 to 2,074,700, or by 21.5 percent. Over 90 percent of the republic's population aged 15 and over now has this level of education, compared with 81.4 percent in 1979. The number of persons with a higher and complete middle education rose rather rapidly during the implementation of the Law on Universal Compulsory Middle Education of Young People. According to this census' data, 71.5 percent of the population aged 15 and over has this level of education; in 1979, it was 56 percent. At the same time, the proportion of persons with a partial middle and elementary education declined from 36.9 percent in 1979 to 25 percent in 1989.

Among the population engaged in the national economy the educational level is higher than for the population as a whole. Among workers, 95.4 percent have a higher and middle (complete or partial) education, as against 86.8 percent in 1979.

Correspondingly, the number of persons engaged in the economy with an elementary education declined during the same period by over 2.5 times, now comprising only 3.7 percent.

There was a leveling of the educational level of the urban and rural populations. In 1979, 87.1 percent of city-dwellers aged 15 and older had a higher and middle (complete or partial) education, and 70.0 percent of rural residents; in 1989, the figures were 93.5 percent and 83.1 percent, respectively; i.e., the gap narrowed by almost 7 points.

Information was obtained in the 1989 census on the population of all nationalities living in the Armenian SSR. As in past censuses, respondents indicated their nationality based on self-evaluation. The nationality of children was determined by their parents.

The number of Armenians grew from 1979-1988, while the proportion of the remaining, relatively small nationalities declined or stayed the same.

Change in the Population Size of Individual Nationalities in the Armenian SSR and Yerevan City Soviet Between the 1978 and 1989 Censuses

	1979	1989	1989 as percentage of 1979	Persons of given nationality as percentage of total	
				1979	1989
Armenian SSR	3,037.3	3,304.8	108.8	100	100
Armenians	2,725.0	3,083.6	113.2	89.7	93.3
Azerbaijanis	160.8	84.9	52.8	5.3	2.6
Russians	70.3	51.6	73.4	2.3	1.6
Kurds	50.8	4.2	—	1.7	0.1
Yezids	— *	51.9	—	—	1.6
Ukrainians	8.9	8.3	93.3	0.3	0.2
Assyrians	6.2	6.0	96.8	0.2	0.2
Greeks	5.7	4.6	80.7	0.2	0.1

Change in the Population Size of Individual Nationalities in the Armenian SSR and Yerevan City Soviet Between the 1978 and 1989 Censuses (Continued)

	1979	1989	1989 as percentage of 1979	Persons of given nationality as percentage of total	
				1979	1989
Other nationalities	9.6	9.7	101.0	0.3	0.3
Yerevan city council	1,031.0	1,141.0	110.7	100	100
Armenians	986.8	1,100.4	111.5	95.7	96.4
Azerbaijanis	2.4	0.9	37.5	0.2	0.1
Russians	26.5	22.2	83.8	2.6	2.0
Kurds	5.7	0.9	—	0.6	0.1
Yezids	— *	6.2	—	—	0.5
Ukrainians	3.4	3.8	111.8	0.3	0.3
Assyrians	0.7	0.5	71.4	0.1	0.05
Greeks	1.2	1.0	83.3	0.1	0.1
Other nationalities	4.3	5.1	118.6	0.4	0.45

*Yezids were included with Kurds in the 1979 census and not counted separately

According to data of the last census, the number of Azerbaijanis in the republic amounted to 84,900 persons. It should be noted that the number of persons of Azerbaijani nationality living in the republic on the date of the census was 7,900 persons. The 77,000 person difference is explained by the fact that the USSR State Committee for Statistics included in the permanent population of our republic those emigrants from Armenia who were included in the census in the Azerbaijan SSR as temporarily resident population.

For the period from 1979 through 1988, the number of Armenians living in the country increased overall by 472,000 persons, or 11.4 percent. This increase occurred in almost all the union republics, except for the two republics of the Caucasus. There is a migration of the Armenian population, basically into Armenia; this is occurring at slower rates from Georgia and in massive immigration from Azerbaijan.

Distribution of Armenians by Territory of Residence

	Number of Armenians living in Union republics (thous.)			As percentage of total	
	1979	1989	1989 as percentage of 1979	1979	1989
USSR	4,151	4,623	111.4	100	100
RSFSR	365	532	146.0	8.8	11.5
Ukrainian SSR	39	54	140.2	0.9	1.2
Uzbek SSR	42	51	119.3	1.0	1.1
Kazakh SSR	14	19	136.4	0.3	0.4
Georgian SSR	448	437	97.6	10.8	9.5
Azerbaijan SSR	475	391	82.1	11.4	8.4
Tajik SSR	4.9	5.7	116.3	0.1	0.1
Armenian SSR	2,725	3,084	113.2	65.7	66.7
Turkmen SSR	27	32	119.6	0.7	0.7
In remaining republics	11.1	17.3	155.9	0.3	0.4

Besides nationality, the census also recorded native language and second language of the peoples of the

USSR in which respondents are fluent.

Distribution of Population of the Armenian SSR by Nationality and Language

		Including those considering Russian their native language			
		Language of one's own nationality	Language of another nationality		
	Total		Armenian	Russian	Others
Total population	100	99.1	0.4	0.5	—
Armenians	100	99.7	—	0.3	0.0
Azerbaijanis	100	99.7	0.1	0.2	—
Russians	100	98.4	1.4	—	0.2
Kurds	100	79.7	18.6	0.6	1.1
Yezids*	—	—	—	—	—
Ukrainians	100	68.1	1.9	29.8	0.2
Assyrians	100	90.0	5.6	4.3	0.1
Greeks	100	58.4	14.7	26.5	0.4
Other nationalities	100	74.4	5.1	19.6	0.9

*Data on Yezids' native language will be published later after processing.

The data reveal that 99.1 percent of the republic's population consider the language of their nationality to be their native language, and 0.9 percent consider it to be

the language of other peoples (in 1979 these were 98.8 percent and 1.2 percent, respectively).

By source of income, the republic's population is distributed as follows:

Source of Income

	Thous. of persons		1989 as percentage of 1979	As percentage of total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	3,037.3	3,304.8	108.8	100.0	100.0
Working in the national economy (except those engaged in private subsidiary production)	1,440.8	1,298.7	90.1	47.4	39.3
Scholarship-aided students	129.0	68.6	53.2	4.3	2.1
Pensioners and those receiving public assistance, and others supported by the state	262.2	395.2	150.7	8.6	11.9
Dependents and family members engaged in private subsidiary production	1,202.8	1,300.6	108.1	39.6	39.4
With other, unspecified source of income	2.5	241.7	96.7 times greater	0.1	7.3

According to census data, for 1979-1988 there is a reduction in the number of workers in the economy and a sharp increase in the number of persons having other sources of income and not indicating the source. This is related to the earthquake, since information was not received on income sources for the population in the earthquake region, as well as to methodological costs of conducting the census under extreme circumstances, when a large part of the population was unable to work on the date of the census.

The republic's government is working on conducting a repeat census after the situation stabilizes in the republic. Only the data of a new census could serve as a

reliable basis for developing long-term social and economic plans for the republic's development.

Official Interviewed on Census

[Interview with L.M. Davtyan, the chairman of the Armenian SSR State Committee for Statistics, by V. Zakharyan: "So How Many Of Us Are There?", date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The question in the article's title may appear rhetorical to many. The results are in from the All-Union Census, according to which the resident population of the Armenian SSR on January 12, 1989 was 3,287,700 persons. But even so that is the question with which I begin

the conversation with the chairman of the Armenian SSR State Committee for Statistics, L.M. Davtyan.

[Davtyan] Alas, that's what the official figure is. And this bitter "Alas" is because it in no way reflects the true size of our republic's population. I am forced to make this confession, which is inadmissible for the director of a statistical center. And now I will explain how this happened.

You know that the All-Union Census is normally conducted once a decade in the country. The one before last was conducted in 1979. Consequently, the next one should have been in 1989; more precisely, from January 12 through 19. And it was conducted, despite the tragic event in Armenia one month before the census, despite all our pleas and demands that it be postponed in our republic alone.

We explained (this was already clear to everyone, by the way) that it was unallowable to hold the census under conditions of demographic chaos caused by a devastating natural disaster causing the death of thousands of people and the evacuation of a large part of the population from the area not only to other areas of the republic, but to other parts of the country. The situation was aggravated by flows of people coming the other way from the two neighboring republics. But none of these arguments were accepted, and we were forced to conduct the census.

[Zakharyan] Levon Misakovich, as a person not only conducting a written argument with the management of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, but also in direct contact with them these days, why do you think there was such unreasonable stubbornness on this question?

[Davtyan] I'll tell you honestly. I do not see any prejudice or bias in this. I think the "law of the set rule" was at work here, which is fundamental for most bureaucrats at all levels...

If a rule exists, it must be observed without deviation, despite all circumstances and with no exceptions. Yet the more than extreme situation in Armenia not only justified, but required an exception. This is not only my personal opinion, but also that of certain of my colleagues from other republics.

But even so we managed to obtain some exceptions to the established rules, although only for the 9 rayons and 3 cities of the disaster zone.

First, the census was conducted there not in eight days, as everywhere else, but in a month.

Second, in view of the psychological state of people, deeply traumatized and having lost next of kin, only 6 of the most important questions were left of the 25 on the questionnaires.

But this humanitarian action had its own negative effects on the sum total. For almost 600,000 persons data were

not obtained on marital status, family composition, sources of income, housing conditions, etc.

Another complication: at the time of the census over 160,000 persons had been evacuated from the disaster zone to outside the republic; naturally, they were not included in the size of Armenia's resident population.

Over half the evacuees also were not included in the size of the permanent population of the republic, since second copies of the census forms were not received for them. Due to the large-scale mobility of the population during the time the census was conducted, it is possible that it was somewhat undercounted in the Armenian SSR.

As I noted above, the census results were affected in large degree by the events stemming from the aggravation of interethnic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

[Zakharyan] Counter flows of refugees are unquestionably difficult to count statistically. How was this reflected in the census results?

[Davtyan] First of all, it sharply distorted the picture of the republic's actual national composition. At the time of the census on 12 January 1989, the number of Azerbaijanis in Armenia amounted to 7,900 persons. But according to data from the USSR State Committee for Statistics it was 84,900 persons.

[Zakharyan] And now I return to the first question. Levon Misakovich, how many of us are there really, what is the true size of our republic's population?

[Davtyan] According to the data of a running calculation, the resident population of the Armenian SSR on January 1, 1989 was 3,448,600 persons. Compare these two figures: the official census result was 3,287,700; the actual one, 3,448,600.

I repeat, the reason that almost 160,000 persons are living in the republic today in an "illegal position," which impairs the social and economic situation of the entire Armenian population, is that despite all our oral and verbal protests the USSR State Committee for Statistics forced us to conduct the census under extremely complex circumstances.

[Zakharyan] But the census is not simply a statistical calculation. It is the basis for planning the republic's long-term social and economic development. Judging from your preceding responses, the results of the last census cannot at all serve as a reliable basis for such planning.

[Davtyan] Without question they cannot. Take, for example, the fact I spoke of earlier. Data on family composition and housing conditions were not received on 600,000 persons.

But these were residents of the disaster area, for the most part without housing. Precise information on their family structure is thus required for determining their

housing needs. We lack such information on almost one-fifth of the republic's population. What kind of accurate long-term planning of housing construction is possible in such circumstances?

And these 160,000 persons not reflected in the statistics and thus not allocated funds, how are they to be assured a normal existence under conditions of rationing of main foodstuffs, acute shortages and renewals of the blockade?

Another example. The approximate cost of one job is now around 15,000 rubles. Can we provide the appropriate volume of capital investments for people who formally do not live in the republic, and thus have no rights to work in it?

Considering the complexities which these considerations could entail for a republic already in a critical condition, a compromise decision was taken at the national level. The plan for social and economic development for this year was approved based on the 1987 projection of the population.

We are satisfied with this approach for now. But what about the future, next year and thereafter?

That is why the republic's government is working on conducting a repeat census of the population after the situation stabilizes in Armenia. We believe the most appropriate time for this to be 1994-1995, when the intermediate social and demographic study, the so-called "small census," is to be held.

[Zakharyan] Levon Misakovich, in the very first days after the earthquake even official sources were citing a number of earthquake victims substantially exceeding that later cited in official statistics...

[Davtyan] Yes, the first days after the disaster were a time of great emotional strain. If I, the chairman of the State Committee for Statistics, had been asked the approximate number of victims, I probably would have said 50,000-60,000 without thinking, our tragedy appeared so overwhelmingly great.

In the first days we did not count, we wept, realizing only how great were our losses. But fortunately, to our bitter luck, we were wrong in our predictions, in our preliminary estimates.

As of December 12, the earthquake victims were counted on a daily basis by the headquarters of the republic's civil defense, the Trade Union Council, the State Committee for Statistics and local agencies. The republic's Council of Ministers held daily meetings to painstakingly analyze the information coming in from the disaster zones, on each person saved, each death, each evacuee. After the 12th, on each one!

The "blank spot" in our calculations is still the first days, when it was practically impossible to ask local authorities for clear information. That is why to obtain accurate, comprehensive data we counted all the death certificated issued and later double-checked them by local issuance.

As of January 1, 1990 there were issued only 17,400 death certificates. These data were also confirmed by the republic's Ministry of Finances, which coordinated issuance of death benefits.

But to this must be added people with no relatives who would have reported their disappearance, people in the disaster area on business or as guests. If these people were residents not of our republic but of, say, Russia or neighboring regions of Georgia, then their death certificates were issued at the place of their permanent residence, and they were not included in our final tally.

In addition, we cannot with complete certainty know the number of persons who could not be removed from under the ruins.

A tragedy cannot be captured in statistics, but even so I, recognizing the full responsibility of my statement and the great significance our people attach to this information, state that the maximum limit of victims of the Spitak earthquake is 25,000 persons.

[Zakharyan] Twenty-five thousand persons is, of course, less than we had supposed. But it is such an infinitely large number for our small people, who have kept a bitter count of their losses throughout their history. How many Armenians are there today in the republic, the country, the world?

[Davtyan] According to the last census's data, in Armenia there are presently living 3,083,600 Armenians, which is 13.2 percent more than in 1979.

For the period from 1979 through 1988, the number of Armenians living in the country increased overall by 472,000 persons, or 11.1 percent. This increase took place in all the union republics, except for the two republics of the Caucasus. There is a migration of the Armenian population, primarily into Armenia: at a slower pace from Georgia, and in massive migrations from Azerbaijan.

In 1989, in the RSFSR there were living 532,000 Armenians; in the Ukraine, 54,000; Uzbek SSR, 51,000; Kazakh SSR, 19,000; Georgian SSR, 437,000; Azerbaijan SSR, 391,000; Tajikistan, 5,700; Turkmenistan, 32,000; in the remaining union republics, 17,300.

The total number of Armenians living in the country in 1989 thus amounted to 4,623,000. As to worldwide statistics, unfortunately we do not have accurate data, since several countries where Armenians are living do not include nationality in their census.

[Zakharyan] Despite the fact that statistics are recognized as a dry science, remote from all emotion, the interview with the chairman of the State Committee for Statistics has nonetheless turned out to be unexpectedly emotional, and even alarming. Let's at least try to end it on an optimistic note.

[Davtyan] Yes let's, especially since "dry" statistics, as everyone knows, have convincing data for this.

In the disaster region there have been more marriages in the last two years than before the natural disaster. This is an encouraging sign.

Here's another. In the total structure of the Armenian population the highest percentage, 21.5 percent, belongs to the most important group, those under 9 years of age. This is 1.1 percent higher than in 1979. Also cause for optimism? Without question. This means that life continues, despite disasters, hardships and deprivations.

1989 Population Census Results

Moldavian All-Union Census Report

90UN2031A Kishinev *KOMMUNIST MOLDAVIA*
in Russian No 5, May 90 (signed to press 24 Apr 90)
pp 95-96

[Article by L. Grigoryev: "The All-Union Population Census of 1989: More Precisely Determined Data for the Moldavian SSR"]

[Text] As the Moldavian SSR State Committee for Statistics has reported, at the beginning of 1989 4,337,600 people, according to more precisely determined data, lived in the republic: In urban settlements—2,036,400, in rural localities—2,301,200. The increase of the size of the population for the 10-year period came to 9.9 percent (the number of Jews, Germans and Poles living in Moldavia decreased). At the present time, the Moldavians constitute 64.5 percent of the republic's population, Ukrainians—13.8, Russians—13, the Gagauz—3.5 percent, the Bulgarians—2.0, the Jews—1.5, the Belorussians—0.5, the Gypsies—0.3 percent, the Poles—0.1, and the inhabitants of other nationalities—0.6 percent. During this time, the urban residents increased by 485,400 (through natural growth, migration influx, and the transformation of rural into urban areas), the rural population decreased by 95,200 (mainly because of the migration outflow to the cities, as well as administrative reorganizations).

The growth of the population is fixed in all cities and the majority of the rayons of the republic. In 14 rayons, located basically close to large industrial centers, the number of inhabitants decreased (migration outflow from the village to the city). In the cities of republic subordination, the population during the 10 years increased by 31.5 percent and constituted approximately one-third of all the inhabitants of Moldavia.

By comparison with 1979, the able-bodied in the republic increased by 118,000 people, which brought their total number to 2,390,300. The number of people working in the national economy (besides those employed in the individual subsidiary sector) increased during the decade by 58,000 people and reached 2,118,000 (an increase of 2.8 percent). This constitutes about 49 percent of the republic's population. During this time, those employed in the private subsidiary sector increased in our republic by a factor of 6.3—82,000, among them of working age—45,000 (here the increase is by a factor of 7.5).

The process of the aging of the population of Moldavia has continued: The number of inhabitants older than working age increased during the decade by 24 percent (let us remember, with a 9.9 percent growth of the total size of the population). The representatives of this age group constitute 663,300 people, or more than 15 percent of all the inhabitants of Moldavia.

Women—with 52.6 percent—are predominant in the structure of the population. There are 1,108 of them for every 1,000 men—this is fewer than in 1979, which improved the correlation of the sexes. However, this occurred with respect to the urban population—in the rural locality this indicator worsened somewhat.

About 40,000 marriages a year are concluded in our republic, more than 11,000 are dissolved. Failed marriages, as is well known, also strike at children—in 1988 alone, more than 10,000 of them, left without one of their parents, were added.

The census showed that during the period since 1979 the number of families in the republic increased by 120,000 and reached 1,144,000. As far as their average size is concerned, here the figure is the same as it was 10 years ago—3.4 persons (in the urban settlements it is one-tenth less, in the rural locality—as much more). The families with six and more persons have become fewer in number, there has been a decrease in the share of families consisting of 2-3 persons, but the proportion of families of 4-5 persons has increased.

Six percent of the population, or 271,000 people are single. The chances of settling down to married life here are greater for men—they come to a total of 28 percent. But one would like to wish them especially not to succeed, you see by chance, but also necessary is the attention of the chosen one, which, as is well known, must still be deserved. Well, it is necessary to call on the women the next time to protect the men. And above all against alcohol, the evil of riding motorcycles and cars, and the involvement in dubious company.

On the level of education. As the census data indicate, there has been an appreciable increase in it during the 10 years. At the beginning of 1989, those with higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education age 15 and older in our republic numbered 2,358,000, which constitutes 129 percent of the 1979 index. The number of inhabitants with higher education increased by 60 percent, with secondary specialized education—by 78 percent, and with secondary education—by 54 percent. The gap in the education of the urban and rural population has been reduced. However, it is also a fact that Moldavia, in terms of the level of education of the population of the aforesaid age occupies 14th place among the union republics. We must try hard if we want to look better in the future. Although the point is not how we will look against one or another background, where it is more important not to forget that the concern about education and the quality of instruction is a concern about the prosperity of society.

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Azerbaijan All-Union Census Report

90UN2031B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
25 May 90 pp 1, 5

[Unattributed report: "On the Results of the All-Union Census of 1989 in the Azerbaijan SSR"]

[Text] In January 1989, the state statistics organs conducted the next All-Union Census. The census was conducted through a survey at the place of the actual residence of citizens by specially-trained workers and counters. A total of more than 30,000 people took part in its conduct in the territory of the republic.

The 1989 census in the Azerbaijan SSR went on in the difficult conditions connected with the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and around it. The very peak of the preparatory work for the census (November-December 1988) coincided with the events that led to the creation of the extreme situation in the city of Baku and other regions of the republic. The period of the census itself also had to encounter serious difficulties.

Thanks to the massive explanatory work that was carried out, the support and practical assistance on the part of the party and soviet organs, and the public, the 1989 census in the republic was on the whole conducted in an organized manner and within the established deadlines.

In Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the course of the preparatory work for the census, beginning in February 1988, became complicated, and subsequently went out of control.

The proposal concerning the conduct of the census in the autonomous oblast after normalization of the situation in it was not accepted by the State Committee for Statistics of the Union.

For the period of the census, representatives of the USSR State Committee for Statistics and the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee for Statistics were sent, but it seemed impossible to monitor the actions of the census personnel. As a result, the demands of the instructions and the provisions concerning the All-Union Census of 1989 were violated, as a result of which its results were distorted.

At the present time, persistent work is being done with respect to the failure of the USSR State Committee for Statistics to publish the results of the census for Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the conduct of a repeat census in the autonomous oblast.

On the basis of the automatized processing of the census lists, the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee has obtained the final results of the All-Union Census of 1989 for the republic, as well as data on the age composition of the population, marital status, the number and size of families, level of education, nationalities and languages, and sources of the means of subsistence.

1. The number of the population on hand of the Azerbaijan SSR as of 12 January 1989 came to 7,037,900 and of the permanent population—7,021,200.

By comparison with 1979, the present population of the republic increased by 1,010,000, or by 17 percent. The dynamic of the size of the population, according to data of the post-war censuses, took shape as follows:

	Number, in Thousands				Average Annual Rates of Growth in Percent			
	1959	1970	1979	1989	1989 in Percent of 1959	1959-1969	1970-1978	1979-1988
Total population	3,697.7	5,117.1	6,028.3	7,037.9	190.3	3.0	2.0	1.6
Urban population	1,767.3	2,564.6	3,200.3	3,790.0	214.5	4.1	2.7	1.8
Rural population	1,930.4	2,552.5	2,828.0	3,247.9	168.2	2.9	1.2	1.5

During 1979-1988, the size of the population increased almost in all administrative regions (with the exception of Dashkesanskiy, Kedabekskiy, and Kusarskiy). In so doing, some differences were observed in the growth rates for the regions. The most intensive growth was registered in the cities of Naftalan, Mingechaur, Yevlakh, as well as Apsheronkiy, Agdzhadebinskiy, Bardinskiy, Saatlinskiy, Shamkhorskiy, Dzhalilabadskiy, and

Pushkinskiy rayons and the Sumgait City Soviet. A relatively high population growth (2.4 percent) is also registered in Nakhichevan ASSR.

The size of the population of the Azerbaijan SSR and its regions during the period between the censuses changed as follows:

	Size of Population, in Thousands		In Percent of the Total		1989 in Percent of 1979
	1979	1989	1979	1989	
Azerbaijan SSR	6,028.3	7,037.9	100	100	116.7
Urban population	3,200.3	3,790.0	53.1	53.9	118.4
Rural population	2,828.0	3,247.9	46.9	46.1	114.8

	Size of Population, in Thousands		In Percent of the Total		1989 in Percent of 1979
	1979	1989	1979	1989	
Nakhichevan ASSR	238.9	295.1	100	100	123.6
Urban population	62.6	88.9	26.2	30.1	142.1
Rural population	176.3	206.2	73.8	69.9	117.0
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast	160.9	—	100	—	—
Urban population	71.4	—	44.4	—	—
Rural population	89.5	—	55.6	—	—
City of Baku**	1,549.8	1,759.3	100	100	113.5
Rayons of republic subordination	4,078.7	4,795.7	100	100	117.6
Urban population	1,516.5	1,844.4	37.2	38.5	121.6
Rural population	2,562.2	2,951.3	62.8	61.5	115.2

* The census of 1989 in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was conducted in extreme conditions, and its results are subject to suspicion.

** Including the populated areas subordinated to the City Soviet.

During the 10 years, the urban population grew by 590,000, or by 18 percent. The share of city-dwellers in the total number of the population increased insignificantly: From 53.1 percent in 1979 to 53.9 percent in 1989. The number of urban residents in Nakhichevan ASSR during the inter-census period increased by 26,300, or by 42.1 percent, but the share of the city-dwellers in 1989 constituted only 30.1 percent.

Apsheronskiy, Divichinskiy, Dashkesanskiy, and Neftechalinskiy rayons, where the share of city-dwellers

constitutes from 68 to 41 percent of the population of the region, are the most urbanized.

The number of rural inhabitants increased in the 1980's by 420,000, or by 15 percent. However, their share in the total number of decreased from 46.9 percent in 1979 to 46.1 percent. The basic reason for the reduction in the proportion of the population is the migration outflow into the city.

2. The distribution of the population by age is characterized by the following:

	Number, in Thousands of People		1989 in Percent of 1979	In Percent of the Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Entire population	6,026.5	7,021.2	116.5	100	100
including of age (years)					
0-9	1,359.6	1,620.8	119.2	22.5	23.1
10-19	1,586.1	1,375.0	86.7	26.4	19.6
20-29	1,022.6	1,393.5	136.3	17.0	19.9
30-39	515.0	950.0	184.5	8.5	13.5
40-49	693.3	489.0	70.5	11.5	6.9
50-59	391.3	641.5	163.9	6.5	9.2
60-69	233.7	325.3	139.2	3.9	4.6
70-79	152.9	146.8	96.0	2.5	2.1
80 and older	69.2	79.2	114.5	1.1	1.1
Younger than working age	2,297.6	2,433.3	105.9	38.1	34.7
Working age	3,183.9	3,888.0	122.1	52.8	55.4
Older than working age	542.2	699.8	129.1	9.0	9.9

The present age structure reflects the past trends of the processes of natural movement, especially the birth rate. They were strongly influenced by the Second World War, which not only took away many lives, but also led to the reduction in the number of births, both in the years of the war and in the years

when the women of the war years or the generations of their daughters entered into active child-bearing age. Basically, this is the reason for the differences in the rates of increase (or the decrease) in the size of the population for the different age groups between the census of 1979 or 1989.

During the past 10 years, the size of the able-bodied population (men 16-59 years old, women 16-54 years old) increased by 704,100, whose share in the total size of the population came to 55.4 percent, as against 52.8 percent in 1979.

In the 1980's a process of aging of the population was observed. The number of persons older than working age increased during the past period by 29 percent, while the entire population increased only by 17 percent. The share of this age group as a whole for the republic accounts for 10 percent of the entire population (in 1979—9 percent), including in Nakhichevan ASSR—8 percent, and in the Baku City Soviet—12 percent.

3. Of the total number of the republic's population, men constitute 3,423,800 (48.8 percent), and women—3,597,400 (51.2 percent).

The number of women exceeds the number of men by 174,000, which is called forth by the higher level of

mortality and the intensity of migration of the male population, especially from the rural locality, as well as in the older ages—by the consequences of its losses during the years of the war. At the same time, an improvement of the sex structure of the population is being registered. If in 1979, there were 948 men for every 1,000 women, in 1989—there were 952. The sex structure is developing most favorably in the city. Among the men migrating from the village to the city, the young account for the greater part.

This is what explains the numerical superiority of men in the young cities of Ali-Bayramly, Naftalan, and Mingechaur, where there are 1,023-1,003 men for every 1,000 women.

4. In the republic, more than 70,000 marriages are concluded per year. According to the data of the 1989 census, there were more than 1,400,000 married couples.

The distribution of the population of the Azerbaijan SSR by marital status in 1989 was as follows:

Share of Persons of Given Marital Status of Corresponding Age, in Percent

	Men				Women			
	Never Married	Married	Widowed	Divorced and Separated	Never Married	Married	Widowed	Divorced and Separated
Entire population 16 years of age and older	30.9	64.4	1.9	0.9	22.7	59.4	13.2	2.8
16-19 years	96.8	1.2	0.0	0.0	88.0	8.9	0.1	0.1
20-24 years	74.6	20.5	0.1	0.2	47.1	48.3	0.4	0.8
25-29 years	29.3	67.2	0.2	0.7	22.1	72.9	1.0	2.0
30-39 years	6.4	90.8	0.4	1.3	9.5	82.5	2.9	4.0
40-49 years	1.9	94.2	1.2	2.0	3.1	81.0	9.4	5.8
50-59 years	1.0	93.8	3.1	1.4	1.9	72.0	20.8	4.3
60 years and older	1.0	84.7	11.7	1.0	1.7	34.2	59.6	2.4

Recently more than 9,000 marriages are dissolved per year, as a result of which approximately 6,500 children are left without one of their parents. By comparison with 1979, the share of dissolved marriages has decreased.

5. The number of families, according to the census data, came to 1,381,400, which is 287,700 families (25.3 percent) more than there were in 1979. The average family size for the republic as a whole decreased and came to 4.8 persons (in 1979—5.1), which was influenced by the reduction in the average size of the family in the rural locality from 5.8 persons in 1979 to 5.2 persons in 1989. In the urban settlements, this index has not changed and, as 10 years ago, came to 4.5 persons.

There have been some improvements in the structure of families in terms of the number of their members.

There has been some reduction in the proportion of families of two and three members, while the share of families consisting of four and five persons has increased. Furthermore, a reduction is registered in the share of families of six and more people, which is caused to a certain extent by the division of extended families that is basically connected with the improvement of the housing conditions.

Below are cited data on the number of families and their grouping by size:

	Number of Families, in Thousands			In Percent of the Total	
	1979	1989	1989 in Percent of 1979	1979	1989
All families	1,102.7	1,381.4	125.3	100	100
Families consisting of:					
2 persons	165.3	203.2	123.0	15.0	14.7
3 persons	161.2	200.1	124.2	14.6	14.5

	Number of Families, in Thousands		1989 in Percent of 1979	In Percent of the Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
4 persons	191.1	293.6	153.6	17.3	21.2
5 persons	168.1	252.3	150.1	15.3	18.3
6 persons and more	417.0	432.2	103.6	37.8	31.3

Today 6,645,600 people, or 94.7 percent of the republic's population, live in families. In addition, 235,200 (3.3 percent) of the members of families live in separation from the family, but are connected with it through the budget. 138,000 people (2.0 percent) do not have families or have lost contact with it (living alone). The proportion of members of families living separately from their families and persons living alone is not high in the

rural locality, where it comes to 3.5 percent, and is more significant in the urban settlements (6.8 percent). This, basically, is connected with the greater concentration of students of institutions of higher and secondary specialized education in the urban settlements of the republic.

6. During 1979-1988 there was an appreciable increase in the level of education both of the entire, as well as the employed, population.

	With Higher and Secondary (Complete and Incomplete) Education	Higher Complete	Including:		Secondary General	Incomplete Secondary
			Higher Incomplete	Secondary Specialized		
Entire population 15 years of age and older, in thousands						
1979	2,998	301	92	374	1,185	1,046
1989	4,144	495	93	683	1,968	905
1989 in % of 1979	138	164	100	183	166	86
Per 1,000 of the population 15 years of age and older						
1979	770	77	24	96	304	269
1989	878	105	20	144	417	192
Employed population, in thousands						
1979	2,191	280	39	335	948	589
1989	2,784	438	43	555	1,368	380
1989 in % of 1979	127	156	110	166	144	65
Per 1,000 employed:						
1979	832	106	15	127	360	224
1989	943	148	15	188	463	129

An equalization of the level of education of the urban and rural population has taken place. If in 1979 among the city dwellers 15 years of age and older there were 82.5 percent with higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education, and among rural inhabitants—69.8 percent, the corresponding figures in 1989 were 91.4 percent and 83.3 percent, the gap was reduced by more than 4 points.

7. In the course of the 1989 census, information was obtained about the population of all nationalities living in the Azerbaijan SSR. As in previous censuses, nationality was indicated by those questioned on the basis of their own

consciousness. The nationality of children was determined by the parents.

The number of the majority of nationalities increased during 1979-1988. The increase occurred chiefly through natural growth, as the result of which the population of the nationalities with a high birth rate grew at the most rapid rates. The change in the size of some nationalities, basically, is connected with migration processes.

The distribution of the population of individual nationalities between the 1979 and 1989 censuses for the republic are characterized by the following data:

	In Thousands		1989 in Percent of 1979	In Percentages of the Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Entire population	6,026.5	7,021.2	116.5	100	100
Azerbaijani	4,708.8	5,805.0	123.3	78.1	82.7

	In Thousands		1989 in Percent of 1979	In Percentages of the Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Russians	475.3	392.3	82.5	7.9	5.6
Armenians	475.5	390.5	82.1	7.9	5.6
Lezgins (Lezghi)	158.1	171.4	108.4	2.6	2.4
Avars [Awars]	36.0	44.1	122.5	0.6	0.6
Ukrainians	26.4	32.3	122.5	0.4	0.5
Tatars*	31.4	28.6	91.1	0.5	0.4
Jews**	33.4	25.3	76.0	0.6	0.4
Talysh [Talush]	...	21.2	0.3
Turks	7.9	17.7	2.2 times greater	0.1	0.3
Georgians	11.4	14.2	124.4	0.2	0.2
Kurds	5.7	12.2	2.2 times greater	0.1	0.2
Tats	8.8	10.2	115.7	0.2	0.1
Udi	5.8	6.1	104.9	0.1	0.1
Mountain Jews	2.1	5.5	2.6 times greater	0.0	0.1
Other nationalities	39.9	44.6	111.5	0.7	0.5

* Including the Crimean Tatars

** Including the Georgian, Central Asian, and Crimean Jews [Krymchaks]

Along with nationality, the native language and second language of the peoples of the USSR, of which those surveyed have fluent command, were taken into account in the census. The data obtained indicate that 97.3 percent consider the language of their nationality as their native language, and 2.7 percent—the languages of other nationalities (in 1979 respectively 95.5 percent and 4.5 percent). In the census, among the Azerbaijani, 5,754,000 (99.1 percent) indicated the Azerbaijan language as their native language, 24,200 (0.4 percent)—Russian, and 26,600—other languages. Among other nationalities, 26,600 people (in 1979—29,100) named Azerbaijan as their native language. In addition, 263,900 people, or 21.7 percent, from among other nationalities indicated the Azerbaijan language as their second language of which they have fluent command (in 1979—207,500 people, or 15.7). Among the Russians, 56,100

people, or 14.3 percent, named the Azerbaijan language as their second language, among the Avars—30,400, or 69 percent, and among the Lezgins—81,700, or 47.7 percent.

The Russian language, as the second language, was named by 2,165,400 people of non-Russian nationality, or 32.7 percent.

Thus, in the 1989 census, 290,500 people (besides the Azerbaijani), or 23.9 percent, named the Azerbaijan language as their native or second language, and 2,302,900 people (besides the Russians), or 34.8 percent—the Russian language.

8. In terms of source of the means of subsistence, the population of the republic was distributed as follows:

	In Thousands		1989 in Percent of 1979	In Percent of the Total	
	1989	1979		1979	1989
Entire population	6,026.5	7,021.2	116.5	100	100
Working in the national economy (except employed in the private subsidiary sector)	2,634.9	2,952.5	112.1	43.7	42.1
Scholarship holders, pensioners, and persons receiving assistance, as well as other persons on state maintenance	686.0	842.4	122.8	11.4	12.0
Dependents of single person, as well as members of families employed in the private subsidiary sector	2,700.3	3,214.0	119.0	44.8	45.7
Having other sources of means of subsistence and not having indicated the source	5.3	12.3	230.6	0.1	0.2

*The total of pensioners at the beginning of 1989 in the republic came to 987,000 people (in 1979—722,000). In terms of the census, pensioners include persons for whom the pension is the chief source of the means of subsistence. Pensioners who have permanent work are considered as part of the employed population.

The 1989 census also took into account persons who have two sources of means of subsistence (in 1979 only one source was taken into account). They constituted 8 percent of the entire population. This is basically pensioners who are working, as well as people who combine their main activity with employment in the private subsidiary sector, who receive a stipend, pension, assistance, or help from relatives.

Uzbek 1989 All-Union Census Results

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15 Jul 90 p 3

[1989 Uzbek All-Union Census Report: "The Uzbek SSR State Committee for Statistics Reports: How Many of Us There Are and What We Are. On the Results of the 1989 All-Union Census"]

[Text] The Uzbek SSR State Committee for Statistics has received the final results on the number and age composition of the population, marital status, the number and size of families, level of education, nationality, languages, and sources of subsistence.

1. The number of the present population of the Uzbek SSR on 12 January 1989 came to 19,905,000 people. By comparison with 1979, it increased by 4,514,000 people, or by 29.3 percent.

The dynamic of the population size according to the data of the postwar censuses developed as follows:

	Number, in Thousands				Average Annual Growth Rates, in Percent		
	1959	1970	1979	1989	1959-1969	1970-1978	1979-1988
Entire population	8,119	11,799	15,391	19,905	3.5	3.0	2.7
Urban	2,729	4,322	6,348	8,111	4.3	4.4	2.5
Rural	5,390	7,477	9,043	11,794	3.1	2.2	2.7

During 1979-1988, the population increased in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, in all oblasts, and in the city of Tashkent,

which is evident from the following data:

	Population Present, in Thousands			Permanent Population, in Thousands		
	1979	1989	1989 in % of 1979	1979	1989	1989 in % of 1979
Uzbek SSR	15,391	19,905	129.3	15,389	19,810	128.7
Kara-Kalpak ASSR	902	1,215	134.8	903	1,212	134.3
Andizhan Oblast	1,349	1,727	128.0	1,355	1,721	127.0
Bukhara Oblast	1,263	1,629	129.1	1,267	1,623	128.1
Dzhizak Oblast	511	738	144.2	512	733	143.0
Kashka-Darya Oblast	1,121	1,599	142.7	1,124	1,596	141.9
Namangan Oblast	1,100	1,477	134.3	1,101	1,471	133.7
Samarkand Oblast	1,783	2,291	128.4	1,782	2,282	128.0
Surkhan-Darya Oblast	895	1,254	140.1	897	1,250	139.4
Syr-Darya Oblast	449	569	126.9	448	565	126.2
Tashkent Oblast	1,792	2,158	120.4	1,793	2,143	119.6
Fergana Oblast	1,694	2,154	127.1	1,698	2,142	126.1
Khorezm Oblast	747	1,015	135.8	750	1,012	134.9
Tashkent City Soviet	1,785	2,079	116.5	1,759	2,060	117.1

Natural increase is the basic factor of the population growth in the Uzbek SSR. In 10 years, the urban population increased by 1,763,000 people, or by 27.8 percent, the number of rural inhabitants increased by 2,751,000,

or by 30.4 percent. The share of the urban and rural inhabitants in the total number of the population by comparison with 1979 did not change in the republic, respectively (41.0% and 59.0%).

2. The distribution of the population by age is characterized by the following:

	Number, in Thousands			In Percent of Total	
	1979	1989	1989 in % of 1979	1979	1989
Entire population	15,389	19,810	128.7	100	100
including of age, in years:					
0-9	4,397	5,827	132.5	28.6	29.4
10-19	3,819	4,261	111.6	24.8	21.5
20-29	2,525	3,618	143.3	16.4	18.3
30-39	1,298	2,406	185.3	8.4	12.1
40-49	1,339	1,198	89.5	8.7	6.0
50-59	910	1,212	133.2	5.9	6.1
60-69	553	754	136.3	3.6	3.8
70-79	409	350	85.6	2.7	1.8
80 years and older	129	184	142.6	0.8	0.9
Younger than working age	6,725	8,507	126.5	43.7	42.9
Of working age	7,345	9,720	132.3	47.7	49.1
Older than working age	1,309	1,583	121.0	8.5	8.0

During the past 10 years the increase of the population of working age (men 16-59 years old, women 16-54 years old) came to 2,375,000, or 32.2 percent compared to 1979.

At the present time, 9,720,000 people of working age live in the republic. The higher growth rates of the population of working age led to an increase in the proportion of this category of the population in the total number of the population from 47.7 percent in 1979 to 49.1 percent in 1989.

The number of persons who are older than working age increased during the past period by 21 percent. The

proportion of this age group for the republic as a whole accounts for 8 percent of the total population.

3. In the total number of the republic's population, men account for 9,784,000 (49.4 percent) and women for 10,026,000 (50.6 percent). An improvement of the sex structure of the population is registered. If in 1979 there were 965 for every 1,000 women, in 1989—976.

An excess in the number of women is observed in city localities on the average from age 30; it is called forth by the higher mortality rate of men.

4. The distribution of the republic's population by marital status in 1989 was as follows:

	Proportion of Persons of Given Marital Status of Corresponding Age, in Percent							
	Men				Women			
	Never Married	Married	Widowed	Divorced and Separated	Never Married	Married	Widowed	Divorced and Separated
Entire population 16 years of age and older	25.7	69.2	2.2	1.8	17.6	65.7	11.5	4.0
16-19	97.2	1.5	0.0	0.0	84.6	13.3	0.1	0.3
20-24	56.0	40.3	0.1	0.8	25.9	69.2	0.4	2.6
25-29	9.4	87.1	0.3	2.1	6.9	86.3	1.0	4.7
30-39	2.7	93.8	0.4	2.7	2.7	88.0	2.7	6.2
40-49	1.2	93.8	1.4	3.2	1.2	83.5	8.2	6.8
50-59	0.8	91.6	4.6	2.5	0.9	74.7	18.7	5.1
60 years and older	0.7	82.0	14.9	1.2	1.1	36.2	58.2	2.6

5. The number of families, according to the data of the census, came to 3,415,000, which is 768,000 (29.0 percent) more than there were in 1979. The average size of the family for the republic did not change and, as 10

years ago, came to 5.5 persons, in the rural localities—6.2, while in the urban settlements the average size of the family increased somewhat from 4.6 persons in 1979 to 4.7—in 1989:

	Number of Families, Thousands	Including Families Consisting of					Average Family Size (Families Living Jointly)
		2 Persons	3 Persons	4 Persons	5 Persons	6 and More Persons	
Uzbek SSR	3,145	409	433	570	509	1,494	5.5
Kara-Kalpak ASSR	178	9	13	21	24	111	6.6
Andizhan Oblast	281	26	28	41	45	141	5.9
Bukhara Oblast	300	38	42	58	48	114	5.1
Dzhizak Oblast	114	9	11	17	16	61	6.2
Kashka-Darya Oblast	257	21	25	37	37	137	6.0
Namangan Oblast	250	25	26	38	42	119	5.6
Samarkand Oblast	379	39	42	57	56	185	5.8
Surkhan-Darya Oblast	206	20	23	29	29	105	5.9
Syr-Darya Oblast	101	12	13	18	16	42	5.4
Tashkent Oblast	397	60	58	75	60	144	5.1
Fergana Oblast	370	43	44	59	59	165	5.5
Khorezm Oblast	142	9	9	15	18	91	6.9
Tashkent City Soviet	440	98	99	105	59	79	4.2

Today 18,871,600 people, or 95.3 percent of the republic's population, live in families. In addition, 677,800 members of families live separated from the family, but are connected with it through a common budget.

260,700 people (1.3 percent) do not have a family or have lost connection with it (people living alone).

6. During 1979-1988, there was an appreciable increase in the level of education of both the entire and the employed population:

			Including			
	With Higher and Secondary (Com- plete and Incom- plete) Education	Complete Higher	Incomplete Higher	Secondary Spe- cialized	Secondary Gen- eral	Incomplete Sec- ondary
Per 1,000 population of age 15 and older						
1979	765	70	20	89	334	252
1989	867	92	19	150	408	198
Per 1,000 employed						
1979	848	96	13	120	413	206
1989	948	127	15	199	480	127

The level of education of the population for the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, the oblasts, and the city of Tashket are

characterized as follows:

	Per 1,000 Persons, 15 Years of Age and Older, with Education:				Per 1,000 Persons, Working in the Economy, with Education:			
	Higher and Secondary (Complete and Incomplete)	Including			Higher and Secondary (Complete and Incomplete)	Including		
		Complete Higher	Complete Secondary	Incomplete Secondary		Complete Higher	Complete Secondary	Incomplete Secondary
Uzbek SSR	867	92	577	198	948	127	694	127
Kara-Kalpak ASSR	854	78	555	221	939	115	679	145

	Per 1,000 Persons, 15 Years of Age and Older, with Education:				Per 1,000 Persons, Working in the Economy, with Education:			
		Including				Including		
Andizhan Oblast	856	64	604	188	946	90	744	112
Bukhara Oblast	890	85	600	205	959	113	719	127
Dzhizak Oblast	870	83	575	212	948	125	682	141
Kashka-Darya Oblast	870	72	604	194	952	105	735	112
Namangan Oblast	874	59	631	184	955	86	774	95
Samarkand Oblast	857	85	581	191	944	119	706	119
Surkhan-Darya Oblast	829	64	567	198	921	95	698	128
Syr-Darya Oblast	856	80	546	230	933	111	656	166
Tashkent Oblast	843	81	539	223	933	111	651	171
Fergana Oblast	856	70	586	200	946	96	727	123
Khorezm Oblast	882	72	591	219	958	103	731	124
Tashkent City Soviet	917	211	538	168	968	275	575	118

In the course of the 1989 census, information was obtained about the population of all the nationalities living in the republic. As in previous censuses, nationality was indicated by those surveyed on the basis of their consciousness. The nationality of the children was determined by the parents.

There was an increase in the number of persons of the majority of the nationalities during 1979-1988. The increase took place mainly through natural growth, as the result of which the population of the nationalities with high birth rates increased rapidly.

Distribution of the Population of the Uzbek SSR by Nationality

Urban and Rural Population, Both Sexes

	1979	1989	
	Number of People	Number of People	1989 in % of 1979
Entire population	15,389,307	19,810,077	128.7
Uzbeks	10,569,007	14,142,475	133.8
Karakalpak	297,788	411,878	138.3
Russians	1,665,638	1,653,478	99.3
Ukrainians	113,826	153,197	134.6
Belorussians	19,073	29,427	154.3
Kazakhs	620,136	808,227	130.3
Georgians	4,088	4,704	115.1
Azerbaijanians	59,779	44,410	74.3
Lithuanians	1,040	1,628	156.5
Moldavians	3,152	5,955	188.9
Latvians	1,464	1,131	77.3
Kirghiz	142,182	174,907	123.0
Tajiks	594,627	933,560	157.0
Armenians	42,374	50,537	119.3
Turkmens	92,285	121,578	131.7
Estonians	1,064	854	80.3
Abkhaz	110	129	117.3

Distribution of the Population of the Uzbek SSR by Nationality (Continued)

Urban and Rural Population, Both Sexes

	1979	1989	
	Number of People	Number of People	1989 in % of 1979
Avars	529	767	145.0
Agul	28	128	457.1
Balkars	144	488	338.9
Bashkirs	25,879	34,771	134.4
Buryats	623	635	101.9
Dargins	1,385	2,030	146.6
Ingush	258	474	183.7
Kabards	315	907	287.9
Kalmyks	221	517	233.9
Karelians	144	194	134.7
Komi	231	472	204.3
Kumyk	395	713	180.5
Lak	2,248	2,807	124.9
Lezgins	2,049	3,071	149.9
Mari	3,427	2,964	86.5
Mordvinians	12,263	11,914	97.2
Nogai	99	91	91.9
Ossetians	5,081	5,823	114.6
Rutul	5	53	1,060.0
Tabasaran	305	457	149.8
Tatars	531,205	467,829	88.1
Tuvinians	267	73	27.3
Udmurts	1,987	2,466	124.1
Tsakhurs	51	24	47.1
Chechen	573	1,006	175.6
Chuvash	9,389	10,074	107.3
Yakuts	119	183	153.8
Adygei	122	139	113.9
Altai	125	191	152.8

Distribution of the Population of the Uzbek SSR by Nationality (Continued)

Urban and Rural Population, Both Sexes

	1979	1989	
	Number of People	Number of People	1989 in % of 1979
Jews	73,920	65,493	88.6
Karachai	289	329	113.8
Khakass	231	288	124.7
Cherkess	243	211	86.8
Komi-Permyaks	143	171	119.6
Dolgan	25	37	148.0
Koryaks	70	143	204.3
Mansi	7	23	328.6
Nenets	28	60	214.3
Khant	6	36	600.0
Evenk	49	37	75.5
Itelmen	4	19	475.0
Nanai	17	14	82.4
Negidals	6	15	250.0
Udegei	15	14	93.3
Ulchi	37	13	35.1
Even	13	31	238.5
Abaza	86	79	91.9
Gagauz	111	190	171.2
Mountain Jews	216	617	285.6
Jews of Georgia	57	210	368.4
Jews of Central Asia	25,643	28,369	110.6
Izhora	1	29	2,900.0
Karaim	29	55	189.7
Krymchaks	72	173	240.3
Crimean Tatars	117,559	188,772	160.6
Tats	159	242	152.2
Udi	28	46	164.3
Gypsies	12,581	16,397	130.3
Shors	198	283	142.9
Austrians	23	34	147.8
Albanians	24	16	66.7
Arabs	2,039	2,805	137.6
Assyrians	260	186	71.5
Afgans	826	1,655	200.4
Beluchi	149	20	13.4
Bulgarians	2,443	2,166	88.7
Hungarians	172	211	122.7
Vietnamese	500	233	46.6
Dutch	3	19	146.2
Greeks	14,025	10,453	74.5

Distribution of the Population of the Uzbek SSR by Nationality (Continued)

Urban and Rural Population, Both Sexes

	1979	1989	
	Number of People	Number of People	1989 in % of 1979
Dungans	1,106	1,353	122.3
Peoples of India and Pakistan	139	756	543.9
Spaniards	37	54	145.9
Italians	65	104	160.0
Chinese	656	816	124.4
Koreans	163,062	183,140	112.3
Cubans	223	253	113.5
Kurds	982	1,839	187.3
Germans	39,517	39,809	100.7
Persians	20,026	21,779	123.7
Poles	3,654	3,007	82.3
Romanians	131	158	120.6
Serbs	16	26	162.5
Slovaks	22	42	190.9
Turks	48,726	106,302	218.2
Uighurs	29,104	35,762	122.9
Finns	202	181	89.6
Khalka Mongols	313	119	38.0
Khorvat	4	14	350.0
Czechs	130	94	72.3
Japanese	5	19	380.0
Other nationalities	1,703	1,689	99.2
Nationality not indicated	47	231	491.5

The distribution of the population of the Uzbek SSR by nationality and language is characterized by the following data:

	Number of Persons of a Given Nationality, in Thousands		Considering as Native the Language of This Same Nationality, in Percent	
	1979	1989	1979	1989
Entire population	15,389	19,810	95.7	95.6
Uzbeks	10,569	14,142	98.8	98.7
Karakalpaks	298	412	96.1	94.6
Russians	1,666	1,654	99.9	99.9
Ukrainians	114	153	45.1	49.2
Belorussians	19	29	50.2	52.9
Kazakhs	620	808	94.7	93.0
Azerbaijanis	60	44	88.3	79.4
Kirghiz	142	175	80.4	80.1
Tajiks	595	934	93.4	94.0

	Number of Persons of a Given Nationality, in Thousands		Considering as Native the Language of This Same Nation- ality, in Percent	
	1979	1989	1979	1989
Armenians	42	51	62.1	62.1
Turkmens	92	122	92.6	90.3
Bashkirs	26	35	70.6	68.1
Mordvinians	12	12	49.3	47.3
Tatars	531	468	84.2	78.5
Chuvash	9	10	59.1	54.5
Jews	74	65	32.6	26.5

	Number of Persons of a Given Nationality, in Thousands		Considering as Native the Language of This Same Nation- ality, in Percent	
	1979	1989	1979	1989
Jews of Central Asia	26	28	79.2	69.2
Crimean Tatars	118	189	77.1	93.2
Gypsies	12	16	41.8	41.2
Greeks	14	11	67.7	53.5
Koreans	163	183	62.1	55.8
Germans	39	40	57.5	47.5
Persians	20	25	14.3	15.1
Turks	49	106	86.9	95.4
Uighurs	29	36	51.0	61.5
Other nationalities	50	62	64.9	63.3

	Of the Total Number of Persons of a Given Nationality with Fluent Command of a Second Language of the Peoples of the USSR, in Percent								Without a Second Lan- guage of the Peoples of the USSR, in Percent	
	Language of Their Republic									
	Uzbek		Kara-Kalpak		Russian		Other Languages			
	1979	1989	1979	1989	1979	1989	1979	1989	1979	1989
Entire popula- tion	3.1	4.1	0.3	0.4	46.7	22.5	1.5	2.1	48.4	70.9
Uzbeks	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	52.9	22.3	1.2	1.9	45.4	75.4
Karakalpak	2.8	3.2	0.1	0.2	45.2	19.7	7.8	7.8	44.1	69.1
Russians	5.9	4.5	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.9	1.1	93.1	94.2
Ukrainians	3.3	3.5	0.1	0.1	40.3	34.1	9.2	7.9	47.1	54.4
Belorussians	2.7	1.9	0.3	0.1	38.4	33.9	8.0	8.9	50.5	55.2
Kazakhs	6.9	11.8	4.6	6.2	48.6	29.2	0.6	1.1	39.3	51.7
Azerbaijanis	24.7	13.2	0.0	0.1	48.5	1.8	2.9	24.6	35.3	
Kirghiz	22.4	30.7	0.0	0.1	37.0	12.1	1.5	2.8	39.1	54.3
Tajiks	28.1	36.8	0.0	0.0	34.7	17.3	1.1	1.4	36.1	44.5
Armenians	2.7	3.4	0.0	0.1	55.5	52.3	7.5	6.6	34.3	37.6
Turkmens	17.0	22.8	2.9	2.4	36.3	13.5	1.7	2.4	42.1	58.9
Bashkirs	6.2	10.4	0.2	0.3	68.8	60.3	4.1	4.5	20.7	24.5
Mordvinians	2.7	3.3	0.0	0.1	45.9	40.5	7.8	6.7	43.6	49.4
Tatars	5.6	9.3	0.1	0.2	73.4	62.5	3.3	3.4	17.6	24.6
Chuvash	5.0	6.2	0.1	0.1	54.6	48.5	6.2	6.1	34.1	39.1
Jews	4.9	6.5	0.0	0.1	31.5	25.3	7.5	7.6	56.1	60.5
Jews of Cen- tral Asia	4.6	9.9	0.0	0.0	66.9	52.7	5.6	7.7	22.9	29.7
Crimean Tatars	2.8	8.2	0.0	0.0	82.3	73.2	1.3	1.5	13.6	17.1
Gypsies	28.4	39.0	0.0	0.0	28.5	11.8	7.2	6.5	35.9	42.7
Greeks	2.5	3.5	0.0	0.1	63.0	46.6	0.4	2.0	34.1	47.8
Koreans	3.1	3.6	0.4	0.4	53.7	47.7	0.3	1.6	42.5	46.7
Germans	2.5	2.9	0.0	0.1	53.3	42.1	0.4	1.3	43.8	53.6
Persians	3.7	3.9	0.0	0.0	67.1	52.5	0.8	5.6	28.4	38.0
Turks	31.0	43.6	0.0	0.1	42.0	26.3	0.7	1.2	26.3	28.8
Uighurs	12.9	20.4	0.0	0.1	56.2	32.2	0.7	0.9	30.2	46.4
Other nation- alities	5.9	7.4	0.1	0.3	53.5	47.2	4.0	4.7	36.5	40.4

In the census, along with nationality, the native language and the second language of the peoples of the USSR of which those surveyed have fluent command, were taken into account. The data obtained indicate that 95.6 percent of the republic's population regard the language of their nationality as their native language, and 4.4 percent—the language of other peoples. The most widespread language is the Russian language. It was named as the native language by 2,151,600 people (in 1979—by 2,063,900 people), of them 1,651,500 Russians and

500,100 people of other nationalities. In addition, 4,464,500 people indicated the Russian language as the second language of which they have fluent command (in 1979—7,180,300 people), thus in the 1989 census a total of 6,616,100, or 33.4 percent of the total population of the republic (in 1979—60.1 percent) named Russian as their native or second language. The Uzbek, Tajik, and Kazakh languages are also disseminated.

8. In terms of the source of the means of subsistence, the republic's population was distributed as follows:

	In Thousands		1989 in Percent of 1979	In Percent of the Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Entire population	15,389	19,810	128.7	100	100
Those working in the national economy (except those working only in private subsidiary farming)	6,201	7,803	125.8	40.3	39.4
Scholarship holders	401	431	107.5	2.6	2.2
Pensioners and persons receiving assistance, as well as other persons on state security	1,343	2,590	192.9	8.7	13.1
Dependents of single persons, as well as those employed only in private subsidiary farming	7,433	8,972	120.7	48.3	45.2
Those who have another source of means of subsistence and have not indicated the source	11	14	125.9	0.1	0.1

The 1989 census also took into account persons who have two sources of means of subsistence (in 1979 only one source was taken into account). They came to 12.7 percent of the entire population. These are mainly working pensioners, as well as persons who combine their basic activity with employment in private subsidiary farming, or who receive a scholarship, pension, assistance and help from relatives.

Head of European, Siberian Spiritual Administration on Muslim Role

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[Article by Mufti-khazret Talgat Tadzhuddin, chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in the European Part of the USSR and Siberia: "Go into the World Together!"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In the age-old struggle between the forces of good and evil, first one and then the other has gotten the upper hand and, in their main characteristics, historical eras are distinguished from one another by the correlation of precisely these forces within them. Regrettably, it is necessary to say that this balance has more and more often turned out to be not on the side of the former and even that the well-known principle that "If you want peace—prepare for war!" has prevailed in relationships between peoples. Until the onset of the nuclear age, many perceived this practically

a focus of great human wisdom, inasmuch as its imaginary reliability was seemingly confirmed by practice: They feared the strong, they tried not to run counter to the strong, and, finally, they simply subordinated themselves to them. And not by accident: The bitter historical experience of many generations of the most varied peoples had in the final account trained them in the idea that the last and decisive argument might always end up being armed force.

So it continued, so long as it seemed that the test of good and evil, of life and death was the life structure of every individual person and sometimes possibly even of an individual tribe or people, but in any case, not of all mankind. Even among many believers, the notion of a universal end of the world, of the course of world history, began to acquire a very, very abstract character. Ever quickening scientific and technical progress, having made entirely realistic mankind's escape from the limits not only of our planet but even of the solar system itself, helped to support such notions. By direct or indirect means, the idea began to penetrate the mass social consciousness that, even should the vital resources of the Earth become exhausted, man's scientific and technological might will reach scales such that will permit him to conquer and make habitable the expanses beyond earth or, at least, to create artificial environments to live in. The principle that "nature is not a temple, but a workshop" began, unfortunately, to dominate everywhere. Our blessed earth has been turned into an object of unrestricted technological experimentation, if not to say—rape. Ever since it began to seriously seem to

people that they would not remain forever within their own cradle, that in the end this would serve them only as a launching pad for the conquest of other worlds, the sense of direct responsibility for their own earth, for their natural environment, necessarily had to become weaker. Essentially, people ceased to appreciate the great meaning of the Almighty's strict warning: **"...do not destroy the earth after its organization"** (The Koran, "Barriers" sura, ayat 85).

But it would, of course, be wrong to assume that carelessness toward our native earth has become an irreversible feature of modern people. We note with joy that the number of those who sharply feel its pain, who are ready to help it, for whom it is a temple, is growing with every day. At the same time, particularly pleasing is the remarkable fact that the desire to preserve the health of our blessed land is today uniting people of the most varied world outlooks, races, and nationalities, helping them, like nothing else, to recognize with their own eyes their natural commonality with one another, the inseparability of their destinies and the destinies of succeeding generations.

We, muslims in particular, are in deep agreement with the ideas of that outstanding fighter for saving nature, the Russian writer V. Rasputin, for whom the earth is the birth mother and wet-nurse of the people, their eternal refuge, their only dwelling place, to which nothing more can be added from outside. And when, among this people, people appear who consider that the earth has been incorrectly organized and that it is necessary to alter it, it is not the fact that they have appeared that is dangerous, but the fact that we permit ourselves to follow them, like prophets. It is not without reason that concern has appeared in our times that those who come after us will not forgive us.

It is possible to free oneself of this concern, to overcome it, only by developing within ourselves a sense of being the true protectors of our wonderful earth, on which, in the words of the prophet Mohammed (May Allah bless and greet him!), people are like the crew of a one ship and are bound by a common destiny: The safety of some cannot be ensured at the expense of others.

The common destiny of all mankind became particularly evident with the start of the nuclear age, of a qualitatively new way of life, when the security of whomsoever turned out to be directly dependent upon the degree to which the security of everyone else is ensured. People saw directly how unified this world is, how closely and inseparably interrelated its component parts are. One of the fundamental postulates of our own faith, and of a whole series of other religious doctrines, that regarding the unity of life, has been convincingly confirmed. This is why the principle of a unified and mutual dependent world, a principle that is increasingly finding approval in international relations, is close to the muslims of the USSR, as it is to all honest people on our planet.

Of course, unification of people of good will can take a spontaneous course. But, as the entire experience of mankind shows, their joint efforts become immeasurably more effective and consequential if their unification process is based on set universal principles of a moral order, acceptable as a whole both for religious and for secular people. The all-embracing character and significance of these moral principles are so great that, without them, neither truly human interrelationships of societies of people nor worthy conduct on the part of the individual person is possible.

An underrating of the principles of a truly humane community, an ignoring of them, can lead to moral conflicts not only of an interpersonal and intrapersonal character, but can also seriously complicate relationships between various social groups and even peoples. With deep sorrow and sadness in our souls we are seeing this today in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The incendiary activities of evil and dishonest politicians have led here to a conflict of whole peoples who have lived as good neighbors for centuries, to bloodletting, to human victims. Patience and love of man, preached by both Islam and Christianity alike, have given way to blind enmity and implacability. With alarm in my heart, I see how such attempts to sow the deeds of dissension and distrust between nations are also being undertaken in Volga and Ural regions where, to our sorrow, people have also been found who strive to drive a wedge of enmity between like-believing peoples—the Tatars and the Bashkirs—and between them and their Russian brothers. Taking advantage of the occasion, I turn to you, my like-blooded brother muslims: Do not allow hatred to grow within your hearts, do not submit to the incitements of extremists, unclench your fists and, as is our good custom, extend both open palms to our neighbors who live alongside us. And may peace and agreement reign between you!

For among the universal moral principles, the fundamental one was, is and remains the principle of living in a just, safe world, where the sanctity of human life is recognized and there is no place for oppression and persecution based on convictions of world outlook. For there is no superiority of some people over others, other than that in the beatitude **"Indeed the most noble of you before Allah is the most devout"** (Koran, "Rooms" sura, ayat 13).

We need to maintain relationships among ourselves that are permeated with a feeling of duty, of mutual responsibility, with a capability sincerely to commiserate, to feel the joy and pain of another. It is specifically from here that the path opens to true trust, so needed by our still disjointed world.

The restructuring of the human community which has been begun in our multinational state has today become a truly universal phenomenon. Its enormous attractive force consists of its application to the real needs and demands of man, independent of his world outlook.

convictions, race, or language. Believing people are particularly inspired by the aim of perestroika to activate not only the material but also the entire spiritual potential of society. The recently solemnly and ceremoniously noted one thousandth anniversary of the christening of Russia and the eleven hundredth anniversary of the acceptance of Islam in the state of Great Bulgaria have showed that a beneficent course has been taken toward overcoming those negative discriminatory incidents which have seriously hindered an organic unity of believers and nonbelievers as co-citizens who have equal rights. Such a course, doubtless, ensures the interested participation in perestroika of all strata in our society, including muslims as well.

Their indispensable and active participation in the great process of creative renewal that is taking place today has been foreordained by their organic participation in the historical destinies of our multinational Soviet fatherland, on one hand, and on the other, by the fundamental principles of our sacred religion. In accordance with these, the well-being of each individual person, of each family, cannot be considered an achieved goal without the well-being of all of society. [Passage omitted]

Decree on Muslim Pilgrimage Published

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3 Jun 90 p 1

[Report by I. Karimov, president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic: "Ukase of the President of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic on the Pilgrimage of Muslims to Saudi Arabia"]

[Text] 1. In execution of the direction of the USSR President to consent to the request of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan on sending as pilgrims to Saudi Arabia a group of Muslims residing in the Central Asian region comprising 500 persons from 19 June to 10 July 1990.

2. The Uzbek board of civil aviation (Comrade Rafikov) is to provide transport for the pilgrims to the city of Jiddah (Saudi Arabia) and back on an agreed route, allocating for these purposes Il-86 and Il-62 aircraft, in addition to ensuring transportation to their places of permanent residence.

3. The Uzbek SSR MVD Department of Visas and Registration (Comrade Yuldashev), the Uzbek SSR MFA (Comrade Azimov), the Uzbek republic customs service (Comrade Tarasov), together with the Council on Religious Affairs under the USSR Council of Ministers for the Uzbek SSR is to ensure expeditious processing of the exit documents.

4. The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health (Comrade Bakhramov) is to allocate the pilgrims the necessary medications, and to ensure qualified medical service for the period of their visit to the pilgrimage sites.

5. The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Trade (Comrade Usmanov), together with the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan are to assist the pilgrims in the acquisition of souvenirs and mementos.

6. The Tashkent gorispolkom [city executive committee] (Comrade Shoabdurakhimov), upon the request of the Spiritual Board of Muslims, is to ensure the accommodation of the pilgrimage participants in the hotels of Tashkent before their departure and upon their return from Saudi Arabia.

I. Karimov, president,
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic

First Torah Ceremony Held in Moscow Since WWII

90UN1955A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by L. Aleynik and M. Lebedeva: "The Holiday of the Torah"]

[Text] For the first time in the Soviet Union since the Second World War, a remarkable event in the life of Soviet Jews was officially widely celebrated—the day of the solemn introduction into the Moscow Choral Synagogue of the recently finished scroll of the holy books of the Torah, traditionally known as the Five Books of Moses. They form the opening of the Bible; each of the books is a narration of the events beginning with the creation of the world and ending with the death of the prophet.

Presented by the Most High on Mount Sinai 33 centuries ago to the prophet Moses, the tablets of the Testament are read by Christians, as well, as their religion grew from the same source. It is no accident that both professions hold as one of their fundamental principles: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you".

D. Tverskoy, a Hassidic spiritual leader and rabbi from New Squire, NY who advocates the service of God in gladness, arrived from the USA especially in the USSR, where, before visiting Moscow, he and nearly 400 of his coreligionists from many countries of Europe and America made their first pilgrimage through the Ukraine, the birthplace of their teachings.

While in the region of the Chernobyl AES, the pilgrims paid their respects to the memory of the victims of the international catastrophe, and made large contributions to the Chernobyl Fund. An agreement was signed, in accordance with which New Skvira and Skvira, Kiev Oblast, became sister cities.

At the Palace of Youth in Moscow, the pilgrims met with the capital city's coreligionists, as well as envoys from many of the country's communities, in order to carry out the introduction of the scroll of the Torah which had been presented as a gift to their compatriots. In the crowded hall, one could hear the greetings of foreign

followers of the cult, and the heads of the diplomatic missions from the USA, Canada and other countries

Eye-witnesses and participants of this holiday, with its remarkable wisdom, brought down to us from the depths of the centuries, with its fiery, happy dances, when, according to immemorial tradition, children who have barely learned to walk and honorable grey-bearded elders are taken by the hand, became convinced that

finally the renaissance of Jewish culture and religious tradition had actually begun.

Not to forget the shining eyes of the Kiev schoolchildren who had come especially, with business cards from a Jewish general education school with instruction "in the language"—almost the first to be born again here since the twenties. Both the holiday and the school are good signs of the time.

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